

**A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS : THE
CONCEPT OF GOD IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
ANGLO-AMERICAN PROCESS PHILOSOPHY**

William Collins

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



1983

Full metadata for this item is available in
St Andrews Research Repository
at:

<http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/>

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

<http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13856>

This item is protected by original copyright

ABSTRACT

The concept of God as it is set forth in Charles Hartshorne's panentheism is undoubtedly influenced by the work of Alfred North Whitehead. This is generally acknowledged. What is not fully appreciated, or at least has not been systematized, is that Whitehead's philosophy was not radically novel, but belonged to a particular philosophical perspective, namely British neo-realism. Whitehead's roots in British neo-realism can be demonstrated by a comparative study which includes contemporaries of Whitehead who also belonged to the neo-realistic school. Such a study demonstrates that Samuel Alexander, C. Lloyd Morgan and Whitehead all had similar viewpoints concerning such matters as ultimate reality, a theory of emergence, the dipolarity of nature, and God. Thus, an affinity of thought in these philosophers can be clearly seen. It is therefore the case that Whitehead's influence on Hartshorne was not merely the influence of one man but was also the influence of the philosophical perspective to which that one man belonged, namely British neo-realism. Consequently, Whitehead's influence on Hartshorne resulted in an affinity of thought not only in two men, but also in two philosophies, British neo-realism and American panentheism. This research systematically sets forth this affinity in these two schools of thought.

Both British neo-realism and American panentheism

ProQuest Number: 10166525

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10166525

Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

belong to the wider context of Anglo-American process philosophy. This philosophical perspective is found under examination to be a synthesis of realism and idealism. Thus the British neo-realists, Alexander, Morgan and Whitehead qualify their realism by retaining the concept of "mind" as central to their cosmology. All three philosophers expound a panpsychistic view of the universe. In America, Hartshorne's panentheism is likewise panpsychistic in viewpoint, and is also a synthesis of realism and idealism. The major influences on Hartshorne were Whitehead and William Ernest Hocking, the American idealist. Hartshorne's panentheism may then best be understood as a synthesis of British neo-realism (from Whitehead) and American idealism (from Hocking).

On the basis of the metaphysical principles of process philosophy, we must conclude that the God who is presented is finite. In conjunction with this, while the process concept of God allows explanation for the temporal process, it allows no explanation for temporal or contingent existence. While such must be regarded as a deficiency, nonetheless the process philosophers rightly remind us of the importance of the topic concerning the nature of God.

CERTIFICATE

We certify that William Collins has fulfilled the conditions of the resolution of the University Court, 1967, No. 1, and that he is qualified to submit this thesis in application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Dr. G. B. Hall,
St. Mary's College,
University of St. Andrews.

Professor D. W. D. Shaw,
St. Mary's College,
University of St. Andrews.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the following thesis is based on the results of research carried out by myself, that it is my own composition and that it has not previously been presented for a higher degree. The research was carried out at the University of St. Andrews under the supervision of Dr. G. B. Hall and Professor D. W. D. Shaw.

A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS:
THE CONCEPT OF GOD IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
ANGLO-AMERICAN PROCESS PHILOSOPHY.

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty
of the Department of Divinity
of the University of St. Andrews

In Application for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy



By
William Collins

Th 9804

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----------|
| INTRODUCTION | Page 1 |
| Significance and Purpose of the Study | |
| Résumé of Related Literature | |
| Definitions, Assumptions and Limitations | |
| Plan of the Thesis | |
| CHAPTER | |
| I. SAMUEL ALEXANDER: God in Process Towards Deity | 15 |
| II. C. LLOYD MORGAN: God as Existent Ideal Involving the World Process | 37 |
| III. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD: Dipolar Theism . . . | 62 |
| IV. CHARLES HARTSHORNE: Surrelative Panentheism . | 119 |
| V. WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING: An American Influence on Hartshorne | 189 |
| VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: | 206 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 216 |

INTRODUCTION

To describe the twentieth century as an age in search of God would, no doubt, be ~~inacur~~^{ate} and somewhat optimistic. Nonetheless, the current century could perhaps be described as an age in search of the meaning of "God". This quest has been and is being conducted not only by linguistic analysts but also by philosophers and philosophical theologians who are willing to concede not only the possibility, but also the necessity, of metaphysical studies. Such metaphysicians hold that questions concerning the existence and nature of God and his relationship to the world remain vital, and that to these questions some answer should at least be attempted.

Among those philosophers who do accept the existence of God, the answers concerning his nature and relationship to the world vary according to the metaphysical model chosen as the foundation or framework upon which the concept of God can be erected. In the twentieth century a prevailing metaphysical model has been that of evolution, and within this evolutionary perspective the process

philosophers and theologians have played, and continue to play a major role in the great debate concerning the nature of God. Such is particularly the case in the United States of America where the work of Whitehead and Hartshorne has attracted much attention. In Great Britain the process viewpoint has thus far gained relatively few adherents, this in spite of the fact that much of the background to the current discussion in process circles lies in early twentieth century British philosophy, specifically that perspective known as neo-realism.¹ Among these realists was Alfred North Whitehead who produced his major metaphysical works after taking up residency in the United States.

Significance and Purpose of the Study

As a study in the history of ideas, this research will demonstrate the affinity of thought in American panentheism and the earlier British neo-realism. That Hartshorne, a panentheist, is indebted to Whitehead is admitted by all, including Hartshorne himself. What is generally overlooked is that Whitehead's influence on

¹The term "neo-realism" or "new realism" is used to distinguish the realism of the early twentieth century from earlier types of realistic philosophies. See William S. Sahakian, History of Philosophy (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968), pp. 292-298; Dagobart D. Runes, ed., Dictionary of Philosophy (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1979), p. 209.

American philosophy is not just the influence of one man, but rather the influence of the philosophical milieu in which that one man's philosophy had its roots and from which it developed. Whitehead himself recognized the similarity of his thought to that of the other British realists, but the consequent affinities in American panentheism and British neo-realism have not been appreciably recognized or at least never systematized. That the "ancestry" of American process thought lies in the work of such British neo-realists as Samuel Alexander and C. Lloyd Morgan is recognized by Norman Pittenger. However, Pittenger confines his very brief remarks on the topic to an appendix--previously in lecture form--in one of his books.¹ It will be the purpose of this research to systematize this relationship of thought in these two philosophical perspectives. The methodology will be as follows: since Hartshorne's indebtedness to Whitehead is already accepted, this study will expound Whitehead's thought in the particular environment of British neo-realism. This will be accomplished by examining the metaphysics of two other British realists, Samuel Alexander and C. Lloyd Morgan, and comparing their work to that of Whitehead. These two are chosen specifically for several

¹Norman Pittenger, God in Process (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1967), p. 97.

reasons. First of all, they are selected because, like Whitehead, they expounded a realist metaphysics, with the emphasis here on the word "metaphysics". Such is not the case with all of the British neo-realists. Some, in rejecting the idealist metaphysics which dominated the philosophical scene in Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century, rejected also any metaphysics and turned their attention to the pursuit of other matters, including linguistic analysis. Others, including Alexander and Morgan, sought to replace the idealist metaphysics with a realist metaphysics, still believing that philosophy had a significant part to play in hopefully supplying answers to important questions.

Secondly, Alexander and Morgan are selected for this study because not only did they share an interest with Whitehead in metaphysics, but they also had in common with him an interest in setting forth a concept of God within the context of their metaphysical realism. Thus, as we examine the concept of God in the writings of Alexander and Morgan, we will see that Whitehead's work was not totally novel, representing a radical departure from the philosophy of his day, but was rather the outgrowth of a particular philosophical perspective, namely British neo-realism.

Thirdly, Alexander and Morgan are also chosen for

this research because they were contemporaries of Whitehead. As such, the views of all three men appearing in close proximity to one another demonstrate a dominant theme, or at least a very active one, on the British philosophical scene. It is not, therefore, being claimed that Whitehead was influenced directly or solely by Alexander and Morgan; what will be shown is that all three men shared a common perspective, each no doubt influencing the other. Whitehead's direct references in his writings to Alexander undoubtedly show some influence which the latter had on Whitehead's thinking. Indeed, Alexander reportedly said that he felt he had "rung the bell" for Whitehead and conceded that Whitehead had gone beyond his own formulations. To Whitehead was granted the great privilege of becoming the "bridge" that crossed the Atlantic, where his British realism took root in the American soil and produced philosophical fruit which greatly influenced those who followed. This influence was and is most clearly seen in the work of Charles Hartshorne and his concept of God. Thus, while Hartshorne speaks of others who have inspired his work, and justly so, this research will trace a continuity of thought from the British neo-realism of the nineteen twenties to the American panentheism of the present day.¹

¹However, the philosophy of the American idealist, William Ernest Hocking, will be reviewed in light of his influence on Hartshorne.

Hartshorne, possibly more so than any other single individual, has attempted to consistently use the tenets of process philosophy in his concept of dipolar theism and the implications of that concept for God's relationship to the world, such relationship being panentheistic. Whether consistency has been truly achieved by Hartshorne is a matter which requires further study and discussion.

Résumé of Related Literature

As intimated above, this research will be concerned primarily with the affinity of thought in British neo-realism and Hartshorne's panentheism, particularly as he sets it forth in his three books entitled Reality as Social Process, Man's Vision of God, and The Divine Relativity. The background material to Hartshorne's thought will be taken from the following works: Space, Time and Deity by Samuel Alexander; Emergent Evolution by C. Lloyd Morgan; and Process and Reality by Alfred North Whitehead. The research will thus concentrate on an exposition of primary sources.

Definitions, Assumptions and Limitations

Although detailed definitions will be given in the body of the text where necessary, it is perhaps appropriate at this point to comment on some of the terms which will be used very frequently in this thesis.

The term "process philosophy" will be used to refer to that metaphysical viewpoint which, as opposed to a philosophy of substance, emphasises "becoming" rather than "being" and stresses that ultimate reality, rather than being static is in a state of flux or dynamic process. This process is "social" in the sense that it is brought about by inter-relationships among actual entities, or occasions. Such inter-relationship among actual entities is termed an "event". The term "actual entities" refers to the "final real things of which the world is made up." One is tempted to regard them as the basic building blocks from which the universe is constructed, but this can leave the impression that the actual entities are substances. They are basic, there being nothing more real behind them, but an actual entity is not a substance; it is a process, specifically a process of feelings, an individual unit of becoming. Each actual entity or occasion is "dipolar" indicating two aspects, the physical pole and the mental pole. In other words, from the viewpoint of process philosophy the universe is panpsychistic. This dipolarity applies to all actual entities without exception, from the least to the greatest, that is God. The expression "dipolar theism" will therefore refer to the point of view that God has two "poles", one primordial and the other consequent. As primordial, God is regarded as being

infinite, eternal, actually deficient and unconscious. As consequent, God is held to be finite, temporal, fully actual and conscious. This consequent nature of God is derived from his relationship to the world.

To some, dipolar theism finds its natural conclusion in the doctrine of panentheism. The term "panentheism" was first used by Krause¹ and in recent years has been revived by Hartshorne and others. "Panentheism" is the transliteration of the Greek words pan (all or everything), en (in) and theos (God), and thus refers to the theological formulation that all things, that is, all finite existents, are literally included in the being of God. However, although God is said to contain the world, he is also said to transcend it in some respect. The distinction between God and the world is that of whole and part. Although the world is in God, God is more than the world. The world represents only one aspect of God; there is another aspect of God which is not the world, but which transcends it. Thus, panentheism is a specific type of dipolar theism. As stated above, dipolar theism refers to the theory that God has two "poles", his consequent nature being derived from his relationship to the world. In dipolar theism this relationship need not mean that God includes the world

¹Arnulf Zweig, "Krause, Karl Christian Friedrich." The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), IV, 363-365.

as part of himself. In panentheism, however, the aspect of God which is related to the world is related to it by means of literally including it in the being of God. In panentheism, God is all-inclusive, but is more than the universe he includes; that universe is only one aspect of God and in another aspect he transcends it. Thus panentheism is to be clearly distinguished from pantheism in which the world and God are identical, and also from theism in which the world is not included in God. Throughout this work, the words "panentheism", "pantheism" and "theism" will be used as here defined.

This writer assumes the validity of metaphysics. This assumption, of course, would hardly go unchallenged in the present philosophical climate. Especially is this true in Britain with its background of logical positivism and its emphasis upon linguistic analysis. Further, since this particular study has to do with the concept of God--a meaningless concept according to many--perhaps a few additional words are necessary in justification of the approach adopted here. First of all, the criteria devised by the positivists (or logical empiricists as they are sometimes called) by which all metaphysics and theology are regarded as meaningless have had to undergo several changes since their inception. Such changes have been necessary but embarrassing to the positivists

because the criteria chosen not only "eliminated" metaphysics in general and God in particular but also several other matters dear to the hearts of the empiricists. Further embarrassment resulted when it was pointed out that the verification principle of the positivists was, by its own definition, meaningless. Thus, in recent years the logical empiricists have now opted for a "falsifiability principle". The necessary limits of this writing will not allow for discussion of the continuing debate concerning the falsifiability principle. However, suffice it to say that the empiricists have been unable to demonstrate conclusively that metaphysics and theology cannot be viable pursuits. Of course, the empiricists may choose not to "indulge" in metaphysics, but it seems a little presumptuous to attempt to bind such on others who do not find the ever-changing criteria of the empiricists convincing.

Of course, logical positivism is no longer the threat that it used to be. However, the general view of empiricism still persists. Even here, however, it is recognized that a single methodology does not suffice for all disciplines. For example, empiricists allow methodological distinction in the realm of mathematics, where their empirical criteria simply do not apply. Now, if the area of study determines method, why is this not true in the

theological disciplines? If mathematics cannot be limited to the empirical method, why should the study of the nature of God be so limited? Particularly is this true if God in any sense transcends the empirical realm. To insist that statements about God are meaningless, or ought to be made only within the confines of empirical observation, is simply to beg the question.

Another problem with the rejection of metaphysics, whatever the source, is the accompanying rejection of important questions. For example, there are still many who believe that the questions, "Is there a God?", "Why is there something rather than nothing?" and "What is ultimately real?" are significant and demand attention. Of course, no claim is made that any one metaphysical system supplies undisputed answers. The point being made is that the questions are important, one might say fundamental to human consciousness. These questions, like the proverbial cat, keep coming back and it is the realm of metaphysics, including philosophical theology, which deals with such ever-recurring issues. Within the context of this metaphysical and cosmological approach, process philosophy and theology--still minority viewpoints--seek to be heard.

This work is not a thesis on the theory of reality (either in terms of ontology or cosmology) but will deal

with such where necessary to supply clarification for discussion with reference to the meaning of "God". The research will not be concerned with reasons for belief in the existence of God, but will deal with recent discussion concerning the nature or attributes of God.

Plan of the Thesis

This research will consist of six chapters, the first three of which will deal with those aspects of the respective philosophies of Alexander, Morgan and Whitehead which were seemingly influential in laying the foundation of a later panentheism, and chapter four will present Hartshorne's panentheistic view.

Chapter I will set forth the views of Alexander which pertain to this study. These will include (1) his concept of Space-Time; (2) his theory of emergence; (3) his emphasis on correspondence, that is that something corresponding to mind exists at every level of being; and (4) his view of God and Deity and the distinction he draws between them.

Chapter II will emphasise the pertinent points in the philosophy of Morgan. These will comprise (1) his view of reality; (2) his emphasis on emergence; (3) his theories of involution, dependence and correlation; and (4) his concept of God.

Chapter III will stress the features of Whitehead's

metaphysics which proved to be so influential in Hartshorne's thinking. After brief consideration of developments in Whitehead's thought, attention will be directed towards (1) his view of reality as constituted by actual entities; (2) the dipolar nature of these actual entities; (3) the consequent view of the universe as panpsychistic; and (4) his concept of God as dipolar. Questions will be raised concerning the nature of Whitehead's God and his relationship to the world, and specifically two matters will be discussed: (i) Is God an actual entity or a series of actual entities? And (ii) is the world included in God, that is, does Whitehead's view qualify as panentheism?

While it is not the purpose of this research to offer a major critique of process thought, these first three chapters will be concluded with a brief examination of the philosophy presented, and chapter III will, in addition, compare the respective viewpoints of Alexander, Morgan and Whitehead, drawing particular attention to similarities rooted in their common perspective of British neo-realism. Within the framework of our study in the history of ideas, these brief critiques are significant insofar as they add to our understanding of process concepts.

Chapter IV will present Hartshorne's dipolar theism

and will emphasise similarities to, and differences from Whitehead. Attention will be directed towards Hartshorne's view of (1) God as dipolar; (2) God as a temporal series of actual entities; and (3) God as including the world, that is the doctrine of panentheism. Again, a brief critique will be offered.

The research will thus have traced some continuity of thought from the concept of Alexander's correspondence to Morgan's correlation, Whitehead's dipolar theism and Hartshorne's surrelative panentheism.

However, although the research will thus have accomplished its goal of demonstrating and systematizing the affinity of thought in British neo-realism and Hartshorne's panentheism, any serious study of Hartshorne would benefit by taking into consideration the influence of the American idealist, William Ernest Hocking. Chapter V of the thesis will therefore be given over to a brief statement of Hocking's thought, particularly with reference to his concept of God, a concept to which Hartshorne expresses some indebtedness.

Chapter VI will summarise the major points in the research and will give the conclusions of the author of this study.

CHAPTER ONE

SAMUEL ALEXANDER: GOD IN PROCESS TOWARDS DEITY

As stated in the introduction, it will be necessary to give some attention to the respective theories of reality of these philosophers in order to appreciate more fully the concepts of God which they advocate. Such is certainly the case with Samuel Alexander and his theory of Space-Time as ultimate reality. Indeed Alexander himself emphasises that, in his view, all the vital problems of philosophy can be understood and solved only when a proper concept of Space and Time and their relationship to each other is comprehended.¹ Therefore to Alexander's theory of Space-Time we now direct our attention.

For Alexander, Space and Time are not separate facts to be considered as isolated from each other but can only be understood within the context of their interdependence. That is, "there neither is Space without Time, nor Time without Space. . . . Space is in its very nature temporal and Time spatial."² It is therefore more accurate to

¹Samuel Alexander, Space, Time and Deity (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1920), Vol. I, p. 35.

²Ibid., p. 44.

think of a single entity, Space-Time, although we shall notice later that each aspect of this dual entity has a significant and somewhat divergent part to play in the concept of emergence and the doctrine of God.

However, can one really describe Space-Time as an "entity"? It is a fundamental tenet of Alexander's metaphysics that Space-Time is an entity and cannot be regarded as merely relational. By the "relational" view of Space-Time Alexander refers to the doctrine which declares "Space and Time to consist of relations between things or entities, these entities with their qualities coming first, and Space and Time are then respectively the order of co-existence and succession of entities."¹ This view is emphatically rejected by Alexander and, as the basis of his metaphysics, he offers an alternative theory as follows:

Another hypothesis as to the connection between things or events and the Space and Time they occupy places in is that Space and Time are not merely the order of their coexistence or succession, but are, as it were, the stuff or Matrix (or matrices) out of which things or events are made, the medium in which they are precipitated and crystallised; that the finites are in some sense complexes of space and time.²

For Alexander, then, Space-Time is the "nurse of becoming".³ In other words, whereas in the relational view entities with their qualities appear first and only

¹Ibid., p. 37.

²Ibid., p. 38.

³Ibid., p. 331.

then do Space and Time have any significance as the framework in which the events occur, in Alexander's metaphysics Space-Time "logically, and in fact, precedes finite things which are differentiations of that stuff."¹ But Space-Time itself is not material, that is does not possess materiality; it is anterior to matter.²

Of what, then, does Space-Time consist? Alexander's reply is that Space-Time is composed of metaphysical elements which he terms point-instants or pure events. These point-instants are distinguished within the matrix of Space-Time by the employment of "intellectual construction" which goes beyond what can be learned through sense.³ By the introduction of these intellectual constructions "we may distinguish points within Space which again are not independent but continuous."⁴ In a similar manner, within Time which is experienced as continuous, being a duration of the successive, it is possible to distinguish connected parts which are termed moments or instants.⁵ Alexander emphasises the matter thus:

Space and Time then are presented to us as infinite and continuous wholes of parts. I shall call these parts points and instants, availing myself of the conceptual description of them, and meaning by their connectedness or continuity at any rate that between any two points or instants another can be found. . . . This is a way of saying that the points and instants are not isolated.⁶

¹Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 48, 49.

²Ibid., p. 49.

³Ibid., Vol. I, p. 39.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 40.

⁶Ibid., pp. 43, 44.

Indeed the nature of these elements is such that points cannot be isolated from instants nor vice-versa; "There are no such things as points or instants by themselves. There are only point-instants or pure events. . . . The real existence is Space-Time, the continuum of point-instants or pure events."¹ The relation of these point-instants or pure events to one another is described by Alexander as "social". "There is a society of instants which are minds established through their connections in space."²

It is important to recognize that just as Space-Time itself is not material, neither are the point-instants. However, although they lack materiality they are nonetheless real and are to be regarded "not as physical elements like the electrons, but as metaphysical elements, as being the elementary constituents of Space-Time or Motion."³

The above quotation equates Space-Time with Motion and Alexander indeed stresses this equivalence. We have already seen at least the suggestion of such a doctrine in Alexander's emphasis upon the connectedness or continuity of Space-Time constituted by point-instants which are also termed the "elements of motion."⁴ Space-Time is therefore a system of motions and to speak of a "vast entity Motion . . . is to do the same thing as to speak of Space-Time."⁵ In other words, ultimate reality is dynamic or in process.

¹Ibid., p. 48.

⁴Ibid.

²Ibid., Vol II, p. 41.

⁵Ibid., p. 62.

³Ibid., Vol. I, p. 325.

From this ultimate reality of Space-Time constituted by point-instants spring forth the empirical existents. These existents are groupings of point-instants, "crystals in that matrix. Only whereas a crystal may be separated from its matrix, existents never can; they remain swimming in the medium of Space-Time."¹ This conception of existents emerging from and in Space-Time is basic to Alexander's metaphysics and we shall return to it shortly. Before doing so, however, it is necessary at this time to comment on the categories as set forth in Alexander's system and how they relate to Space-Time itself and to the empirical existents.

For Alexander, the categories are the a priori or non-empirical characters which pervade all empirical existents without exception. These categorial features such as identity, existence, substance, relation and causality are not contributed by the mind as per Kant, but are the "fundamental properties or determinations of Space-Time itself, not taken as a whole, but in every portion of it."² The categories, then, are the simplest characters of Space-Time and no empirical existent is exempt from them; they apply to "everything empirical, everything which is not the whole of Space-Time but a part of it."³

From the preceding quotations it is obvious that, in Alexander's view, Space-Time as a whole is not subject to

¹Ibid., p. 183.

³Ibid., p. 324.

²Ibid., p. 189.

the categories. Such is the case because Space-Time itself, although the source of the categories is not, in actual fact, an existent. In the words of Alexander,

the source of the categories is not itself subject to the categories. . . . They apply in our conception of the matter to the empirical things which are special configurations in Space-Time and because they are such, but they do not apply to Space-Time itself. Space-Time does not exist but is itself the totality of all that exists. Existence belongs to that which occupies a space-time. . . . Space-Time therefore does not exist but it is existence itself, taken in the whole.^{1, 2}

This particular concept of applying the categories to all empirical existents but not to Space-Time itself has significant implications for Alexander's doctrine of God.

We must now return to a matter which was referred to only in passing earlier, namely the emergence of empirical existents from the matrix of Space-Time. By referring to qualities and qualitized existents as "emergents" Alexander emphasised the novelty which each new quality possessed, as opposed to mere "resultants" which are wholly explicable in terms of their antecedents.³ The simplest statement

¹Ibid., pp. 337, 338.

²There is a strange similarity between Alexander's concept of Space-Time, and Tillich's concept of God. For Tillich, God is not "a being" but "being-itself" and thus cannot be subject to the categories which can be applied only to finite beings. It is not so much that God exists; He is existence itself. See Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 235 ff.

³Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, Vol II, p. 14.

of Alexander's concept of emergence is that from Space-Time itself there emerged, by the complex groupings of point-instants, first of all matter with its qualities, then life in its multiple forms, and eventually mind. Each of these empirical qualities is built upon the basis of the preceding quality but possesses some new attributes not explicable on the basis of the nature of the preceding quality alone. In other words life is also material but not merely material, and mind although also vital is not merely vital.¹ Each new and more advanced quality appears as the consequence of more and more complex groupings of pure events or point-instants, the elements of motion, the dynamic factors constitutive of ultimate reality. Needless to say, since in this view the nature of reality is dynamic, the process of bringing forth new empirical qualities continues. "There is a nisus in Space-Time which, as it has borne its creatures forward through matter and life to mind, will bear them forward to some higher level of existence."² In Alexander's metaphysics the next level to appear beyond the empirical quality of mind is deity, also an empirical quality.³ We shall examine this quality of deity shortly when we analyze Alexander's concepts of God, deity and the distinction he draws between

¹Ibid., pp. 45, 46.

²Ibid., p. 346.

³Ibid., pp. 345, 347.

them.

Before turning to that, however, the question must be raised as to the cause of the generation of these empirical qualities. As has already been made clear, the complex grouping of point-instants supplies at least a partial answer, but it is only partial. Such complex collocation of pure events is only possible because of the nature of Time which is the productive or creative aspect of the dual entity Space-Time.

Empirical things come into existence, because Space-Time of its own nature breaks up into finites. . . . But in a special sense Time is the author of finitude, for it is the transition intrinsic to Time which in the first place makes motion possible, and secondly provides for the ceaseless rearrangements in Space through which groupings of motions are possible. Time could not do its work without Space; but, this being presumed, Time is the principle of motion and change. . . . Time is in truth the abiding principle of impermanence which is the real creator.¹

In Alexander's system it is evident that Time is the generator of qualities. Time is therefore productive or creative and, indeed, Alexander refers to Time as the "mind" of Space and Space the "body" of Time, once again emphasising the dual nature of Space-Time² Indeed this duality expressed analogously in terms of the mind-body relationship is universal in Alexander's metaphysics, applying not only to Space-Time as a whole, but also to every part of it, that is to every empirical existent.

¹Ibid., pp. 47, 48.

²Ibid., p. 38.

Stating that there is nothing really unusual in this hypothesis since the conception of a world-soul is an old and familiar one, Alexander nonetheless seeks to assure us that he does not mean that Time is mind "or any lowest degree of mind."¹ He is speaking only of that which corresponds to mind at lower levels of existence and stresses this correspondence as follows:

I mean that in the matrix of all existence, Space-Time, there is an element Time which performs the same function in respect of the other element Space as mind performs in respect of its bodily equivalent. The points of Space have no consciousness in any shape or form, but their instants perform to them the office of consciousness to our brains. . . . Our hypothesis is merely that alike in the matrix of finite things and in all finite things there is something of which, on the highest level we know of finite existents, mind is the counterpart or correspondent.²

While stressing that this is a theory of correspondence and his use of language is metaphorical, Alexander yet insists that all finite existence is in a certain sense animated³ and that "in every finite there is one element corresponding to body in ourselves and another corresponding to mind."⁴

In brief summary, thus far we have seen that from the base of this "animated" Space-Time, with Time as the creative aspect, there springs forth as a result of complex "social" groupings of point-instants or pure events a

¹Ibid., p. 43.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 69.

⁴Ibid., p. 334.

series of empirical existents which are "emergent" in that, at each new level there is true novelty of character, that is, empirical qualities which could not have been predicted on the basis of the nature of the lower or preceding qualities alone. The highest empirical quality which has thus far emerged is that quality which we know as mind, but reality is dynamic and the process of emergence continues. The next higher empirical quality to emerge will be, in Alexander's language, "deity" and to his concepts of God and deity we now direct our attention.

In Alexander's metaphysical approach, God is defined as "the being, if any, which possesses deity or the divine quality."¹ Given this definition, Alexander's methodology is to ask first of all whether there is a place in the world for the empirical quality of deity, and if so, it would then be possible to verify the reality of the being which possesses that quality, that is God.² As has already been noted, in Alexander's philosophy deity is the next higher empirical quality to mind, which the universe is in the process of bringing forth.³ Two facts need to be emphasised at this point. First, "deity" is a general description of what is actually a variable quality, "and as the world grows in time, deity changes with it."⁴ Alexander stresses that for any level of existence, deity

¹Ibid., p. 342.

²Ibid., p. 345.

³Ibid., p. 347.

⁴Ibid., p. 348.

is the next higher empirical quality. For example, "to creatures upon the level of life, deity is still the quality in front, but to us who come later this quality has been revealed as mind."¹ Thus, "deity" refers to that empirical quality, whatever it may be, which is the next to be revealed. Secondly, for those of us who live upon the level of mind "deity" can have no specific description. We must remain agnostic concerning the nature of deity, that is the next empirical quality to be revealed.² When that empirical quality of deity will be revealed it will be an emergent (as opposed to a resultant) and by definition could not possibly be predicted. For Alexander deity is the novel quality of the future and is thereby unknown and unknowable.

Having thus found a place for the quality of deity in his metaphysics, Alexander then turns to the question of God, the being, if any, which possesses deity. Is there such a being? Alexander's reply is that "God is the whole world as possessing the quality of deity. Of such a being the whole world is the 'body' and deity is the 'mind.'"³ Elsewhere Alexander confirms that the whole of Space-Time is God's body and states explicitly that "God in respect of his body is all-inclusive, and all

¹Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 353.

²Ibid., pp. 347, 349.

finities are included in him."¹ This all-inclusiveness of God is once again emphasised by Alexander when he says that "our minds, therefore, and everything else in the world are 'organic sensa' of God. All we are the hunger and thirst, the heart-beats and sweat of God."² Because God's body is the whole of Space-Time it is therefore infinite in extent and duration, that is omnipresent and eternal.³ But is infinitude applicable to God's deity? Alexander replies in the affirmative, stressing that this is the case because God's deity "represents" his body and must therefore also be infinite, this representation being physiological "like the representation on the brain of the different portions of the body which send nervous messages to the brain."⁴ Thus in Alexander's view, God is infinite in both his body and his deity.

Having thus argued for the infinitude of God, Alexander then proceeds to emphasise that the infinite God so described is non-existent! This point is so significant that we shall quote Alexander at length as follows:

We are now led to a qualification of the greatest importance. . . . The infinite God is purely ideal or conceptual. The individual so sketched is not asserted to exist. . . . As actual, God does not possess the quality of deity but is the universe as tending to that quality. This *nisus* in the universe, though not present to sense, is yet present to reflection upon experience. Only in this sense of straining towards deity can there be an infinite actual God. . . .

¹Ibid., p. 394.

²Ibid., p. 357.

³Ibid., p. 358.

⁴Ibid., p. 357.

Thus there is no actual infinite being with the quality of deity; but there is an actual infinite, the whole universe, with a *nisus* to deity.¹

But infinite deity is never attained and does not and can never exist. This is the case because the attainment of deity would make deity finite. Alexander explains,

Deity is an empirical quality like mind or life. Before there was mind the universe was straining towards infinite mind. But there is no existent infinite mind, but only many finite minds. Deity is subject to the same law as other empirical qualities and is but the next member of the series. . . . God as an actual existent is always becoming deity but never attains it. He is the ideal God in embryo.²

Another way of expressing the same thought is to say that God as the possessor of deity would be a qualitized infinite. But in Alexander's metaphysical system quality belongs only to finite complexes of space-time. Therefore God as possessor of infinite deity would be a meaningless concept and Alexander draws attention to this point when he states that "God is never thus realised in the contradictory form of an infinite qualitized individual, but he is in process towards this quality of deity."³ Thus, deity is never a present quality of God; deity always lies in the future and God is always in process towards deity.

The tenet of God's being in process is, of course,

¹Ibid., pp. 361, 362.

²Ibid., p. 365.

³Ibid., p. 394.

fundamental to Alexander's philosophy. Because of the nature of Space-Time itself, God's body, being the whole of Space-Time, is neither spaceless nor timeless and his deity also is "essentially in process and caught in the general movement of Time."¹ God is therefore the whole universe engaged in process towards the emergence of the new quality of deity.²

Since the empirical quality of deity emerges from the lower finites or preceding qualified existents, deity is thereby dependent upon such existents and, in Alexander's language, is "sustained"³ and indeed "created".⁴ If deity is thus created, then by what or whom is it created? Is God the creator and, if so, how is he related to deity? Alexander's response is to state that God, taken as the whole universe in process is creative but that his distinctive character of deity is not creative but created.⁵ However, Alexander qualifies this immediately and significantly by stressing that "it is, properly speaking, Space-Time itself which is the creator and not God."⁶ He continues,

God, then, like all things in the universe--for Space-time itself is not in the universe, whereas God, since his deity is part of the universe, is in it--is in the strictest sense not a creator

¹Ibid., p. 399.

²Ibid., p. 429.

³Ibid., p. 395.

⁴Ibid., p. 399.

⁵Ibid., p. 397.

⁶Ibid.

but a creature. . . . He is an¹ infinite creature of the universe of Space-Time.

It is clear, then, that for Alexander Space-Time is the creative factor--we have already seen his emphasis upon Time as the generative aspect of this dual entity--whereas God, in terms of both his body and deity, is in actual fact created. However, although God is created, Alexander insists that there is nonetheless a sense in which he is transcendent, namely by virtue of his deity which radically transcends all other qualified existents.² "God is thus immanent in a different respect from that in which he is transcendent. . . . God is immanent in respect of his body, but transcendent in respect of his deity."³ In further clarifying this transcendence, Alexander states that deity is that which is distinctive of God.⁴

In spite of holding to the doctrine that God has a transcendent aspect, Alexander nonetheless has committed himself to the view that God is a creature rather than creator and is dependent upon finite existents. Is God then dependent upon man in any sense? Alexander replies in the affirmative. "There is always the double relationship of need. If man wants God and depends upon him, God wants man, and is so far dependent."⁵ This depend-

¹Ibid., p. 398.

⁴Ibid., p. 394.

²Ibid., p. 395.

⁵Ibid., p. 386.

³Ibid., p. 396.

ency of God is further stressed when Alexander states that by our action we may affect God,¹ and that we help to maintain and sustain his nature.² The implication for religion and ethics is clear.

Accordingly in relation to conduct, religion does not so much command us to perform our duties with the consciousness that they are the commands of God, as rather it is religion to do our duty with³ the consciousness of helping to create his deity.

The emphasis is clear. If man is dependent upon God, God is also dependent upon man.

This interdependence is a consequence of God's all-inclusive nature. Given this all-inclusiveness, another result is that unvalues also exist in God. For example, with reference to evil, Alexander states that since the world is the body of God, evil cannot be dismissed from his nature.⁴ Similarly, pain is also experienced by God "in so far as God includes within his body the creatures which suffer pain."⁵ However, Alexander emphasises that moral evil, pain and all unvalues belong to the body of God but not to his deity; they exist in the immanent aspect of God but not in the transcendent aspect in which all values are conserved.⁶ Yet, neither in respect of his immanence nor his transcendence can God be described

¹Ibid., p. 387.

²Ibid., p. 388.

³Ibid., p. 399.

⁴Ibid., p. 414.

⁵Ibid., p. 425.

⁶Ibid., p. 419.

as good or evil, since terms of value apply only to finites.¹

If terms of value do not apply to God, neither do the categories apply. It is true that Alexander comments that the categories do apply to what he termed empirical infinities including the infinite deity.² However, as we have already seen, infinite deity does not exist and indeed cannot exist since deity is an empirical quality and quality belongs only to finite existents. Therefore in neither his immanent nor transcendent aspect is God subject to the categories. His body, being the whole universe of Space-Time, is not subject to them--we have already noted that only finite portions of space-time are subject to the categories--and his deity, always a *nisus* but never an accomplishment, cannot be subject to them.³

It is this admission that deity is never realised or accomplished which, in Alexander's own words "prevents⁴ the conception from being wholly theistical." In spite of this concession Alexander elsewhere insists that it is in respect of his deity that this conception of God is theistic.⁵ What is to be made of this apparent contradiction? The solution lies in recognizing that, for Alexander, deity represents God's transcendence and it

¹Ibid., p. 420.

⁴Ibid.

²Ibid., Vol. I, p. 324.

⁵Ibid., p. 394.

³Ibid., Vol. II, p. 364.

is this transcendent aspect of God which coincides with traditional theistic belief. However, this deity is never actualized in Alexander's metaphysics, and it is this lack of realization of deity which prevents the concept from being wholly theistic.

Alexander himself believed that his conception of God was in strict terms neither theistic nor pantheistic, but that in different respects it could be described as both.¹ In respect of God's body which is all-inclusive, all finites being included in him, he possesses "the totality which pantheism assigns to God."² But, as has already been noted, Alexander believed that within his speculative system deity gave to God the necessary transcendence to allow this conception of God to remain predominantly theistic. If Alexander is correct in his estimation that his concept of God belongs neither to theism nor pantheism--and we shall be obliged to return to this shortly--does it belong instead to panentheism? To this question we must now direct our attention.

It is undoubtedly the case that there are some process and panentheistic concepts contained within the speculative conception of God advanced by Alexander. For example, that ultimate reality is dynamic or in process and is constituted by pure events whose relationship with

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 395.

one another may be described as "social" has obvious affinity with the views of Whitehead and Hartshorne in their discussion of actual entities. Also, Alexander's emphasis upon emergence is certainly closely allied to the importance which Whitehead attaches to novelty. In addition Alexander's basic tenet that Space-Time as a whole and every part of it, that is every finite existent, has a dual nature expressed analogously in terms of the body-mind relationship clearly resembles Whitehead's and Hartshorne's concept of nature as dipolar. More specifically, Alexander's doctrine of God's having two aspects, one being his all-inclusive and therefore immanent body and the other his transcendent deity certainly bears a strong relationship to later panentheism. Again, Alexander's emphasis upon God's being created and his dependence upon man is language duplicated in later writers who were and are undoubtedly panentheists. Finally, Alexander's concession that unvalues exist in God's immanent aspect but not his transcendent aspect brings to mind the admissions of present day panentheists.

Does Alexander's concept of God then qualify as panentheism? In spite of the above similarities the answer must be in the negative. In panentheistic views, there is an eternal transcendent aspect of God which exists beyond

his all-inclusive immanent aspect, this transcendent aspect being what distinguishes panentheism from pantheism. It is true that Alexander argues at great length that God's deity is what is distinctive of him and is his transcendent aspect. But in reality this deity, as Alexander himself insists, is never attained and never can be attained. In Alexander's concept of God deity, that is God's transcendent aspect, is ideal but never actual; it is non-existent. We are compelled to draw the only logical conclusion; if God has no actual transcendence, then he must be wholly immanent. Alexander's concept of God must be regarded as pantheistic; it is a process view in which the logical conclusion is a God who is both temporal and sheerly immanent. It is this same lack of genuine transcendence which disqualifies Alexander's view not only from being panentheistic but also, as he himself admits, from being truly theistic. Of course, Alexander argues that his theological system cannot be equated with pantheism since God's deity makes him in some sense transcendent. It may also be argued that since deity is a variable quality, it is actualized with each new emergent quality which appears. However, each new quality is realised only in finite form, Alexander emphasising that there can be no qualified infinite. It is precisely this point which makes Alexander's God, as possessor of infinite deity, only an ideal but

never an actual reality. God, as actual is always finite. Infinite deity, that is God's transcendent aspect, is never attained and where there is no actual transcendence there is no ontological distinction between God and the world. Such is the case in the Space-Time universe of Samuel Alexander.

As noted in the introduction, it will be appropriate to conclude this chapter with some additional brief criticisms of Alexander's particular view of God.

First of all, it is clear that Space-Time is more ultimate than God himself. On the one hand Alexander states that all of Space-Time is the body of God; on the other hand it is conceded that God is an infinite creature of Space-Time. But if God is a creature he must be contingent, accidental rather than essential. God is not in control, but under control of factors other than himself.

Secondly, we have seen Alexander's insistence upon the mutual dependence of God and man. If we need God, he also needs us; we affect him and help create his deity. But all of these factors, dependence, need, being affected, are aspects of relatedness. However, we have noted that neither God's deity--which is never a present reality--nor his body--which is the universe as a whole--can be subject to the categories among which are the categories of relation and reciprocity. How can God be dependent

if the categories do not apply to him? This is a fundamental contradiction in Alexander's concept of God.

Thirdly, Alexander's rejection of God as creator leaves nothing in this metaphysical system which fulfills the requirement of the principle of sufficient reason. The question as to why anything should exist at all--even a quality-less Space-Time--remains unanswered; it admits no explanation. It is not surprising that later process writers would at least attempt to retain God as creative agent within their philosophical frameworks.

In conclusion, Alexander's conception of God contains certain problems which will be repeated in later writers to be discussed. We have concluded that in its logical outcome Alexander's doctrine is actually pantheistic rather than panentheistic. Nonetheless, some of his basic tenets and much of his language undoubtedly laid the groundwork for a later panentheism.

CHAPTER TWO

C. LLOYD MORGAN:

GOD AS EXISTENT IDEAL INVOLVING THE WORLD PROCESS

The evolutionary philosophy of Samuel Alexander, with its emphasis on emergence, has a strong affinity to the philosophical position of C. Lloyd Morgan. Morgan however was not uncritical of Alexander and it is therefore the case that there are some major differences in their respective speculative systems. In this chapter the philosophy of Morgan, as set forth in his work entitled Emergent Evolution, will be examined and his criticisms of Alexander and differences from him noted.

As will be recalled from chapter one, the base of Alexander's metaphysical system is a quality-less Space-Time which is anterior to matter and which is constituted by immaterial pure events or point-instants which are related to one another in a manner which in some sense can be termed social. Eventually qualities emerge because of the grouping and rearrangements of point-instants within the context of Time which, as the principle of impermanence, is productive or creative and is the generator of qualities.

This concept of Space-Time is rejected by Morgan on two counts. First of all he insists that primordial events

cannot be immaterial. He states, "I seek in vain for evidence that spatio-temporal relatedness does exist apart from physical events. I can pierce no deeper than events which, in their primordial form are not only spatio-temporal, but physical also."¹ Secondly, Morgan denies the creativity of Time. "I doubt" he writes, "whether the concept of the fluency of time, on which so much turns, will stand the test of philosophical criticism."² In other words, time is by its very nature successive, but this temporal succession neither necessitates nor implies creativity. In the language of Morgan, time is not "effective", that is, it does not supply sufficient reason for the emergence of qualities which make such a radical difference to the world in which they appear. This ineffectiveness of time will, as we shall see later, cause Morgan to look elsewhere for his explanation of emergence.

Having rejected Alexander's concept of an incorporeal Space-Time, Morgan sets forth his own view of emergent levels with matter as the lowest level or base. For Morgan, this matter is the physical world and from this basal level emerge in ascending order life, mind and reflective thought.³ Including the basal material level the natural systems described by Morgan are matter systems, life-

¹C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution (London: Williams and Norgate Ltd., 1927), p. 23.

²Ibid., p. 24.

³Ibid., p. 1.

matter systems and mind-life-matter systems.¹ As in other theories of emergence, including that of Alexander, natural events at the level of mind are "higher than those at the level of life, and these higher than the events at the level of matter."² In dealing with some events being "higher" than others, Morgan introduces his notion of involution and dependence. In explaining his concept of involution he writes,

When two or more kinds of events . . . as A, B and C, co-exist on one complex system in such wise that the C kind involves the co-existence of B, and B in like manner involves A, whereas the A-kind does not involve the co-existence of B, nor B that of C, we may speak of C, as, in this sense, higher than B, and B than A. Thus, for emergent evolution, conscious events at level C (mind) involve specific physiological events at level B (life), and these involve specific physico-chemical events at level A (matter). No C without B, and no B without A. No mind without life; and no life without "a physical basis."³

Morgan specifically emphasises his use of the word "involve" in the above passage. He continues, "I speak of events at any given level in the pyramid of emergent evolution as 'involving' concurrent events at lower levels."⁴ By "involution" it is clear that Morgan is referring to a given event (such as mind) involving the necessary co-existence of another event at a lower level (such as life).

In Morgan's philosophy, emphasis on "dependence" is no less essential than that on "involution".

¹Ibid., p. 22.

²Ibid., p. 15.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

In a physical system wherein life has emerged, the way things happen is raised to a higher plane. In an organism within which consciousness is emergent a new course of events depends on its presence. In a person in whom reflective thought is emergent behaviour is sustained at a higher level Strike out reflective consciousness and action is of a lower impulsive order. Strike out all guiding consciousness and behaviour is that appropriate to the level of life. Strike out life and the course of events drops down to the physical level. The new relations emergent at each higher level guide and sustain the course of events distinctive of that level, which in the phraseology I suggest depends on its continued presence.¹

Thus in Morgan's view, the concepts of involution and dependence are inextricably bound up with his theory of emergent levels. At any given level, higher events involve the necessary co-existence of lower events, while the lower events are guided and sustained by, and are dependent upon the higher events. This one-way direction of dependence in which the lower is always dependent upon the higher, but never the higher upon the lower, has significance for Morgan's concept of God which shall be discussed later.

Having glanced briefly at Morgan's theory of emergent levels--and we shall shortly examine this more closely--we now return to his view of the physical world as the base or lowest level in the scheme of things. Such a physical world Morgan accepts under "acknowledgment".² The notion of acknowledgment is vital to his philosophy

¹Ibid., p. 17.

²Ibid., pp. 24, 33.

and is defined by Morgan as "acceptance of that which is . . . not susceptible of logical proof or disproof, on the grounds that such acceptance gives consistency to a scheme otherwise incomplete."¹ With reference to the physical world, Morgan holds that its independent existence is not susceptible of proof under rigid philosophical criticism and that he therefore accepts such a world under acknowledgment "as part of a constructive scheme of emergent evolution."² Elsewhere he concedes that acceptance under acknowledgment goes beyond the positive evidence and this, also, will prove significant with reference to his statements concerning the existence of God.

If such acceptance of anything under acknowledgment goes beyond the positive evidence, how does Morgan reach this acknowledged physical world? He does so by following downwards the line of involution till he reaches what is, for his constructive philosophy, the "limiting concept", that is matter or the physical world.³ As we noticed earlier, the concept of involution refers to that which is involved as a necessary co-existent. Thus for Morgan, matter or the physical world is the lowest level of necessary co-existence with which and upon which higher events occur. It is important to recognize that the notion of

¹Ibid., p. 116.

²Ibid., p. 24.

³Ibid., p. 33.

involution does not represent an argument for the independent existence of the world; such a world, recognized as the basal limiting concept via involution is still only accepted under acknowledgment. Morgan emphasises that this acknowledgment of the world as an independent existent presents, for his philosophy, an escape from solipsism.¹

The world thus acknowledged by Morgan is physical but not merely physical; it is also psychical. While he seems to follow Alexander fairly closely at this point in the latter's emphasis upon "correspondence", that is something corresponding to "mind" applying throughout nature, Morgan objects to Alexander's use of the word "mind" in this context. Morgan prefers to accept the psycho-physical nature of the universe under his acknowledgment of "correlation". He writes,

Without subscribing to Mr. Alexander's doctrine of time as, in any sense, the mind of space--this my attitude towards spatio-temporal relatedness precludes--I fully accept unrestricted and universal correlation as an acknowledgment--avowedly speculative, and admittedly beyond positive proof (or disproof), but essential to my constructive philosophy of evolution. This means, for me, that there are no physical systems, of integral status, that are not also psychical systems; and no psychical systems that are not also physical systems. All systems of events are in their degree psycho-physical. Both attributes, inseparable in essence, are pervasive throughout the universe of natural entities.²

The above quotation makes clear that Morgan's view

¹Ibid., pp. 195, 196.

²Ibid., p. 26.

that all physical events have psychical or mental correlates, and that all mental events have physical correlates, is accepted by him under acknowledgment. Since such correlation goes beyond any positive evidence for it, why should such be postulated at all? Morgan responds, "Universal correlation is also part of my creed--assuredly beyond proof. . . . Should this also be accepted it annuls the 'fatal gulf' between the material and the immaterial aspects of the world."¹ In other words, the acceptance of correlation under acknowledgment provides an answer to the problem of psycho-physical dualism. It should, however, be emphasised that there is no causal relation between the physical and psychical attributes; it is strictly a matter of correlation.² Thus, in Morgan's view, the psychical attribute is not an explanation for, that is, is not the cause of new emergents.

The psycho-physical world accepted under acknowledgment is a world in constant process of change.

Events are always involved; and events imply change in the relation of terms. Even an electron . . . is an event; and an atom, for all its seeming stability, is a rhythmic whirl of events We must bear in mind, then, that relatedness, in the world at large and in everything therein, is au fond fluent and ever changing.³

Morgan, then, views reality as being in process of development,⁴ with relatedness as an essential feature of that

¹Ibid., p. 62.

²Ibid., p. 28.

³Ibid., pp. 66, 67.

⁴Ibid., p. 203.

reality. Relatedness is that which "obtains throughout . . . the pyramid of emergent evolution."¹

Within this ever-changing reality, as stated earlier, emergence occurs. Morgan draws the same distinction as Alexander with reference to emergents and resultants. Both men emphasise, under the concept of emergence, the incoming of the new. Under Morgan's scheme, examples are found in the advent of life, mind and reflective thought.² As noted earlier, Morgan does not include matter as an emergent; the physical world is not an emergent but is instead the necessary base or foundation upon which emergence takes place. In recognizing this philosophical position, one is almost compelled to raise the question of the origin of matter itself. For Alexander, it will be recalled that matter is itself an emergent which arises from a quality-less and non-material Space-Time. Morgan, as noted, rejects such a view and instead regards matter as the base for his theory of emergent evolution. Whence then matter? Is it eternal? As interesting as this question undoubtedly is, we shall delay dealing with it until later discussion concerning Morgan's concept of God.

Morgan's theory is a theory of levels and his world is a world of emergence, that is, with the emergence occurring upon the limiting concept of matter. In any theory of emergence, the question of "cause" must be raised, that

¹Ibid., p. 178.

²Ibid., p. 1.

is, what makes emergents emerge? As has been previously indicated, Morgan rejected Alexander's view of time as the effective generator of emergent qualities; temporal succession is not sufficient explanation of emergence.¹ Further, since in Morgan's theory of levels the psychical and physical are only correlates and there is no causal relation between them,² it is clear that in his speculative system the psychical attribute cannot be the cause of emergence in or from the physical or vice versa, nor can the higher events explain the existence or emergence of lower events. It is, of course, true that the lower events are dependent upon the higher but this dependence, as made clear by Morgan, refers to the higher events (such as mind) "guiding" or "sustaining" the lower events (such as matter or "body"), that is, the higher may influence the behaviour of the lower which co-exists with it under the concept of involution.³ But this dependence of the lower upon the higher does not refer to dependence for existence or emergence. Nor can the lower events explain the emergence of the higher events. If such were the case, the new qualities and relations would not be emergent at all, but would be merely resultant.

Since Morgan has eliminated time, psychical attri-

¹Ibid., p. 24.

²Ibid., p. 28.

³Ibid., p. 17.

butes, higher and lower events as causes of emergence, one may be tempted to question whether there is anything within his scheme of emergent evolution which could possibly be an explanation of emergence. In the absence of a specific cause of emergence within the system, one may have expected Morgan to do as many before and after him have done, namely appeal to the general theory of evolution as the explanation. However, this he refused to do. Morgan recognized that evolution is not an explanation of emergence but merely a "descriptive interpretation".¹

Is there anything, then, which will not merely interpret but will also explain the process of emergent evolution? Morgan answers in the affirmative by introducing his concept of Activity.² Morgan himself raises the question, "What makes emergents emerge?" and answers it by stating that there is "some Mind through whose Activity . . . the course of events is directed."³ For Morgan, this Mind or Spirit--he uses the words synonymously--is God "through whose Activity emergents emerge, and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed."⁴ Morgan chooses to emphasise the contrast between the explanations of emergence given in his own system and that of Alexander as follows:

¹Ibid., pp. 206, 207.

⁴Ibid., p. 36.

²Ibid., p. 32.

³Ibid.

For him [Alexander], as I understand, it is the inherent go of time that pushes events onwards. A doctrine that acknowledges a directive Activity in evolution explains also from above, accepting with its fitting form of piety, God who draws all things and all men upwards.¹

In Morgan's view, therefore, the world is in constant process of change and "ultimately all observable change is due to some form of Spiritual Activity."² God is the ultimate philosophical explanation.³

At this critical point in his metaphysical system, in the acceptance of the existence of God as an ultimate philosophical explanation, Morgan emphasises that this too is accepted under acknowledgment.⁴ This acknowledgment of God, for which there can be no positive proof, nor against which no disproof can be levelled, is founded upon philosophic considerations only, without scientific evidence or support, the proper attitude of science being that of agnosticism.⁵

Since by Morgan's own definition and concession, nothing accepted under the concept of acknowledgment can be proven true, why should God be acknowledged at all? Morgan gives four reasons for so doing. First of all, such an acknowledgment functions in his metaphysical system as the ultimate philosophical explanation as has al-

¹Ibid., p. 62.

⁴Ibid., pp. 61-2, 116.

²Ibid., p. 276.

⁵Ibid., pp. 2, 9.

³Ibid., p. 9.

ready been discussed. In other words, God supplies the explanation for process and emergence. Secondly, the acceptance of God under acknowledgment is supported by, although of course not proved by, the concept of dependence. In accordance with this concept, which theorizes that lower events are guided and sustained by, and are dependent upon higher events co-existing at the same level, Morgan speculates,

if . . . I follow upwards the line of "dependence" I again reach (for my constructive philosophy) a limiting concept--that of ultimate dependence in terms of which the whole course of emergent evolution is explained (not merely interpreted) within one consistent and balanced scheme. This, too, I accept under acknowledgment.¹

Thus for Morgan, just as the physical world is the limiting concept under "involution", so God is the limiting concept under "dependence".

Thirdly, Morgan accepts the existence of God under acknowledgment by introducing a pragmatic element into his philosophy which otherwise emphasises the importance of coherence. He states that belief in God has pragmatic endorsement in that it has profound influence in the practical guidance of human conduct.² Elsewhere, emphasising the same point, Morgan states that the acknowledgment of God is a "postulate" which is accepted on the ground that it "works".³

Fourthly, there is also an intuitive and subjective

¹Ibid., p. 33.

³Ibid., p. 299.

²Ibid., pp. 61, 62.

element involved in the recognition of the Activity of God under acknowledgment.

Within us, if anywhere, we must feel the urge, or however it be named, which shall afford the basis upon which acknowledgment of Activity is founded. What then does it feel like? Each must answer for himself, fully realising that he may misinterpret the evidence. . . . To me it feels like a drawing upwards through Activity existent at a higher level than that to which I have attained. Of course, I am quite ready to admit that those who do have this feeling of being attracted by the Ideal and who build an explanation thereon may be mistaken. Hence my reiterated speaking of acknowledgment.¹

Again, Morgan stresses that unless we "intuitively" enjoy God's Activity within us, we can have no immediate knowledge of Him as the source of our own existence and of emergent evolution.²

It is evident that, although Morgan concedes that belief in the existence and Activity of God can never be proved since it is accepted under acknowledgment, he nonetheless offers rational (with emphasis on coherence), pragmatic and intuitive elements in defence of such acknowledgment.

Morgan specifically justifies his acknowledgment of God on the basis that this acknowledgment lends coherence to his scheme which aims at constructive consistency.³ Allowing Morgan this acknowledgment, let us examine his

¹Ibid., p. 208.

²Ibid., p. 301.

³Ibid., p. 33.

concept of God a little more closely.

First of all, it must be pointed out that what Morgan here acknowledges is, in his estimation, "a really existent Ideal" just as the physical world which he also accepts under acknowledgment is regarded as existing independently of its being perceived.¹ Morgan contrasts his own position with that of Alexander whose concept of God is such that God, as actually possessing deity, does not exist.² As emphasised in the previous chapter, Alexander viewed God as an ideal in the process of becoming, that is in process towards, but never attaining infinite deity. Morgan, on the other hand, stresses that what he acknowledges is an Ideal which actually exists.

Further, in Morgan's scheme of things God, as cause of and explanation for emergence does not himself emerge. Morgan states explicitly that Mind--his synonym for Spirit or God--"as directive of emergent evolution does not emerge."³ In this instance also, Morgan adopts a position at variance with Alexander, as the latter viewed God himself as emerging from, and being an infinite creature of, Space-Time. However, although in Morgan's view God does not emerge, he is progressively unfolded and this "progressive unfolding is a process 'in time.'"⁴ Thus God is manifested in natural events and in a temporal process. Morgan himself

¹Ibid., pp. 208, 209.

²Ibid., p. 34.

³Ibid., p. 37.

⁴Ibid., p. 112.

immediately raises the question, "Does the Activity which is thus manifested subsist sub specie temporis or sub specie aeternitatis?"¹ His response is an emphatic vote for the latter alternative. After conceding that his belief in the existence of the physical world, of God, and of unrestricted correlation is accepted under acknowledgment, he states,

It is within such an acknowledged frame of reference, with its three-fold relatedness of involution, dependence, and correlation, that world-events take their course "in space and time."² But dependence on God is sub specie aeternitatis.

Thus in Morgan's view God possesses both temporal and non-temporal features. The temporal is the manifestation of his Activity, the progressive unfolding of himself in the world process; the non-temporal is that aspect upon which everything else, including the world process, depends. The former represents God's immanence; the latter represents his transcendence.³

Morgan therefore leaves the impression that God, in some sense, does transcend the world. However, with reference to this matter there may be some ambiguity. In one brief comment emphasising God's relationship to the world Morgan states, "Emphasis on relatedness still seems to be essential; and this is implied in both involution and de-

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 116.

³Ibid., pp. 208, 209.

pendence. Of God in isolation from the world . . . I can form no adequate conception."¹ Morgan had, as we have already seen, stressed the essential relatedness of natural events within the world process of space and time; in this brief statement there is at least the apparent suggestion that essential relatedness may also exist between God and the world. Since Morgan stresses that essential relatedness is implied in his doctrines of involution and dependence, we must pursue this matter a little further to determine in which ways, if any, either involution or dependence can be applied to God, or rather if God himself is subject to either involution or dependence.

It must be clear already that in Morgan's view God is not and cannot be dependent upon anything else. This is the case because in Morgan's theory of dependence, dependence is always upon the "higher", the "higher" not depending upon the "lower" but involving it. This again differentiates Morgan's view from that of Alexander who held that dependence was mutual, God depending on the world (and man in particular), and the world (and man in particular) depending upon God as in panentheism. However, as previously stated, such is not the case in Morgan's scheme. In his estimation dependence is a "one-way street" as it were, the lower events depending upon the higher, but never the higher upon the lower; the high-

¹Ibid., p. 299.

er events, however, do involve the lower events as necessary co-existents.

If God, then, is not subject to dependence, is he subject to involution, that is, does God involve the world as a necessary co-existent? In actual fact, this is another formulation of the question already raised earlier,¹ namely is matter just as eternal as God himself? It would seem that in answer to this question, three alternatives are possible: (1) that matter itself is not eternal but is an emergent from something else; (2) that matter is not eternal but was brought into existence, that is created, by God; and (3) that matter is eternal. With reference to (1) we have already seen that Morgan denied that matter is emergent. In his view, although life, mind and reflective thought are emergents, this emergence takes place from matter which, for Morgan, is the basal level, the limiting concept under involution. For Morgan, primordial events are material.² Matter is not an emergent. Concerning (2) Morgan makes no specific reference whatsoever. However, in light of his view that primordial events are physical and his concession that he can form no concept of God in isolation from the world, it would appear that he would also reject this second alternative. What then of option (3)? Regarding this possibility of the eternity of matter Morgan again makes no specific comment. How-

¹Supra, p. 37.

²Morgan, Ibid., p. 23.

ever, that this is at least the implication of his philosophical position is indicated by the following considerations. First of all, the eternity of matter seems to be implied in the theory of involution. It will be recalled that this concept refers to higher events involving lower events as necessary co-existents. Morgan, however, insists that under the theory of involution the physical world, that is matter, is the limiting concept. What, then, does matter "involve"? Nothing; it is the base. But if matter involves nothing else, then it requires nothing else as a necessary co-existent, and if nothing else is necessary to the existence of matter, then matter is self-existent or eternal. Secondly, if the first point is inconclusive on its own, it must be considered in the context of Morgan's view that primordial events are physical. Taken together, these two points state, in summary, that the primordial events were constituted by, or composed of matter and that matter itself required nothing else for its own existence. Self-existent matter, without beginning, seems to be the picture portrayed, that is, eternal matter. If the picture seemingly portrayed is accurate, then what is the relationship existing between this eternal matter and God? Does God involve the physical world? This possibility may be attacked on the basis that involution applies only to natural events occurring in

space and time. However, such limitation of the concept of involution to the world process may not be justified. It will be recalled that Morgan viewed the entire process of emergence as being dependent upon God. Therefore the concept of dependence at least is significant in terms of God's relationship to the world; why not also the concept of involution? Indeed, this seems to be the thrust of the brief passage with which this discussion began, that both dependence and involution are embraced in the relationship existing between God and the world, that is, God involving the world, and the world depending upon God. In this view it would seem that God and the world require each other, God involving the world as a necessary co-existent and the world process, that is the temporal course of events, depending upon God, that is, in the language of Morgan, being guided and sustained by him. This we regard as the meaning of Morgan's statement, "Emphasis on relatedness still seems to be essential; and this is implied in both involution and dependence. Of God in isolation from the world . . . I can form no adequate conception."¹

In view of this relationship in which God and the world process apparently require each other, can Morgan's view be described as a process philosophy and, more specifically, can it be regarded as being panentheistic?

¹Ibid., p. 209.

Certainly Morgan's philosophic scheme contains elements which are found in, or bear some affinity to both process and panentheistic concepts. His repeated emphasis on the world being in constant process of change; his stress upon the essential relatedness of the "events" within the world process; his affirmation that even the seemingly stable, such as the atom, is in actual fact a rhythmic whirl of events; all of these are positions endorsed by process thinkers. Not only so, but his theory of correlation in which he asserts that all systems of events contain both psychical and physical aspects, that both attributes are pervasive throughout the universe of natural entities, is seemingly parallel, if not identical, to the process viewpoint of nature itself as dipolar. In both Morgan's position and that of process philosophy the universe is panpsychistic. In addition, Morgan's use of the concept of God as an explanation for the world process was duplicated by process writers. For example Morgan, it will be recalled, stated that God draws all things and all men upwards; Whitehead affirms that actual entities go through a process of completion motivated by consequent, conceptual experience initially derived from God, a position to be discussed in the next chapter. Further, Morgan's statements which refer to God's being progressively unfolded in the temporal world process, but that this process it-

self is dependent upon God sub specie aeternitatis, are certainly extremely similar to the theories advanced by process and panentheistic philosophers. Also if, as seems to be the case, in Morgan's view God and the world process are essentially related, requiring each other--this being implied in the theories of involution and dependence--then this, too, is a fundamental tenet of the process and panentheistic positions. Therefore on the basis of these facts, together with the explication of them in this chapter, we must conclude that Morgan's metaphysical position truly belongs to the process perspective.

The question yet remains: Is Morgan's view of the relation between God and the world a panentheistic one? In this instance we believe that the answer must be in the negative. The basic tenet of panentheism, by definition, is that everything is in God; God is all-inclusive. Such cannot be conclusively demonstrated to be the case in Morgan's philosophy and, indeed, there are strong indications to the contrary. First of all, there is no explicit statement with reference to God's being all-inclusive. There is no language in Morgan indicating that the world process is literally a contingent aspect of God himself. But, it may be argued, is it not Morgan's view that God is "unfolded" in the temporal process? Yes, but this unfolding of God in the world is not, in Morgan's

metaphysics, a process whereby God grows or develops as in panentheism; instead it is "the unfolding of that which is enfolded; the rendering explicit of that which is hitherto implicit."¹ With additional reference to the world process, Morgan writes, "In the beginning the end was enfolded; but only through unfolding do we learn what was, from first to last, the nature of this enfolded end."² We wish to draw attention particularly to the expression "from first to last" in the above quotation. The conclusion, we believe, is clear: God is progressively manifested in the temporal process, but this unfolding is of that which is constant, which does not itself grow or develop. This conclusion finds confirmation in Morgan's explicit statement that "Mind"--his synonym for God--"as directive of emergent evolution does not emerge."³ In addition, Morgan's rejection of Alexander's view that God, as possessor of deity does not exist but is always "becoming", coupled with his own belief that God is a really existing Ideal, once again indicates that in Morgan's view God is not "caught up" in the temporal process. Therefore, if the temporal world process which, by definition, is growing and developing does not cause God to do the same, then the world process cannot be contained within God; and if

¹Ibid., pp. 111, 112.

²Ibid., p. 111.

³Ibid., p. 37.

the world is not contained within God, then Morgan's view cannot be considered as panentheistic. If it be argued that we have not considered the possibility that it is God's essence which does not change and that this may be the already existent Ideal of which Morgan speaks, we reply that Morgan himself makes no distinction between the essence and accidents of God, and that to read such panentheistic concepts into his writing is unwarranted.

If Morgan, then, is not a panentheist, what is his position? Morgan's view seems to result in a metaphysical dualism in which the psycho-physical universe is co-existent with God but not a part of him. This disqualifies Morgan's theory of reality not only from being panentheism but also from being pantheism inasmuch as God and the world are not identical. Is Morgan, then, a traditional theist? Some have held that this is the case, but to this conclusion we must take exception. In Morgan's theory of reality God and the world may be distinct, but there remains an ultimate metaphysical dualism. God may in Morgan's words be the "ultimate philosophical explanation" for the world process, but there still remains the "problem" of the world's very existence. God may cause emergence from the basal psycho-physical events, but as indicated in this chapter, the psycho-physical events themselves seem to be just as ultimate as God. This ultimate metaphysical dualism is contrary to the traditional concept in which God is responsible for the very existence of the world.

We conclude, therefore, that if Morgan be considered as a theist because of the distinction he draws between God and the world process, his position should be recognized as a limited theism in which God is, and always has been, confronted with a spatio-temporal realm not of his making but over which he can exert his influence. Thus Morgan's description of God as the ultimate philosophical explanation seems to be premature; something else requires explanation, the very existence of the finite entities in which process or change is taking place. As in Alexander, so in Morgan, there is no real sense of God as creator. We repeat here a comment we made in concluding the previous chapter. "The question as to why anything should exist at all . . . remains unanswered; it admits no explanation." This particular lacuna is not uncommon in process philosophy.

In conclusion, for Morgan belief in the existence of God is not a deduction from any closely reasoned argument; the concept of God is a postulate which, even if erroneous, lends coherence to the system. There is, therefore a presumption in favour of theism--or at least, as we have seen, a limited theism--but one may well be justified in at least raising the question as to whether such a limited theism is truly explanatory of the universe in which we live.

In terms of explaining the process pervading reality, Alexander assumed Time as the creative element, subordinat-

ing God to the position of being a creature of Space-Time. Morgan, recognizing this weakness, postulated God himself as the explanation of the world process. In the next chapter a similar but far from identical view will be examined as we review the metaphysical position of Alfred North Whitehead.

CHAPTER THREE

ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD: DIPOLAR THEISM

As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, specifically as it is set forth in his work Process and Reality, will be briefly examined in this chapter. Obviously, no one chapter can do justice to the genius of Whitehead, nor can his metaphysics be critically examined within such limits as are necessary in this writing. All that will be attempted will be a brief review of his philosophy as it pertains to his doctrine of God. An effort will be made to emphasise the similarities to, and differences from, the viewpoints of Alexander and Morgan, and hopefully a groundwork will be laid for the next chapter in which Hartshorne's indebtedness to Whitehead will be demonstrated. Before turning to an examination of Process and Reality, which can surely be regarded as the culmination of Whitehead's philosophy, it will be advantageous to trace the development of his thought prior to the publication of that work. Such a development can be seen from his earlier writings, particularly Science and the Modern World and

Religion in the Making.¹

In Process and Reality Whitehead concedes that his philosophical perspective is closely allied to that of Spinoza, but distinguishes between them in that his own view emphasises dynamic process as opposed to the one substance of Spinoza.² Much of the similarity to Spinoza which has been lost in Process and Reality is more clearly recognized in Science and the Modern World to which we now direct our attention. In that work, Whitehead had regarded the ultimate metaphysical reality as a substantial or eternal activity,³ and had compared this underlying activity to the one infinite substance of Spinoza.⁴ However, although the two views can be compared, they cannot be equated. Whitehead again stresses that the eternal activity which he regards as the ultimate reality is not a static substance but rather an underlying process.⁵ Despite this basic distinction, the affinity existing between the views of Spinoza and Whitehead remains obvious. Just as the one infinite substance of Spinoza is characterized by its two

¹John B. Cobb, Jr. has noted this progression in excellent fashion in his work, A Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965), pp. 135-175.

²Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929), p. 10.

³Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), pp. 154, 155.

⁴Ibid., p. 181.

⁵Ibid.

known attributes and its various modes, so also in the philosophy of Whitehead the ultimate reality which is eternal activity is characterized by its attributes and modes. Indeed, in Whitehead's metaphysics this characterization is essential; the eternal activity, apart from its attributes and modes, is abstract and non-actual. As Cobb states the matter, "Substantial activity . . . cannot occur except in some definite way,"¹ that is, through its attributes and modes. The question which arises at this point has to do with the identification and nature of the attributes and modes; what are they? Cobb summarises the matter as follows:

. . . all definite entities can be analyzed into actual entities and eternal objects. This means that substantial activity necessarily adopts these forms which are then declared, in accordance with Spinozistic terminology, to be its attributes. In concreto, substantial activity is given only in actual entities which are called its modes.²

Thus at this stage, eternal activity can be seen to possess two attributes, namely eternal objects and actual entities. An extremely important distinction which must be noted is that although eternal objects and actual entities are both attributes of substantial activity, only the actual entities are truly actual. That is, they are concrete matters of

¹Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p. 139.

²Ibid., pp. 139-140.

fact, actual existents. Eternal objects, on the other hand, are not actual; they compose the realm of possibilities for actualization and can be classified as pure potentials for the constitution of concrete things, that is, actual entities. These actual entities, as Cobb notes, are the modes of eternal activity. Whitehead also theorizes that the eternal activity envisages both eternal objects and actual entities. He states,

The underlying activity, as conceived apart from the fact of realisation, has three types of envisagement. These are: first, the envisagement of eternal objects; secondly, the envisagement of possibilities of value in respect to the synthesis of eternal objects; and lastly, the envisagement of the actual matter of fact which must enter into the total situation which is achievable by the addition of the future.¹

Thus far, we have seen that Whitehead viewed ultimate reality as an eternal activity which envisaged two of its own attributes, namely the realm of possibilities or potentials, and the realm of concrete fact. However, at this point there seems to be no relationship between the two different realms, or at least no explanation as to how the potentials become actualized in the world of concrete things. Whitehead meets this apparent deficiency by introducing a third attribute of the eternal activity, namely the principle of concretion or limitation, which Whitehead also refers to as God.² Three matters of consequence should

¹Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, pp. 154, 155.

²Ibid., pp. 250, 256.

be observed at this time with reference to the doctrine of God as it appears in Science and the Modern World: (1) God is not the ultimate reality; he is merely one of three attributes of the ultimate reality which is eternal activity; (2) God is not concrete, that is, not actual.¹ He is a metaphysical principle; (3) How God functions as the principle of concretion, mediating between the eternal objects and the actual entities, is at this point in Whitehead's philosophy simply not explained. For a partial explanation of how God functions as the principle of concretion, and for further development in Whitehead's philosophy and his doctrine of God, we turn to Religion in the Making.

In Religion in the Making Whitehead continues to theorize that God is the principle of concretion, but expands and alters the theory in various significant ways. Two major changes are made which at least partially explain how God functions as the principle of concretion. First of all, Whitehead states that God grasps the realm of eternal objects in the synthesis of omniscience and that he embraces "the concept of all such possibilities graded in harmonious, relative subordination."² It is clear then that the actual world takes the definite form it does because of God's envisagement and ordering of the eternal objects. Through

¹Ibid., p. 257.

²Alfred N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 157.

this envisagement of the eternal objects and his ordering of them whereby some potentials become definite and actual, God functions as the principle of concretion. Obviously, a major modification has occurred in Whitehead's view since his publication of Science and the Modern World. In that work, it will be recalled, the eternal activity envisaged two of its own attributes, namely the eternal objects and the actual entities. The third attribute of the ultimate metaphysical reality was God, the principle of concretion. In Religion in the Making, on the other hand, God--still as the principle of concretion--envisages the eternal objects, and this envisagement is no longer attributed to the underlying activity, which in Religion in the Making is now termed "creativity".¹

The second major change in Whitehead's doctrine of God could well have been brought about in response to an obvious question: how can a non-actual metaphysical principle possess the capacity of envisaging the eternal objects and of ordering them in such a fashion that some potentialities are actualized? Whitehead's response is to desert the previously held position that God is not concrete, and to adopt instead the view that God is an actual entity.² As Cobb relates, "This is not a rejection of the view that he [God] is the principle of concretion (or limitation) but the

¹Ibid., p. 90.

²Ibid., pp. 90-99.

affirmation that it is an actual entity that performs the function of providing the limitations that make concretion possible."¹ This new emphasis upon God as an actual entity seems to be an early application of the ontological principle which plays such an important part in Whitehead's thinking in Process and Reality, a matter to which we shall return later.

Although God is now classified as an actual entity, Whitehead draws a distinction between God and all other actual entities; whereas they are temporal, he is non-temporal.² This non-temporal character of God is necessary for the "definite determination which imposes ordered balance on the world"³ However, although God is described as non-temporal, he is nonetheless related to the temporal actual entities composing the world of concrete fact. "There is, therefore, in God's nature the aspect of the realm of forms as qualified by the world, and the aspect of the world as qualified by the forms."⁴ Thus as the non-temporal actual entity, God envisages not only the eternal objects, but also the temporal actual entities and is thereby related to them, the non-temporal interacting with the

¹Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p. 146.

²Whitehead, Religion in the Making, p. 90.

³Ibid., p. 94.

⁴Ibid., p. 98.

temporal. An excellent summary of the development of Whitehead's thought as seen in Science and the Modern World and Religion in the Making is given by Cobb as follows:

In Science and the Modern World, we encountered four metaphysical principles: the underlying substantial activity and its three attributes--eternal objects, actual entities, and the principle of limitation. In Religion in the Making, subtle but important changes have occurred in the understanding of these four elements in the philosophic system. First, the underlying substantial activity is now called creativity. . . . We are no longer invited to compare Whitehead's thought with that of Spinoza. We read no more of attributes and modes, and the tendency toward monism of the earlier book gives way to an emphatic pluralism of actual entities. Whereas substantial activity was that of which all the other three were attributes, creativity is accorded no such favored place. Complete interdependence of the four principles is stressed rather than the primacy of any one. Second, since God is now conceived as an actual entity, we might consider the four metaphysical principles as reduced to three: creativity, eternal objects, and actual entities including God as a special case. If we do so, however, we have to remember that there is a major philosophical difference between God and the temporal actual entities.^{1, 2}

As stated earlier, in Religion in the Making we find partial answers to questions raised concerning how God functions as the principle of concretion. He does so as an actual entity who envisages and orders the eternal objects. The question, however, remains as to how God's envisagement and ordering of the realm of possibilities actually results in certain determinate, concrete existents.

¹Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, pp. 148, 149.

²For the preceding section of this chapter, I have been heavily indebted to Cobb's work. For the remaining portion of the chapter, we now turn to an examination of the primary source, Process and Reality.

To seek the answer to this and other questions we now come to what can surely be regarded as Whitehead's greatest and most influential work, Process and Reality.

Whitehead insists that the importance of philosophy lies in its fusion of religion and science into one rational scheme of thought.¹ Obviously, such a fusion is more compatible with some scientific theories than with others. Whitehead opts for a realistic philosophy² which is not allied to a rigid empiricism. As he says,

In natural science this rigid method is the Baconian method of induction, a method which, if consistently pursued, would have left science where it found it. What Bacon omitted was the play of a free imagination, controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic. The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation.³

It is evident from the above quotation that Whitehead's philosophy is speculative and, indeed, he himself gladly concedes the point, stating that the lectures are designed as "an essay in Speculative Philosophy."⁴ However, in his speculative philosophy Whitehead insists upon two conditions for the success of the "imaginative experiment". The "first requisite is to proceed by the method of generalization so

¹Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 23.

²Ibid., pp. vii, viii.

³Ibid., p. 7.

⁴Ibid., p. 4.

that certainly there is some application. . . . The second condition for the success of imaginative construction is unflinching pursuit of the two rationalistic ideals, coherence and logical perfection."¹ Earlier, Whitehead had added the criterion of adequacy to those mentioned above.

. . . the philosophical scheme should be coherent, logical, and, in respect to its interpretation, applicable and adequate. Here 'applicable' means that some items of experience are thus interpretable, and 'adequate' means that there are no items incapable of such interpretation. . . . 'Coherence,' as here employed, means that the fundamental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that in isolation they are meaningless. . . . The term 'logical' has its ordinary meaning, including 'logical' consistency, or lack of contradiction²

Thus in his speculation, Whitehead seeks to achieve a philosophical perspective which meets the test of both empirical and rational criteria, and at the same time brings about a fusion of science and religion. In his view, the "philosophy of organism"³ or "organic realism"⁴ meets the challenge.

In his philosophy of organism, Whitehead rejects not only a rigid empiricism but also a strict materialism.⁵ As stated earlier, some scientific theories are more compatible than others with a fusion of science and religion, and a strict materialism would not easily lend itself to such a

¹Ibid., p. 8.

⁴Ibid., p. 471.

²Ibid., pp. 4, 5.

⁵Ibid.

³Ibid., p. v.

synthesis as Whitehead no doubt recognized. The rejection of materialism in favour of organic realism is no doubt significant in this context. However, it is not being suggested that this was Whitehead's primary motive for the substitution of one perspective by the other. Undoubtedly he regarded the organic philosophy as more readily fulfilling the empirical and rational criteria already cited.¹ Further, the rejection of materialism in favour of organic realism "is the displacement of the notion of static stuff by the notion of fluent energy,"² a viewpoint supportive of Whitehead's emphasis upon dynamic process.³

The notion of 'organism' is combined with that of 'process' in a twofold manner. The community of actual things is an organism; but it is not a static organism. It is an incompleteness in process of production. Thus the expansion of the universe in respect to actual things is the first meaning of 'process'; and the universe in any stage of its expansion is the first meaning of 'organism.'⁴

The second manner in which the notions of organism and process are combined reintroduces us to the actual entity, already briefly discussed in the material on Science and the Modern World and Religion in the Making.

. . . each actual entity is itself only describable as an organic process. It repeats in microcosm what the universe is in macrocosm. It is a process proceeding from phase to phase, each phase being the real basis from which its successor proceeds towards the completion of the thing in question.⁵

¹Supra, p. 71.

²Process and Reality, p. 471.

⁴Ibid., p. 327.

³Ibid., pp. 10, 327.

⁵Ibid.

Thus, for Whitehead, the universe is a dynamic organism composed of dynamic organisms, the latter being actual entities, "the final real things of which the world is made up."¹

The theory of actual entities is central to the philosophy of Whitehead. Not only is there "no going behind actual entities to find anything more real"² but there is no going behind them to find any reasons. This is the famous ontological principle, also called the principle of efficient and final causation,³ which states that "the reasons for things are always to be found in the composite nature of definite actual entities The ontological principle can be summarized as: no actual entity, then no reason."⁴ On the surface it may appear since actual entities are the only reasons and one cannot go behind them to find anything more real, that one could conclude that these entities are now the ultimate in Whitehead's metaphysics. Such a conclusion, however, would be unjustified. In Whitehead's philosophy of organism, the ultimate metaphysical principle continues to be creativity,⁵ earlier termed eternal activity. In what sense, then, can creativity be regarded as ultimate when Whitehead insists that there is

¹Ibid., p. 27.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 33, 37.

⁴Ibid., p. 28. See also pp. 46, 65, 373.

⁵Ibid., p. 11.

no going behind actual entities to find anything more real? The key to this question is found in the word "real". Actual entities are "real", that is concrete; creativity as the ultimate metaphysical principle is not concrete, not actual. It is "the ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality."¹ Whitehead describes the relationship existing between this highest generality and the concrete actualities on the basis of a philosophical assumption which he states as follows: "In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents. It is only then capable of characterization through its accidental embodiments, and apart from these accidents is devoid of actuality."² In the philosophy of organism, the ultimate is creativity and the actual entities are its accidental embodiments or accidents. There is some ambiguity in the language of Whitehead as to whether he wishes to describe the actual entities as really characterizing creativity. In the above quotation the word "characterization" is used to describe this relationship and the same idea is again employed when Whitehead writes that "it is the function of actuality to characterize the creativity. . . ."³ However, he also writes that creativity "is that ultimate

¹Ibid., p. 47.

²Ibid., pp. 10, 11.

³Ibid., p. 344 (emphasis added).

notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality. It cannot be characterized, because all characters are more special than itself. But creativity is always found under conditions, and described as conditioned."¹ That there is a seeming contradiction here cannot be denied, but the apparent contradiction seems to be merely verbal and of no real consequence. However, because of Whitehead's ambiguity in this matter, in this writing the actual entities will not be referred to as characterizations of creativity but rather as accidents of creativity. They will also be referred to as "creatures" of creativity, in compliance with Whitehead's own vocabulary. He states that "the actual world is a process, and that the process is the becoming of actual entities. Thus actual entities are creatures."² Again he writes, "But of course, there is no meaning to 'creativity' apart from its 'creatures' . . . and no meaning to the temporal creatures apart from 'creativity'"³ It is evident that Whitehead has moved a long way from his earlier position set forth in Science and the Modern World. In that work eternal activity as the ultimate was indeed characterized by its own attributes, including the actual entities, also called "modes" of eternal activity. Now in Process and Reality, the

¹Ibid., p. 47 (emphasis added).

²Ibid., p. 33.

³Ibid., p. 344.

actual entities are neither attributes nor modes of the ultimate reality, creativity, but rather its creatures.

While the emphasis of this discussion has been placed upon Whitehead's view that the actual entities are creatures of creativity, he also stresses--as noted above--that creativity itself is always found under conditions, and described as conditioned. In this respect, actual entities have a vital part to play; they are said to condition creativity, and such is possible by virtue of a decision on the part of the actual entities. In a significant passage, Whitehead writes as follows:

. . . 'decision' cannot be construed as a casual adjunct of an actual entity. It constitutes the very meaning of actuality. An actual entity arises from decisions for it, and by its very existence provides decisions for other actual entities which supersede it. . . . Just as 'potentiality for process' is the meaning of the more general term 'entity,' or 'thing'; so 'decision' is the additional meaning imported by the word 'actual' into the phrase 'actual entity.' 'Actuality' is the decision amid 'potentiality.' The real internal constitution of an actual entity progressively constitutes a decision conditioning the creativity which transcends that actuality.¹

In summary, to be actual means to be involved in decision, and the decision which is made conditions creativity within the limits or confines of that decision. Thus an actual entity may be described as a decision-making, dynamic organism in the process of becoming.

It must be understood in this context that "in our

¹Ibid., pp. 68, 69.

reference to the actual world, we rarely consider an individual actual entity. The objects of our thoughts are almost always societies, or looser groups of actual entities,"¹ and it is these societies--also called a "nexus" of actual occasions or "event"²--which "enjoy adventures of change throughout time and space."³ On the other hand, actual entities do not change; they exist for only an instant and then perish, and in perishing compel their successors to take account of them.⁴ Thus what we may consider to be an object will actually be composed of any number of actual entities. Whitehead illustrates this in two significant examples. He states that man is a society of actual entities with personal order, "an historic route of actual occasions"--another term for the temporal actual entities--"which in a marked degree . . . inherit from each other."⁵ In this first example, although the description of a person as a society of entities may appear unusual, it is not difficult to attribute decision making to a person. However, in his second example, and this with specific reference to decision making in actual entities or occasions, Whitehead reaches into what is generally considered to be the

¹Ibid., p. 301.

⁴Ibid., pp. 52, 92, 222, 223.

²Ibid., pp. 113, 124.

⁵Ibid., p. 137.

³Ibid., p. 52.

inorganic realm. He writes, "The Castle Rock at Edinburgh exists from moment to moment, and from century to century, by reason of the decisions effected by its own historic route of antecedent occasions."¹ The question must be asked: In what sense can decision making be attributed to the actual occasions constituting the Castle Rock at Edinburgh, or any other object which is generally held to be inorganic? Whitehead's answer is that mental activity belongs to all actual entities in some degree.² However, such mental activity or experience does not necessarily involve consciousness, which arises only in the higher phases of concrescence.³ Nonetheless, mental activity can be attributed to all actual entities, and all actual entities can therefore be described as dipolar, possessing both physical and mental poles or aspects.⁴ In this theory Whitehead, like Alexander and Morgan, presents a basic panpsychism as fundamental to his philosophy. Through this panpsychistic theory, Whitehead is able to account for decision-making in all levels of concrete reality.

Thus, all actual entities are dipolar, and since each entity is dynamic, or in process of becoming, the process of becoming is dipolar. In this process each pole or aspect of the actual entity performs a different function.

¹Ibid., p. 69.

⁴Ibid., pp. 54, 366.

²Ibid., pp. 88, 366.

³Ibid., pp. 54, 130, 246, 379, 423.

With the physical pole, the actual entity takes account of the actual world, composed of other actual entities in its past, since according to Whitehead contemporary entities are causally independent of one another.¹ With the mental pole the actual entity takes account of the eternal objects² which are pure potentials for the specific determination of fact.³ This "taking account of" other actual entities or eternal objects, Whitehead calls a "prehension"⁴ which he equates with rudimentary feeling. Such prehensions include emotion, purpose, valuation and causation,⁵ but as noted earlier, consciousness is not necessarily included. Thus the actual entity is dipolar by reason of its physical prehensions of the actual world and its conceptual prehensions of eternal objects.⁶ As a result of its physical prehensions, an actual entity is interdependent⁷ and social, the latter being the case because "the outlines of its own character are determined by the data which its environment provides for its process of feeling."⁸ As a result of its conceptual prehensions, each actual entity takes account of possibilities for future realisation into concrete fact. Whitehead further explains con-

¹Ibid., pp. 95, 102.

⁵Ibid., p. 28.

²Ibid., p. 72.

⁶Ibid., pp. 72, 366, 367.

³Ibid., pp. 32, 34, 44.

⁷Ibid., p. 28.

⁴Ibid., p. 335.

⁸Ibid., p. 309; see also p. 168.

ceptual prehension by the use of an equivalent term, "appetition".¹ He states,

Appetition is immediate matter of fact including in itself a principle of unrest, involving realization of what is not and may be. The immediate occasion thereby conditions creativity so as to procure, in the future, physical realization of its mental pole, according to the various valuations inherent in its various conceptual prehensions.²

With reference to the above quotations, two matters must be emphasised: (1) In its appetite for the concrete realisation of certain potentials, the actual entity aims at a specific ideal for itself;³ and (2) in conditioning creativity in accordance with that aim, the actual entity can be described as self-creative or self-caused.⁴ Of course, as noted earlier, actual entities are creatures of creativity, but in their decision making role with reference to the ideal to be achieved, that is, in their process of concrescence, they are self-creative. In the language of the ontological principle, they are their own reasons for what they are becoming and become. As the self-creative process of becoming is completed, the actual entity is said to perish, having reached its satisfaction and, in this satisfaction loses its self-creative subjectivity but continues to exist as a superject or object to be prehended by succeeding occasions. In the latter state, the entity is said to be "objectively immortal" or to possess "object-

¹Ibid., p. 49.

²Ibid., pp. 47, 48.

³Ibid., p. 130.

⁴Ibid., pp. 38, 130, 339, 340, 374.

ive immortality."¹ The emphasis here should be placed upon the word "objective"; immortality does not belong to the experiencing subject in the process of becoming, but only to the entity as superject or object for the becoming of others. Whitehead makes the point as follows:

. . . actual entities 'perpetually perish' subjectively, but are immortal objectively. Actuality in perishing acquires objectivity, while it loses subjective immediacy. It loses the final causation which is its internal principle of unrest, and it acquires efficient causation whereby it is a ground of obligation characterizing the creativity.²

In the preceding quotation, Whitehead mentions two different types of causation with reference to the actual entities, "final" and "efficient". The distinction between these is extremely important, Whitehead stressing that "one task of a sound metaphysics is to exhibit final and efficient causes in their proper relation to each other."³ First of all, with reference to efficient causation, this must always be understood in the context of the entity having already reached its satisfaction, and always has reference to its effect upon other entities. Whitehead states that the effects of the actual entity

. . . are all to be described in terms of its 'satisfaction.' The 'effects' of an actual entity are its interventions in concrescent processes other than its own. Any entity, thus intervening in processes transcending⁴ itself, is said to be functioning as an object.

¹Ibid., pp. 44, 71, 89.

³Ibid., p. 129.

²Ibid., p. 44.

⁴Ibid., p. 336 (emphasis added).

Of course, as noted earlier, contemporary entities are causally independent of one another and, consequently, efficient causation always has reference to the past. That is, the entity which intervenes in the concrescent process of another through being prehended by the latter, is always in the past. Indeed, Whitehead speaks of the efficient cause as being "the immortal past".¹

The final cause, on the other hand, has reference to the future, to the ideal or potential yet to be realised by the entity concerned. Further, this final cause is not inherited from the past but is "the internal principle of unrest" within the present actual entity.² This internal principle of unrest or final causation is termed, by Whitehead, the "subjective aim" of the actual entity.³ It is the ideal for itself which guides the actual entity in its self-creative process.⁴ This ideal is recognized by the occasion via its mental pole or aspect.⁵ Here again the element of decision is involved. As Whitehead states, "the decision derived from the actual world, which is the efficient cause, is completed by the decision embodied in the subjective aim which is the final cause."⁶ However, the decision embodied in the subjective aim does not necessarily include consciousness. Whitehead writes,

¹Ibid., p. 320.

⁴Ibid., pp. 130, 134.

²Ibid., p. 44.

⁵Ibid., p. 423.

³Ibid., pp. 130, 320.

⁶Ibid.

This subjective aim is not primarily intellectual; it is the lure for feeling. This lure for feeling is the germ of mind. Here I am using the term 'mind' to mean the complex of mental operations involved in the constitution of an actual entity. Mental operations do not necessarily involve consciousness.¹

Thus the final cause is the lure for feeling, the germ of mind, the internal subjective aim of the actual entity as a subject seeking to realise in actuality what it recognizes as an ideal for itself, seeking what is not, and yet may come to be.

With the foregoing brief discussion of causation in mind, it is possible to draw a simple but significant conclusion: efficient causation has to do strictly with inheritance from the past; final causation--the subjective aim of the actual entity--has to do with future possibilities yet unrealised, that is, with the emergence of novelty. This subjective aim which allows for novel concrescences is supplied to each actual entity by God.² Through supplying the subjective aim, God is thereby the principle of concretion. "In this sense God is the principle of concretion; namely, he is that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts."³

Whitehead has now explained in what sense God is the

¹Ibid., p. 130.

²Ibid., pp. 104, 164, 343, 373, 522.

³Ibid., p. 374.

principle of concretion. This is a further development of his previous thought. It will be recalled that in Science and the Modern World God was regarded as only a metaphysical principle; in Religion in the Making God was described as an actual entity, still functioning as the principle of concretion, but with no indication given as to how that function was performed; now in Process and Reality, we are informed that God functions as the principle of concretion by supplying the initial subjective aim to the temporal actual entities. In Process and Reality Whitehead confirms the position adopted in Religion in the Making, namely, that God performs this function as an actual entity since, in accordance with the ontological principle, only actual entities are effective. As the principle of concretion God can also be described as the organ of novelty.¹ He is "the ground of all order and of all originality."² As the ground of all originality, God can be described as a "mediator" in two different respects. First, God "mediates" between creativity and the actual occasions. Creativity is the principle of novelty,³ the actual occasions are the real concrete novelties, and God is the organ of novelty making it

¹Ibid., p. 104.

²Ibid., p. 164.

³Ibid., p. 31.

possible for the metaphysical principle to be actualized in its temporal creatures. Secondly, God "mediates" between the eternal objects and the temporal actual entities.

. . . the actualities constituting the process of the world are conceived as exemplifying the ingression (or 'participation') of other things which constitute the potentialities of definiteness for any actual existence. The things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal. The two sets are mediated by a thing which combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential. This final entity is the divine element in the world, by which the barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities obtains primordially the efficient conjunction of ideal realization. This ideal realization of potentialities in a primordial actual entity constitutes the metaphysical stability whereby the actual process exemplifies general principles of metaphysics, and attains the ends proper to specific types of emergent order. By reason of the actuality of this primordial valuation of pure potentials, each eternal object has a definite, effective relevance to each concrescent process. Apart from such orderings, there would be a complete disjunction of eternal objects unrealized in the temporal world. Novelty would be meaningless, and inconceivable.¹

God, therefore, as an actual entity, envisages all the eternal objects, that is the entire realm of possibilities and, prehending also the actual world, presents to each occasion the ideal for itself within the context of its actual world.² The "actual world" is peculiar to each actual entity, and always includes the primordial actual entity, God.³ Because God is an actual entity,

¹Ibid., pp. 63, 64.

²Ibid., p. 248.

³Ibid., pp. 42, 102.

he too is both subject and superject; God, too, is prehended by the temporal occasions, and it is through prehending God that the temporal occasions become aware of "the ideal" for themselves. In this respect, the prehension through which God is objectified--that is, through which he is an object for the temporal actual occasions--is termed by Whitehead a "hybrid" feeling, that is a feeling whose data are the conceptual feelings of God.¹ To summarise--and certainly to oversimplify--through God's envisagement of all eternal objects he is aware of the ideal for each actual entity; through the actual entity's prehension of God, it too becomes aware of the ideal for itself, thereby obtaining its subjective aim for its process of becoming. "The novel hybrid feelings derived from God . . . are the foundations of progress."²

Through supplying the subjective aim to the occasions, God can be termed the creator of each temporal actual entity.³ However, this would be, in Whitehead's own admission, "misleading". There are several reasons why this is the case. First of all, as noted earlier, each actual entity is self-created. Although it receives the general outline of its character from the past, it still has a significant part to play in its own becoming,

¹Ibid., p. 377.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 343.

this through the decision involved in its subjective aim. In this respect, the actual entity is conditioned but not determined by its subjective aim;¹ it remains free and in its freedom creates itself. Secondly, to describe God as creator would be inappropriate because it suggests "that the ultimate creativity of the universe is to be ascribed to God's volition" whereas the "true metaphysical position is that God is the aboriginal instance of this creativity. . . ."² That is, God too, as an actual entity, is a creature of creativity.³ Thirdly, God cannot be termed the creator of the temporal actual entities because there is no meaning to "God" apart from the temporal creatures.⁴ This last point has reference to Whitehead's rejection of the traditional Christian view which regards God as "the transcendent creator, at whose fiat the world came into being"⁵

It is clear, then, that in Whitehead's speculative system God cannot be justly called creator. Nevertheless, in the philosophy of organism God plays a major and significant part as the actual entity which makes the emergence of novelty possible. We will now turn to a more detailed study of the concept of God in Whitehead's philosophy.

With reference to his doctrine of God, Whitehead

¹Ibid., pp. 135, 373.

⁴Ibid., p. 344.

²Ibid., p. 344.

⁵Ibid., p. 519.

³Ibid., pp. 33, 46.

frankly states some matters of great importance. He concedes that his theory of God is an interpretative element in his cosmology,¹ and that no "proof" is offered.² What he does undertake is a dispassionate investigation as to what his metaphysical principles require concerning the nature of God. That is, "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification."³

In compliance with the metaphysical principles of Whitehead's system, and specifically with reference to the ontological principle, God is regarded as an actual entity. As stressed above, only by being an actual entity could God function as the principle of concretion, the organ of novelty since, according to the ontological principle, only actual entities are agents, that is, are effective. Much discussion has centred around whether Whitehead intended God to be viewed as an actual entity or a series of actual entities. The controversy is not sheerly academic but has to do with further implications concerning the nature of God and his relationship to the world. Three such important matters--only mentioned here but discussed later--are (1) Can God be described as personal? (2) Does God literally include the temporal actual

¹Ibid., p. 518.

²Ibid., p. 521.

³Ibid.

entities, that is, is it a doctrine of panentheism, and (3) is God able to preserve value in the universe? To these matters we shall return later and we shall deal at the moment only with the question as to whether God is an actual entity or a series of entities.

Much of what has been written in this chapter already has made reference to God as "an actual entity". This has not been an effort to prejudge the issue but is rather an attempt in this research to reflect Whitehead's own usage. While insisting that actual entities differ among themselves, he states that "God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space."¹ In dealing with the ontological principle in the context of the potentiality of the universe he writes, "the general potentiality of the universe must be somewhere This 'somewhere' is the non-temporal actual entity."² As noted earlier in direct quotations from Whitehead, God is described as "that actual entity" which supplies the initial subjective aim of each occasion³ and as "the final entity" which makes novelty possible.⁴

In view of the explicit statements by Whitehead that God is an actual entity, it may seem unusual that any discussion should arise concerning the possibility that he intended to describe God not as a single entity but rather

¹Ibid., p. 28.

²Ibid., p. 73.

³Ibid., p. 374.

⁴Ibid., p. 64.

as a series of entities. Among those who hold that Whitehead may really have regarded God as a series of actual entities are Robert Whittemore and Charles Hartshorne. Hartshorne's position will be the object of our attention in the following chapter. Whittemore believes that Hartshorne's assessment that Whitehead may have viewed God as a series of actual entities is correct. Whittemore reaches this conclusion on the basis that Whitehead himself draws attention to the fact that God does differ from other actual entities.¹ That Whitehead does indeed distinguish between God and other actual entities is certainly true, but such qualifying statements do not have any reference to the question concerning whether God is an actual entity; they have reference to distinctions between God as the primordial actual entity and the temporal occasions. Cobb, who adopts the view that God should be regarded as a series of actual entities, rightly concedes that such a conclusion differs from Whitehead and that Whitehead himself undoubtedly thought of God as an actual entity.² There is nothing in the text of Process and Reality which in any respect detracts from the clear and explicit statements by Whitehead that God is a single actual entity.

Because God is an actual entity, certain other con-

¹Robert C. Whittemore, "The Americanization of Panentheism," Southern Journal of Philosophy, VII (Spring, 1969), 29-35.

²Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p. 188.

clusions can be reached about God within the framework of Whitehead's metaphysical principles. For example, if God is an actual entity, he must, as noted earlier, also be a creature.¹ Such, indeed, is confirmed by Whitehead in very clear language.

In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents. It is only then capable of characterization through its accidental embodiments, and apart from these accidents, is devoid of actuality. In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed 'creativity';² and God is its primordial, non-temporal accident.

Again,

This is the conception of God, according to which he is considered as the outcome of creativity. . . . And also it is to be noted that every actual entity, including God, is a creature transcended by the creativity which it qualifies.³

As stated earlier, and here confirmed, in the philosophy of organism the ultimate is creativity and God is its creature. However, it must be remembered that creativity is devoid of actuality separate and apart from its creatures, including God.

. . . there is no meaning to 'creativity' apart from its 'creatures,' and no meaning to 'God' apart from the creativity and the 'temporal creatures,' and no meaning to the temporal creatures apart from 'creativity' and 'God.'⁴

Here Whitehead is laying strong emphasis upon his concept of coherence which stresses that the basic elements in his metaphysics "presuppose each other so that in isolation

¹Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 33, 46.

²Ibid., pp. 10, 11. ³Ibid., p. 135. ⁴Ibid., p. 344.

they are meaningless."¹ Thus, although God is a creature of creativity, as are the temporal actual entities, all three--creativity, God and the temporal occasions--require each other in Whitehead's speculative system.

It is clear from the above quotations that God is a creature. It is equally clear that he is not a creature in the same sense as the other actual entities. He is the "primordial, non-temporal" creature; they are "temporal creatures". This distinction is vital but must be understood within the context that God as primordial has reference to only one aspect of his nature. In other words, like all actual entities, God too is dipolar, this theory once again being in compliance with the general metaphysical principles of Whitehead's system.

Thus, analogously to all actual entities, the nature of God is dipolar. He has a primordial nature and a consequent nature. . . .

[The primordial] nature is constituted by his conceptual experience. This experience is the primordial fact in the world, limited by no actuality which it presupposes. It is therefore infinite This side of his nature is free, complete, primordial, eternal, actually deficient and unconscious. The other side [God's consequent nature] originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world. . . . It is determined, incomplete, consequent, 'everlasting,' fully actual, and conscious.²

Elsewhere Whitehead states,

The primordial created fact is the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects. This is the 'primordial nature' of

¹Ibid., p. 5.

²Ibid., p. 524.

God. . . . God is the primordial creature; but the description of his nature is not exhausted by this conceptual side of it. His 'consequent nature' results from his physical prehensions of the derivative actual entities.¹

With further reference to the consequent nature of God, Whitehead writes that as a creature, God is "always in concrescence and never in the past," and so receives a reaction from the world; this reaction, says Whitehead, is God's consequent nature.²

In summary, God like all other actual entities is dipolar. Unlike the temporal occasions, one pole or aspect of God is primordial, eternal, underived; this aspect is constituted by God's conceptual prehensions of all eternal objects. The other pole or aspect of God is consequent, derived from and dependent upon his physical prehensions of the temporal occasions. As noted earlier, it is precisely because God envisages all potentials that he is able to present the "ideal" as a subjective aim to each temporal occasion. As Whitehead says, "The primary element in the 'lure for feeling' is the subject's prehension of the primordial nature of God."³ Thus, it is God in his primordial nature who is the source of the possibilities for the realisation of value in the actual world.

For Whitehead, however, the realisation of value is

¹Ibid., p. 46.

²Ibid., p. 47.

³Ibid., p. 287. See also p. 104.

not the only goal he seeks in his metaphysics; the con-
servation of value is of equal importance. What is
 gained must not be lost. In Whitehead's system, the values
 realised as a result of God's primordial nature are con-
 served in his consequent nature. Whitehead makes clear
 that objective immortality within the temporal world
 does not solve the problem of loss. This problem can
 only be solved by the world becoming "everlasting" by its
 objective immortality in God.¹ In God's consequent na-
 ture there is no loss. This is what Whitehead means when
 he calls the consequent nature of God "everlasting."²
 "The consequent nature of God is his judgement on the
 world. He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy
 of his own life. It is the judgement of a tenderness
 which loses nothing that can be saved."³

Thus, God in his primordial nature is the source of
 the subjective aim of each temporal actual entity. In
 his consequent nature he prehends the concrete realisation
 into fact of the value achieved. In this respect, God can
 be conceived as not only the organ of novelty, but as the
 conserver of value. To this matter of God's conserving
 value we shall return in the next chapter when it will be
 necessary to compare Whitehead's position to that of
 Hartshorne.

¹Ibid., p. 527.

³Ibid., p. 525.

²Ibid., pp. 524, 525.

As God in his consequent nature conserves the value realised in the temporal occasions, he too is the recipient of benefits from the world. First, and most fundamental, it is only in his consequent nature that God is truly actual. As primordial he is deficient in actuality or "deficiently actual". Such is the case because his feelings are only conceptual,¹ having reference to nothing concrete. Thus the consequent nature of God is required as "the fulfillment of his experience by his reception of the multiple freedom of actuality into the harmony of his own actualization. It is God as really actual, completing the deficiency of his mere conceptual actuality."²

Secondly, since conceptual feelings, separate and apart from integration with physical feelings, are devoid of consciousness, God in his primordial nature is not conscious.³ Therefore the physical feelings of God, supplied by his relationship to and prehension of the temporal entities, are necessary to God if he is to be regarded as conscious. These physical feelings or prehensions, of course, constitute the consequent nature of God, and it is this consequent nature of God which is conscious.⁴

Thirdly, as God reaps the benefit of concrete actuality and consciousness in his relationship with the world, he also profits by the addition of novelty to his own being.

¹Ibid., pp. 50, 521.

³Ibid., pp. 521, 522.

²Ibid., p. 530.

⁴Ibid., p. 524.

As God in his consequent nature conserves all values achieved, he himself is the recipient of the novel additions. Thus as God is the organ of novelty for the world, so the world is the organ of novelty for God. "Neither God, nor the world, reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty. Either of them, God and the world, is the instrument of novelty for the other."¹ In this sense, God and the world require each other.²

Thus God, in his consequent nature, that is, through his relationship to the world, reaps the benefits of concrete actuality, consciousness and the advance into novelty. Conversely, God benefits the world. By supplying the subjective aim to each temporal occasion, he is the principle of concretion and the organ of novelty. In his consequent nature, he conserves without loss all of the values realised in the world. This mutual benefit is shared by God and the world, each requiring the other. In Whitehead's metaphysics, God and the world are interdependent. This interdependence is expressed most clearly in Whitehead's now famous antitheses, some of which are as follows:

It is as true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as that the World is permanent and God is fluent.

¹Ibid., p. 529.

²Ibid.

It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is one and God many.

It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the World.

It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God.¹

We now return to two questions raised earlier, namely, is God personal and is he all-inclusive, that is, can Whitehead's doctrine of God be described as panentheistic?

With reference to the first question, it is undoubtedly the case that Whitehead uses language which attributes personal characteristics to God. For example, God is conceived as being conscious in his consequent nature. He is described as having a tenderness for the temporal actual entities,² and, in a well-known passage, Whitehead speaks of God as "the great companion--the fellow-sufferer who understands."³ If Whitehead's language could be taken literally, then God must surely be regarded as truly personal. However, Whitehead himself warns us that when he speaks of God as possessing a "tender care" that he is using an "image", that is, the language is not to be understood literally. Further, Whitehead's language could only be regarded as literal if it were isolated from the rest of his metaphysics, specifically his explicit statements to the effect that personality belongs to societies

¹Ibid., p. 528.

³Ibid., p. 532.

²Ibid., pp. 161, 525.

of entities and not to single entities. Man, for example, is a society with personal order, an historic route of actual occasions.¹ But God is not a society of actual entities as we noted earlier. Consequently we must conclude on the basis of Whitehead's metaphysical principles, that God--as an actual entity--is not a divine person, or personal.

And now we turn to the second question as to whether Whitehead's doctrine of God could justly be described as panentheistic, a position attributed to Whitehead by Hartshorne. William Christian has dealt with this matter in excellent fashion and we will simply summarise his argument.²

In panentheism, as it is set forth by Hartshorne--a perspective to be examined in the next chapter--God literally contains the universe, and thereby also literally has all of the experiences that the temporal actual entities have. In Hartshorne's language, God is the "subject of all change" who includes all the experiences of finite subjects and in this sense includes the world. On this basis, then, can Whitehead be regarded as a panentheist?

Christian points out that while it is true that God doesprehend actual occasions, he does not share their

¹Ibid., pp. 137, 138, 244, 301.

²William A. Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1977), pp. 404-409.

immediacy. "Actual occasions enter into God's experience, but they do so as objects of his physical prehensions. . . . And an objectified entity has perished and lost its subjective immediacy. It is functioning as an object and not as a subject."¹ He continues, "Between God and an actual occasion there is no sharing of immediacy. In this respect God does not include the world but excludes it. God is not the subject of all change. There are real processes of change of which God is not the subject."²

In conjunction with the above, Christian reminds us that, according to Whitehead's metaphysical principles, contemporary actual entities are causally independent, that is, cannotprehend one another, or be objects for one another. Thus for any given "now" God cannot evenprehend the temporal occasions at all. Thus, Christian argues effectively that, for Whitehead, God does not literally include the actual world because (1) he does not include their experiences as subjects; he prehends them only as objects which have lost their subjective immediacy and (2) God cannot include, even as objects, the contemporary occasions.

An additional, but simple, argument which Christian does not mention is the difficulty of viewing God as all-inclusive when he is a single actual entity. In other

¹Ibid., p. 405.

²Ibid., p. 406.

words, could God be truly described as an actual entity if he literally included as part of himself all of the temporal occasions and societies of occasions which make up the finite world? It seems evident that Whitehead's description of God as an actual entity eliminates his theory of God from being panentheistic.

Since, on the basis of the above arguments, it seems that in Whitehead's view God transcends the world not only in his primordial nature but also in his consequent nature, can this perspective be regarded as more nearly a traditional theism than panentheism, as Christian believes?¹ If such is the case, it is certainly true that Whitehead's "theism" is not to be equated with traditional theism. As Thomas says, "Whitehead's view of God is so different in several respects from the traditional Theism . . . that it would probably be wise not to speak of him without qualification as a "theist."² This word of caution is surely justified. As we have already seen, Whitehead's God is neither truly personal nor truly creator. Nor is he transcendent in any unique sense. As noted above, there is indeed a sense in which Whitehead's God transcends the world in both his primordial and consequent natures, but this transcendence "is not peculiar to him. Every actual

¹Ibid., p. 406.

²George F. Thomas, Religious Philosophies of the West (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965), p. 373.

entity, in virtue of its novelty, transcends its universe, God included."¹ Again, Whitehead writes that "every actual entity also shares with God the characteristic of transcending all other actual entities, including God."² Thus if it can be argued that God transcends the world, it can also be argued that every actual entity in the world transcends God. Whitehead's concept of the transcendence of God seemingly allows no ontological distinction between God and the temporal entities. While it is true that Whitehead emphasises that God is a unique actual entity, being non-temporal in his primordial nature, it is equally true that Whitehead also stresses that there is only one genus of actual entity, including God.³ Although actual entities differ among themselves, some being more important than others, "yet in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level."⁴ Elsewhere Whitehead explicitly states that no "eminent reality" is to be attributed to God.⁵ The conclusion is inevitable; in Whitehead's view there is no ontological transcendence of God.

This lack of true transcendence on the part of God has to do not only with his relationship to the temporal occasions, but also with his relationship to creativity.

¹Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 143.

²Ibid., p. 339.

⁴Ibid., p. 28.

³Ibid., p. 168.

⁵Ibid., p. 521.

Creativity, of course, is the ultimate metaphysical principle and God is its primordial creature. Thus God, along with all of the temporal creatures, is "in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty."¹ It is evident therefore, that in the context of his relationship to both creativity and the other actual entities, God is not uniquely transcendent.

Further, it can be argued that Whitehead's God is finite. Such an argument must be made in the face of Whitehead's own explicit statement that God in his primordial nature, is infinite.² However, as Whitehead himself insists, God is deficient in actuality in his primordial nature and requires his consequent nature for his own completion. That is, as an actual entity, God cannot be abstracted from his consequent nature, and it is this consequent nature which makes him finite, that is dependent. As Whitehead says, "Conceptual experience can be infinite, but it belongs to the nature of physical experience that it is finite."³ Not only can God not be abstracted from his consequent nature, that is, his prehension of the temporal actual entities, he cannot be abstracted from the temporal entities themselves. In other words, in Whitehead's concept of coherence, God

¹Ibid., p. 529.

³Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 524.

and the temporal occasions presuppose each other; they need each other in Whitehead's system. Such "need" on the part of God excludes any possible claim that God is infinite. Whitehead has been justly criticized for sometimes writing as though God's primordial and consequent natures were two different "beings". Such, of course, is not the case. God is an actual entity and is therefore, by definition, dipolar. As argued above, his consequent pole makes him finite. This would not necessarily be true of a God who was the free creator of all temporal creatures. He could have knowledge of them without jeopardising his infinity. But in Whitehead's system, God and the occasions require each other. God needs them as much as they need him. God is dependent.

In light of the fact that Whitehead's God is not personal, not creator, not uniquely transcendent and not infinite, it would indeed be unwise to call Whitehead a traditional theist. What then is he?

Certainly Whitehead cannot be regarded as a pantheist. His emphasis upon the primordial nature of God makes this clear. Further, since in pantheism God and the world are equated one with the other, then God--as the world--would experience all of the subjective immediacy of the elements in the world. Such is not the case in Whitehead's view as we have seen. Thus, Whitehead is neither traditional theist, pantheist, nor panentheist.

The elimination of these alternatives leaves little room for further choice. However, Whitehead himself identifies his position clearly in the following passage:

There is another point in which the organic philosophy only repeats Plato. In the Timaeus the origin of the present cosmic epoch is traced back to an aboriginal disorder, chaotic according to our ideals. This is the evolutionary doctrine of the philosophy of organism.¹

With reference to his doctrine of God, Whitehead is a metaphysical dualist. His God is a finite God who has always been confronted with a reality other than himself. In this respect Whitehead's dualism is similar to that of Morgan described in the last chapter.

We now turn to a brief discussion of the internal integrity of Whitehead's philosophy of organism. In this short critique, the criteria applied will be those suggested by Whitehead himself, namely applicability, adequacy, coherence and logical consistency. With reference to applicability, Whitehead means that some items of experience can be interpreted within the context of his philosophy. This will be conceded. In light of the great variety of "things" of which this world is composed, it would seem unwise to conclude that none could be interpreted according to the metaphysical principles of organic realism.

However, as we move to the consideration of

¹Ibid., p. 146.

adequacy, by which Whitehead means that no items of experience are incapable of being interpreted by his philosophy, the conclusion may not be quite as evident as Whitehead himself would believe. Can the philosophy of organism really explain all items of experience from the greatest to the least? For example, can the actual entities composing the Castle Rock at Edinburgh really be "of one genus" with the actual entities which constitute a human being and his qualities, say, the genius of Whitehead himself? Of course, Whitehead makes clear that actual entities differ among themselves in terms of their degrees of importance and function, but the question still remains: is the intellect of Whitehead really only different in degree from the non-conscious "decisions" of the occasions making up the Castle Rock? Surely some case may be made for a more radical distinction than this. At least, it would seem that reasonable doubt can be offered concerning the adequacy of the philosophy of organism in this respect.

We now turn to Whitehead's concept of coherence, by which he means "that the fundamental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that in isolation they are meaningless."¹ An excellent illustration of the application of this concept is found in a previously quoted passage:

¹Ibid., p. 5.

. . . there is no meaning to 'creativity' apart from its 'creatures,' and no meaning to 'God' apart from the creativity and the 'temporal creatures,' and no meaning to the temporal creatures apart from 'creativity' and 'God.'¹

Whitehead does seem to have developed a metaphysics in which every element presupposes every other. Ironically, it is this "success" in stressing this particular concept of coherence that brings about one of the most damaging attacks against Whitehead's philosophy, and particularly against its logical consistency or lack of it in one crucial matter. Whitehead has developed a philosophy in which--in accordance with his concept of coherence--everything presupposes, requires or explains everything else, but nothing explains the whole. This basic ontological problem has been noted by others² but has been stated in a precise manner by Robert Neville. He argues that there is nothing in Whitehead's system to account for the existence of the actual entities. Creativity does not suffice since it "is indeterminate in abstraction from concrete events that exhibit it" and it therefore cannot be regarded as a normative principle that necessitates that there are actual entities.³

¹Ibid., p. 344.

²For example, E. L. Mascall, He Who Is (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1970), pp. 158, 159; William Temple, Nature, Man and God (London: Macmillan and Company Ltd., 1934), p. 263.

³Robert C. Neville, "Whitehead on the One and the Many," Southern Journal of Philosophy, VII (Winter, 1969), 390.

Whitehead, we imagine, would agree since only actual entities are effective according to his ontological principle.

However, as Neville points out, neither does the ontological principle account for the existence of actual entities; it has to do with the decision of entities in their process of becoming and "does not answer the question why there is any decision at all" ¹ The ontological principle does not solve the ontological problem and it is therefore "misleadingly named. It should be called the cosmological principle, since it deals with the constitution of the particularities of this cosmos." ² Neville thus rightly insists upon the distinction between such a cosmological principle and a truly ontological principle which would really explain the existence of entities and not merely the stages of their process. In this respect, Whitehead's ontological principle is deficient and, since this principle is central to the whole philosophy of organism, it would seem that some radical revision is required, a revision which would not only explain temporal process, but would also help us understand the existence of actual finites.

Before leaving this brief analysis of the internal

¹Ibid., p. 388.

²Ibid.

integrity of Whitehead's philosophy, we wish to direct our attention to one other question, namely, does Whitehead succeed in his effort to apply his metaphysical principles to God in such a way that God does not represent an exception to those principles? In one major respect it seems that Whitehead may have failed, and this with reference to God, as a single actual entity, possessing objective immortality. It will be recalled that Whitehead stresses that objective immortality is obtained at the cost of the subjective immediacy of the actual entity involved; it is no longer a prehending subject still in the process of concrescence, but is now an object to be prehended by succeeding actual entities. In other words, the subject perishes, having reached its satisfaction, and is then an object for others. Whitehead emphasises it thus:

All relatedness has its foundation in the relatedness of actualities; and such relatedness is wholly concerned with the appropriation of the dead by the living--that is to say, with 'objective immortality' whereby what is divested of its own living immediacy becomes a real component in other living immediacies of becoming.¹

In what sense, then, does God have objective immortality? Can God lose his subjective living immediacy in order that he might become an object for others? That God is indeed prehendend by the temporal creatures we have already seen; God belongs to the actual world of all occa-

¹Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. ix.

sions; through a hybrid prehension of God's conceptual feelings they derive their subjective aims. Further, Whitehead explicitly states that God has objective immortality in respect to both his primordial and consequent natures.¹ That God is an object for others is clear. The problem is, Whitehead uses language which seems to contradict such a possibility. He states that God, as a creature, is "always in concrescence and never in the past" and thereby is able to receive a constant reaction from the world. But if God, as an actual entity, is "always in concrescence and never in the past", how can he ever attain his "satisfaction"? And if his satisfaction is not attained, how can he be an object for others; how can he possess objective immortality? Whitehead's God is an actual entity always in concrescence, that is, always retaining his subjective immediacy, while at the same time he is always an object for others. Such a conclusion seems to be inevitable. Christian agrees. "Unlike other actual entities God does not perish. He is everlasting. Nothing could happen that would entail the final completion and perishing of God. God is always in concrescence and always satisfied."² In this conclusion Christian apparently sees nothing problematic for Whitehead's system. We beg to differ in this matter. There is a funda-

¹Ibid., p. 47.

²Christian, Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics, p. 397 (emphasis added).

mental contradiction at this point. How can God be always "satisfied" but never completed? If we transfer Whitehead's terminology to this question, the contradiction becomes evident: How can God be always objectively immortal but never objectively immortal? Or, Christian's statement that "God is always in concrescence and always satisfied" may be "translated" as "God always possesses subjective immediacy and always possesses objective immortality." We agree that Christian's interpretation of Whitehead at this point is correct; the point being made is that God, as an actual entity who is objectively immortal while retaining his subjective immediacy, is an exception to the metaphysical principles of Whitehead's own system.

Before concluding this chapter on Whitehead's view of reality and his dipolar theism, we will take this opportunity to compare the respective viewpoints of Alexander, Morgan and Whitehead, drawing particular attention to similarities rooted in their common perspective of British neo-realism.

We turn first of all to what is ultimate in each man's philosophy. For Alexander this ultimate is Space-Time with a "nisus", that is a straining or striving towards realisation of ever higher levels of finite existence, with these emergent finite existents referred to as the "creatures" of Space-Time. The similarity to Whitehead is obvious. Whitehead's ultimate, creativity, bears a

strong affinity to Alexander's Space-Time with its *nisus*; creativity also has its finite "creatures", the actual occasions. A further parallel can be drawn in that, for Alexander, Space-Time--with particular reference to the Time aspect of this dual entity--is the "principle of change"; for Whitehead, creativity is the "principle of novelty." There are, of course differences. For example, Alexander views Space-Time as a non-material entity, anterior to matter. Whitehead, on the other hand, does not regard creativity as an entity in itself; it cannot be abstracted from its creatures. Apart from the creatures there is no meaning to creativity. In this respect, Morgan sides with Whitehead against Alexander. For Morgan there is a basal physical or material level which cannot be regarded as an emergent; events even in their primordial form are not only spatio-temporal, but also physical. Thus, Alexander and Whitehead concur in their respective emphases upon "*nisus*" and "creativity"; Morgan and Whitehead concur that ultimately even the physical events are required. All three men agree that ultimate reality is dynamic. This "process" concept is a fundamental tenet of British neo-realist metaphysics.

Another fundamental aspect of British neo-realism is its emphasis upon emergence. Again, all three philosophers under discussion share this basic concept. Alexander and Morgan place their emphasis upon a theory of emergence as

opposed to the production of mere resultants. In other words, they stressed the emergence of novelty. Whitehead shared this emphasis with them, drawing the distinction between efficient causation which accounted for what was merely inherited from the past, and final causation which accounted for the production of novelty. Again, close kinship can be seen in the views of all three men in their views as to how such emergence of novelty occurs. Alexander speaks of emergence arising from groupings of point-instants or pure events whose relationship can be described as "social". Whitehead describes novelty as being produced by the decision of actual entities which are interdependent and "social" in their relationship. Morgan stresses that what emerges is a new form of relatedness. Although the views are far from identical, the affinity is evident.

With reference to what each man regarded as the agent or cause of emergence, Morgan and Whitehead are more closely related in their views, whereas Alexander differs substantially. It will be recalled that Alexander viewed Time--one aspect of the dual entity, Space-Time--as the generator of qualities. By its very nature, Time is the principle of impermanence and the real creator of emergents. To this view Morgan took exception, claiming that although time is by nature successive, this does not imply creativity on its part. He therefore introduced his concept of God through whose "Activity" emergents arise. Morgan speaks

of emergence occurring in response to "God who draws all things and all men upwards", and that men can feel within the "urge" upon which this theory can be and is founded. Morgan's view is certainly similar to that of Whitehead for whom God, as an actual entity, presents the "lure" by which each temporal occasion moves on to its satisfaction. As we noted, God is therefore the agent of novelty. Thus for Alexander, Time is effective; for Morgan, Time is not effective and he therefore postulates God; for Whitehead, only actual entities are effective (on the basis of the ontological principle) and so God, as an actual entity, is required as explanation for progress and novelty.

Moving on now to Whitehead's view of the dipolarity of nature, here again we find that he draws on a perspective not uncommon to British neo-realism. Although it was left to Whitehead to speak specifically of "dipolarity", the same concept is clearly seen in both Alexander and Morgan. Alexander sets it forth in a theory of correspondence, namely that something corresponding to "mind" exists at every level of being. Morgan expounds the same basic theory, calling it correlation. In this view, all physical events have psychical or mental correlates and all mental events have physical correlates; there are no physical systems which are not also psychical systems. The parallel to Whitehead's view of dipolarity, in which all actual entities have both physical and mental poles, is obvious. All three views fall under

the category of panpsychism. This is one of the ironies of British neo-realist metaphysics. While it arose in opposition to the absolute idealism of the very early twentieth century which attributed everything to mind, it never fully escaped it; British neo-realism, in turn, attributed "mind" to everything.

Finally, we come to the concept of God. Again, although not identical, the views of these three men are, in some instances, strikingly similar. For example, Alexander describes God as an infinite creature of Space-Time; Whitehead speaks of God as the primordial creature of creativity. For Alexander God has two aspects to his nature, his all-inclusive body (in process towards deity) and his transcendence, that is his "deity", always future but never realised. For Whitehead, God has two "poles", one primordial and the other consequent, although we have argued that for Whitehead, God is not all-inclusive. Just as Alexander's God is in process towards deity (new empirical qualities yet future) so Whitehead's God reaps the benefit of the novel additions to his own consequent nature. Morgan, while agreeing that God has both temporal and non-temporal features, disagrees with the concept of God himself being caught up in the process of emergence or novelty. Therefore in this case, Alexander and Whitehead bear more similarity to each other than they do to Morgan. Another respect in which Morgan disagrees with Alexander and Whitehead has reference to whether God is dependent upon the

finite existents. It will be recalled that for Morgan, dependence is always a "one way street", the lower events depending upon the higher, but never the higher upon the lower. Consequently, God cannot depend upon anyone or any thing. Against this, Alexander and Whitehead both agree that God is dependent upon the finite existents, just as they are dependent upon God.

However, if Morgan does not like to speak of God as depending upon the world, he does concede that God necessarily "involves" the world, that is, Morgan states that he could form no adequate conception of God in isolation from the world. This language parallels closely that of Whitehead when he states that there is no meaning to God apart from the temporal creatures.

A matter in which Morgan and Whitehead agree against Alexander has to do with the actuality of God. Alexander, of course, states that God as actually possessing deity does not exist. Morgan, on the contrary, stresses that what he acknowledges is an Ideal which actually exists. Whitehead, as we have seen, states that God is fully actual, this because of his consequent nature which completes the deficient actuality of his primordial nature. It is interesting to note that the contrast between the views of Alexander and Morgan is reminiscent of the contrast between the earlier and later views of Whitehead which Cobb draws attention to and which are discussed at

the beginning of this chapter.

One final word should be said concerning the respective concepts of God set forth by Morgan and Whitehead. Both writers seek a systematic philosophy which is coherent and logically consistent. Morgan postulates God under his concept of acknowledgment, by which he means that the theory is subject to neither proof nor disproof but lends coherence to his scheme. Thus, for Morgan, God is postulated as an explanation for the process of emergence, and this postulation is intended to lend consistency to Morgan's philosophy. In one respect, Whitehead also sets forth a postulational theism. This is the case because, as noted earlier, Whitehead himself admits that with reference to his concept of God nothing in the nature of proof is offered. Yet, as we also noted, Whitehead's system "requires" God as the actual entity who is the agent of novelty. However, one must make a distinction between the postulational theism of Morgan and that of Whitehead. In the former, God is postulated by Morgan without any effort being made to subject that concept to the same principles which apply to the rest of Morgan's philosophy. Such, of course, may not be a weakness; the assumption that the same metaphysical principles which apply to finite creatures must also apply to God perhaps cannot be maintained. In any case, this assumption, apparently rejected by Morgan, is accepted

by Whitehead. Thus in postulating God, Whitehead at least attempted to construct a concept of God which was not an exception to the metaphysical principles of his scheme. As argued earlier, this attempt failed.

One other matter of importance is shared by these three men. All of them devised theories of reality which share a common weakness: the ontological problem. None of them really deals with the basic question as to why anything exists at all. They are all concerned, and justly so, with an explanation for the temporal process; the question of finite existence is, in the final analysis, unanswered.

We have seen, then, that Alexander, Morgan and Whitehead have very much in common with reference to their theories of ultimate reality, emergence, the dipolarity of nature, and God. We believe that the foregoing comparative study, based upon the works of Alexander, Morgan and Whitehead as explicated in these three chapters, surely demonstrates the common viewpoint shared by all three philosophers. That common viewpoint was British neo-realism. Consequently, we believe that the purpose of this research is well on its way to being accomplished; the influence of Whitehead on American dipolar theism, and more specifically on Hartshorne, resulted in an affinity of thought between British neo-realism as a whole and American panentheism. It was our purpose to

set forth this relationship of ideas between these two philosophical perspectives in a more systematic fashion than previously shown. Thus to complete our objective, it remains to be shown within the framework of this research a point generally acknowledged, namely the influence of Whitehead on Hartshorne.

Therefore, as we continue our study in the next chapter dealing with Hartshorne's panentheism, although the major point will be to show the influence of Whitehead on Hartshorne, the conclusion of our study thus far will not be forgotten; Whitehead's influence on Hartshorne resulted in an affinity of thought not only in these two philosophers, but also in two great philosophies. We turn now to a study of Hartshorne's panentheism.

CHAPTER FOUR

CHARLES HARTSHORNE: SURRELATIVE PANENTHEISM

In America, the influence of Whitehead is perhaps best seen in the work of Charles Hartshorne. One is tempted to consider Hartshorne as the best known "disciple" of Whitehead but, although Hartshorne is undoubtedly indebted to Whitehead for much of his thought, he is justly recognized as an independent thinker in his own right who did not merely follow Whitehead, but rather adapted and expanded his work. Those who participate in the discipline of philosophical theology should recognize their debt to Hartshorne in at least two respects. First of all, as Hartshorne himself states, Whitehead's work is for many readers "inaccessibly intricate".¹ Hartshorne therefore has attempted, with much success, to make Whitehead's work more available to more people through expounding Whitehead's writings in less technical terms where such has been possible. Secondly, whereas Whitehead through choice or limited time confined most of his exposition to the philosophical realm, Hartshorne has applied Whitehead's philosophical principles primarily to the theological realm and, more specifically, has applied them

¹Charles Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1964), p. x.

to the concept of the being of God.

As will be seen in this chapter, the similarity of Hartshorne's view to that of Whitehead will be evident. This will particularly be the case with reference to the theories of a "social" cosmology and a God who is also truly social. However, as we shall see later, it may well be the case that Hartshorne's view of God is not quite as similar to that of Whitehead as Hartshorne himself thinks, this with particular reference to Hartshorne's view of God as a temporal succession of actual entities and as all-inclusive, that is, the doctrine of panentheism. As will be recalled, we argued in the last chapter that in Whitehead's view God is a single actual entity and not a society, and that Whitehead's concept of God was not panentheistic in its formulation. Thus, we will contend that while Hartshorne's view bears extremely close affinity to that of Whitehead, Hartshorne's conclusions are more of an adaptation of Whitehead than even Hartshorne himself realised.

The influence of Whitehead on Hartshorne is varied. In some cases it is perhaps not quite as immediate as had been considered. For example, Hartshorne relates that his view concerning God as temporal as well as eternal and his concept of reality as panpsychistic did not derive directly from Whitehead. The former he attributes primarily to

Hocking,¹ and the latter he regards as an idea he held prior to any acquaintance with academic philosophy.² However, this is not to deny Whitehead's influence on Hartshorne in these crucial matters. On the contrary, Hartshorne concedes his great indebtedness to Whitehead as the one who had given these matters their classic and therefore most influential expression.³ In addition, Hartshorne constantly refers to the similarity existing between his own views and those of Whitehead.⁴ Thus it would be fair to say that although other philosophers (for example Hocking) had a chronologically prior influence on Hartshorne, no single philosopher had the impact of Whitehead on Hartshorne's thinking. Indeed, Hartshorne states that in some respects Whitehead's influence may well be even greater than perhaps many have realised. For example, while some may see in Hartshorne's writings the influence of the American pragmatists, especially Peirce, James and Dewey, Hartshorne insists that their contribution was not great, because he is inclined to

¹We shall briefly review Hocking's influence on Hartshorne in the next chapter.

²Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1971), p. 18.

³Ibid., p. 20.

⁴Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. ix, xiii, 28, 29.

think "that what is valid in pragmatism is largely contained in Whitehead."¹ Thus Whitehead's influence on Hartshorne is indeed extensive.

Hartshorne seeks to take the Whiteheadian principles set forth in the previous chapter and apply them primarily to the concept of God. In this effort he is concerned with setting forth his view of God within the context of two general standards. First of all, the concept of God must be free from logical contradiction or absurdity.² Secondly, the idea of God must be so formulated as to preserve and perhaps even increase its religious value.³ With reference to both criteria Hartshorne believes he has been successful. As to the first standard, Hartshorne --as one would expect from any metaphysician--obviously believes his scheme to be internally coherent. As to the second, he concludes that his doctrine of God is in line with the spirit of the Gospels⁴ and is not hopelessly in disagreement with the views of Jesus and the prophets.⁵

Before turning specifically to Hartshorne's doctrine of God, we must first direct our attention to his cosmology since such will give added insight into the subsequent concept of God. In common with the philosophers

¹Reality as Social Process, pp. 20, 21.

²The Divine Relativity, pp. ix, 1, 2.

³Ibid., p. 1.

⁴Reality as Social Process, p. 23. ⁵Ibid., p. 196.

discussed in the previous three chapters, Hartshorne regards all reality as being social; reality is social process.¹ For this theory that reality is essentially social, Hartshorne introduces the term "societism".² In this societism there is no individual unit of reality which is not social. God is social (a matter to which we shall return shortly), human nature is social,³ animals are social,⁴ plants are social,⁵ and seemingly inorganic parts of nature are in some sense social.⁶ But what does it mean to be social? Hartshorne defines the social as,

. . . the appeal of life for life, of experience for experience. It is "shared experience," the echo of one experience in another. Hence nothing can be social that is without experience. The minimum of experience, let us further agree, is feeling. Creatures are social if they feel, and feel in relation to each others' feelings.⁷

Again he states, "The social theory of existence denies that any individual unit of reality . . . is absolutely without feeling or free creative action."⁸ Thus, when Hartshorne contends that all reality is social, he is

¹Ibid., p. 17.

⁷Ibid., p. 34.

²Ibid., p. 24.

⁸Ibid., p. 134.

³Divine Relativity, p. 27.

⁴Reality as Social Process, p. 34.

⁵Ibid., p. 35.

⁶Ibid., pp. 35, 36.

arguing that reality is composed of individual units of feeling. The language could easily be that of Whitehead. The influence is obvious, the views extremely similar. For Hartshorne, as for Whitehead, reality is panpsychistic.

Hartshorne argues for panpsychism on the basis of aesthetics, that is, the world is more aesthetically pleasing or beautiful if the panpsychistic conclusion is true. He asks,

Is the universe as a whole beautiful? Certainly it contains more contrasts than anything else, for all contrasts fall within it. And it does have unity

But there is one contrast in the world which seems unbalanced by any sufficient unity. This is the contrast between living mind and mere dead matter, between that which has feeling and emotion and memory and desire, and that which totally lacks these traits. Now such a contrast as this between the living and the dead, that which has feeling and that which has none, is not beautiful

The way to bring the most beauty into our picture of the world is to regard atoms and the other inferior individuals as very simple, low-grade types of minds, or sub-minds, with their own to us more or less unimaginable feelings. Then we have immense . . . contrasts between the various levels and kinds of mind and feeling. Mind in general becomes the theme of which the entire universe is a system of variations.¹

Hartshorne therefore argues for a panpsychistic view of the universe on the aesthetic basis that there is a need for the greatest possible contrasts, and that such contrasts would be absent if panpsychism were not true. Hartshorne's emphasis upon aesthetics will be just as significant in his doctrine of God, as we shall see later.

¹Man's Vision of God, pp. 213, 214.

For Hartshorne, not only are there different levels or complexities of mind, there are different types of societies, two to be precise, namely democratic and monarchical. A democratic society is one in which all the members are of similar grade with no single dominant member.¹ An example of a democratic society--which Hartshorne borrows from Whitehead--is a tree in which each of the cells has more functional unity than the whole tree.² A monarchical society, on the other hand, has a dominant ruling member which is radically superior to the others,³ and because the other members are in subordination to a superior, "in a monarchical society the entire group acts with a functional unity comparable or superior to that of the various members."⁴ Probably the best example of a monarchical society is that of the human being. As Hartshorne says, "The living human body is a society of cells (relatively low-grade individuals) plus one high-grade individual, the human personality whose body it is."⁵

On this distinction which Hartshorne makes between democratic and monarchical societies, he bases an argument

¹Reality as Social Process, pp. 35, 133.

²Ibid., p. 35.

³Ibid., p. 133.

⁴Ibid., p. 38.

⁵Ibid., p. 133.

for the existence and nature of God. Using the human body-personality relationship analogously, Hartshorne argues that

. . . a portion or sub-class of a monarchical society may in itself be a democracy. Thus, the cells of the heart, though they act together, do so only in crude fashion as compared to the unity of action found in the growth and self-maintenance of the single cells composing the heart. No ruling member of the heart society, it seems, imposes unity of action upon the society, though the ruler of the entire body, the human personality, does of course, influence the heart action. Now this suggests the idea that all societies, however democratic, may be portions of an all-inclusive monarchical society, the entire universe, with order imposed throughout by a single dominant all-ruling member.¹

Hartshorne continues the argument by contending that God must be understood as the dominant ruling member of the universal monarchical society if any sense is to be made of the fact that the world continues to exist without disintegration into chaos.

The members of a democracy which is merely that, in other words, which lacks an imposed ruler, would not be compelled to cooperate. Would they even be able to do so? Nothing would guarantee the continuance of the society from moment to moment save the infinite good luck that they all happened to use their freedom in ways servicable to the society If there were in the universe no radically dominant member, able to set limits to the chaotic possibilities of individual freedom, it seems there would be no reason why the scheme of things should not dissolve in a chaos of unmitigated conflict Hence it seems clear that the universe as a going concern must be a monarchical

¹Ibid., p. 38.

society

What we have arrived at is the question of the existence and nature of God, as it arises in any philosophy based on the social conception of reality.¹

Thus, for Hartshorne, the social theory of reality becomes an argument not only for God's existence, but also for attributing to God a specific nature; he is the radically dominant member in the monarchical society of the cosmos who imposes order on the society by setting limits upon the freedom of the included democratic societies, thereby prohibiting sheer chaos and encouraging mutual co-operation.

With reference to this description of the nature of God, the question arises as to the relationship existing between God, as the radically dominant member of the cosmic society, and the other members of the society. Hartshorne acknowledges that the relation of God to the world must be conceived by analogy with relations given in human experience.² (We have already noted something of this view where Hartshorne states that the human personality as the dominant ruling member of the human body suggests that the cosmos as a whole requires a radically dominant member, that is, God). That such an analogy is justified Hartshorne argues on the basis that man is indeed the image of God.³ What then, does human

¹ Ibid., p. 39. See also p. 135.

² Man's Vision of God, p. 174.

³ Ibid.

experience tell us concerning God's relation to the world?

The most obvious quality of human experience is that it is social. Our experience is permeated by, indeed in a real sense, constituted by our social relations with others. Thus by analogy Hartshorne concludes that the relationship between God and the world can be conceived as social.¹ The view that the relationship between God and the world is social has two strengths. First of all, it is religiously significant inasmuch as God has been viewed as a father caring for his children, an obviously social relationship.² Secondly, social relationships are meaningful and understandable to us. We live by them, with them and in them every day of our lives; we know what it is for a relationship to be social.

However, although Hartshorne believes that the social analogy is to be preferred over any other because of its religious significance, he regards it as deficient in several respects: the social analogy "throws no light on the radical superiority of creator to creatures; and it throws no light on the immanence or omnipresence ascribed to God."³ In addition, the social analogy does not allow us to conceive of God's relationship to us as immediate since human intercourse "is apparently not direct contact

¹Ibid., p. 175.

³Ibid., p. 175.

²Ibid., pp. 175, 202.

of mind with mind, but requires intermediaries, such as vibrations of the air particles between their bodies."¹ Thus, in Hartshorne's assessment, the social analogy fails to do justice to God's radical superiority as creator, his immanence or omnipresence, and the immediacy of his relations with the world.

Hartshorne therefore seeks another analogy drawn from human experience which will do justice to the elements mentioned above. He insists that such an analogy must be based upon a relationship which will treat the human personality as radically superior to sub-human creatures. In Hartshorne's view, there is another analogy drawn from human experience which will accomplish this purpose and which is to be preferred philosophically to the social analogy; it is the mind-body or organic analogy. This analogy is not without its difficulties but these are in Hartshorne's view not insurmountable. He writes,

Our relation to the sub-human, to bear much analogy to the relation of God to the world, must be a relation to a whole of things all of which are radically inferior to us, and in which whole we may be said to be something like omnipresent or immanent. There is one and only one such whole--the human body.²

Thus the mind-body analogy is strong where the social analogy is weak. The organic analogy allows for radical superiority of a dominant member of the society which is

¹Ibid., p. 187.

²Ibid., p. 175.

the human body, for the concept of immanence and also for immediacy in the relationship of mind to body.

The organic analogy, however, also has its weaknesses. For example, the "human body does not, for direct perception, contain distinct individual things, as the world to which God is to be related certainly does."¹ Hartshorne overcomes this particular problem by insisting, in keeping with his social theory of reality, that the human body is in actual fact a "world" of individuals, microscopic in scale--"and a mind . . . is to that body something like an indwelling God."² There are, however, two other weaknesses in the organic analogy acknowledged by Hartshorne.

The organic relation is factually immediate but mysterious or unintelligible as it stands. (It is further insufficient in that the relation of God to man which we particularly wish to understand is that of mind to mind, whereas the relation of a man's mind to his cells appears to be the relation of "mind" to "matter.")³

Thus far Hartshorne has presented us with two analogies, each with strengths and weaknesses. The social analogy, which Hartshorne prefers for religious reasons, has the advantage of being intelligible to us and has to do with mind to mind relations, but lacks the immediacy of relationship which is required of God's relation to the world; the mind-body analogy, which Hartshorne prefers philosophically,

¹Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 187.

²Ibid., p. 177.

has the advantage of this immediacy of relationship, but the relationship itself is mysterious and unintelligible, and has to do with mind to matter rather than mind to mind.

Thus we have two analogies, each of which is strong where the other is weak, and neither of which alone can suffice What is to be done? What could possibly be done except to combine the two analogies so as to produce a unitary variable without either the seeming unintelligibility and materialistic character of the one or the non-immediacy of the other? We have only to suppose the mind-body relationship is immediately social the body is a society of living organic cells. We have only to suppose that these cells possess humble forms of feeling or desire to reach the position that the human mind influences and is influenced by them through immediate (there is nothing to mediate it) sharing of feeling, with much indistinctness on both sides¹

Thus Hartshorne concludes that the combined organic-social analogy must be the best means of constructing a conception of God and his relations with the world.²

Three consequences follow from the adoption of the organic-social analogy. One is thereby committed to (1) "a certain interpretation of the mind-body relation,"³ (2) the view that all of reality is social, that is, "a relational form of panpsychism,"⁴ and (3) the theory that the world is God's body. With reference to point

¹Ibid., pp. 187, 188.

²Ibid., p. 204.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

(1), Hartshorne has little to say except that it is his view that "there are no facts which disprove the social character of the surely immediate mind-body relations, and some which suggest it."¹ It is not to be forgotten, of course, that Hartshorne has already conceded that the mind-body relationship is "mysterious or unintelligible" --one of the weaknesses of the organic analogy taken on its own--but in his estimation this relationship must be regarded as social as described above. As to point number (2) Hartshorne, as we have seen, not only concedes the necessity of the panpsychistic conclusion on the basis of the organic-social analogy, but insists upon it. His insistence is founded upon two basic arguments which we have already noted, namely, the general metaphysical argument that all of reality is social and the more restricted aesthetic argument that the contrast between living and dead is not truly beautiful, and therefore life and feeling must be attributed to all units of reality. We now direct our attention to the third consequence of the organic-social analogy; the world is God's body.

To the concept of the universe as God's body we have already been introduced in Hartshorne's writings to the effect that God is the dominant all ruling member of the cosmic monarchical society. The organic-social analogy

¹Ibid., p. 187.

sets forth the relationship between God and the other members of the society as a social relationship, thereby implying their experience of and feelings for one another. Hartshorne asks us to "consider seriously the doctrine that the world is God's body, to whose members he has immediate social relations, and which are related to each other, directly or indirectly, exclusively by social relations."¹

Although Hartshorne is satisfied with the organic-social analogy, he recognizes that certain questions may be raised with reference to at least apparent weaknesses in the analogy, and he therefore attempts to answer some of these questions which can be anticipated. For example, if the world is God's body then how does one deal with the problem of evil? Hartshorne concedes that this is the most serious problem confronting the organic analogy.² After all, if the world is God's body, must God not be held responsible for the acts of wickedness perpetrated by parts of himself, that is, the finite existents which constitute his body? Hartshorne responds in two ways: first, God is not qualified by moral evil, only by aesthetic evil; secondly, since the finite existents constituting God's body possess not only feelings but also freedom, God cannot be held responsible for their

¹Ibid., p. 192.

²Ibid., p. 195.

actions. We now let Hartshorne speak for himself on these matters.

We must . . . admit that in some sense the world body is not an absolute, perfectly harmonized unity For him [God] and in the world body no conflicts occur except such as are to him tolerable. But this does not mean that for God no conflict and nothing unpleasant occurs at all

It is to be noted that omniscience must in some fashion know evil. Now to know involves experience; hence God must experience the quality of evil. Could he experience the evil of conflict if there were nothing in his being but sheer harmony?

Does this imply that God must experience wickedness through himself being wicked, as he must experience conflict by himself suffering from it? I reply that conflict is positive in a sense in which wickedness is not. God is himself qualified by what is positive in evil, namely discord, which is not mere absence of harmony, but positive clash. But he is not qualified by the privative element essential to moral evil, namely blindness to the interests of others

It may be said that there is an element of positive willfulness in wickedness, which we call perversity. But the answer is that it is not simply as deliberate volition that perversity is perverse, but as the deliberate choice of non-realization over realization Only aesthetic evil which alone is not privative (it is not the absence of things which harmonize but the presence of things which conflict), can qualify God.

From another point of view this is clear enough, in that aesthetic evil is "suffered," while moral evil is enacted, chosen. God must suffer all things, for he must participate in all things to know them, but he cannot be said to choose all things, for he has granted choices also to the creatures.¹

¹Ibid., pp. 195-197.

Thus Hartshorne contends--in terms rather reminiscent of Augustine--that God is not qualified by moral evil since such is not positive but privative. He is, however, qualified by, or affected by the aesthetic evil in the universe, that is the contrasts and disharmony produced within the body. Hartshorne further maintains that although God is all inclusive, he is not involved in the evil choices of creatures because those creatures are free.

But are they truly free? Can the individual units of reality, each a part of God's body, be genuinely free in terms of their own desires and actions? After all, does not the personality as the dominant member of the human body dictate the action of the body as a whole, the parts of the body simply complying with the desires and purposes of the dominant member? Hartshorne's response is to continue with the organic analogy, basing his argument at the cellular level. In the human body the cells cannot feel dominated by the personality whose body it is because the human being "must be incomprehensible to the cell to such an extent as to constitute merely a sort of environment, not a definite term of a social relation."¹ Hartshorne draws the parallel,

Again, consider the relations of a man to a

¹Ibid., p. 190.

radically superior mind, such as God
 What would this imply? The man would not have the divine as a clear and distinct datum; for if he saw God distinctly he would be God, himself omniscient. Thus, as the man to the cell, the divine to the man would be a vague environment rather than a definite social other And the vagueness which inevitably limits the direct vision which we men could possibly have of God gives us plenty of freedom of interpretation of the divine datum, this freedom going all the way to denying that there is a God. An indistinct datum can always be explained away, if not completely, still sufficiently for a good many purposes.¹

Thus Hartshorne seeks to preserve the freedom of the creatures by regarding God, the dominant ruling member of the world society, as an indistinct datum, a vague environment rather than a definite social other. Our knowledge of God, as he is related to the world, must be regarded as infinitesimal.²

There are two other questions to which Hartshorne responds concerning the organic-social analogy. First, is this analogy not inadequate inasmuch as bodies, being composite and mutable, are also destructible?³ What then of God's body? Hartshorne's reply is that just as even the weakest minds have some preserving power over their bodies, so the "most eminent mind" may amount to "an unconditional power to preserve the body always"⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 190, 191.

²The Divine Relativity, pp. 40, 41, 92.

³Man's Vision of God, p. 180.

⁴Ibid.

In this sense, God's body is uniquely perfect. If it be complained that at this point Hartshorne is inconsistent in his presentation, he reminds us that the bodies with which we are familiar eventually disint^egrate because of an external environment over which we have no immediate control. The universe, on the other hand, has no external environment, no external factors upon which it depends; it immediately controls all its parts and so is self-maintaining.¹ In this respect--as well as others we shall note later--the universe, being maintained by an "eminent mind", is an eminent effect.²

The remaining question which is raised concerning the organic-social analogy may be phrased as follows: "Does the analogy not break down inasmuch as the mind-body relation is dependent upon a nervous system and sense organs for the qualities of experience and feeling?" Hartshorne responds by turning this seeming deficiency to an advantage. He concedes that

God cannot . . . have a nervous system or sense organs, for these are bodily parts with a preferential relation to the mind. And if by "sensation" we mean experience mediated by sense organs, then God has no sense experiences. But if by sensation we mean that aspect of experience which is neither thought nor volition, neither meaning nor action, but qualitative feeling, then God can as little be free from sensation as man. . . . God will have not the least but the most of the richness supplied by such qualities;

¹Ibid., p. 181.

²Ibid.

but he will derive them from all parts of the world body, not merely from focal points which would constitute sense organs.^{1, 2}

In other words, it is precisely because God is not dependent upon a nervous system or sense organs that he is able to enjoy the fullest intimacy with all parts of his body. In this sense the divine organism is more organic than man himself,³ and God, having this immediate intimacy with all parts of the body is able "to participate without reserve in every last fragment of feeling and thought anywhere"⁴ Thus God is "the subject of all change,"⁵ the one who is eminently related to all things.⁶

This theory that God is eminently or supremely related to all things, Hartshorne terms "surrelativism" and is eager to deny that it is a pantheistic doctrine. Pantheism rejects the personality of deity and makes God identical with the universe. According to Hartshorne, it is true that the

. . . total actual state of deity-now, as surrelative to the present universe, has nothing outside itself, and in that sense is the All. But the individual essence of deity (what makes

¹Ibid., p. 199.

²There is a striking similarity here to Alexander's view that "our minds . . . and everything else in the world are 'organic sensa' of God." (Supra, p. 26, emphasis added).

³Man's Vision of God, p. 200.

⁴Ibid., p. 265.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Divine Relativity, pp. 76, 123.

God God, or the divine divine) is utterly independent of this All, since any other possible all (and there are infinite possibilities of different totalities) would have been compatible with this essence.¹

This essence of God, which Hartshorne equates with God's character or personality,² is absolutely independent of any particular universe and consequently "can be correlated with any possible character you please in its correlate, the world."³ Thus for Hartshorne, whatever form the world may take, the essence of God--his character or personality--remains absolutely independent of those particular finite existents.

If Hartshorne's denial that his theory is not representative of pantheism is justified--and we believe that it is justified--what description would suffice? Hartshorne himself adopts the term "panentheism"⁴ for the view that "deity is in some real aspect distinguishable from and independent of any and all relative items, and yet, taken as an actual whole, includes all relative items."⁵ In this concept, while God is "literally all inclusive" he is both the system of dependent things

¹Ibid., pp. 88, 89.

²Ibid., pp. 80, 88, 89, 90; Man's Vision of God, p. 110.

³Divine Relativity, p. 80; see also pp. 81, 89.

⁴Ibid., pp. ix, 89, 90.

⁵Ibid., p. 89.

and something independent of it.¹ We have now reached Hartshorne's view of God as dipolar: in one aspect God is relative, supremely related to every contingent existent; in another aspect--in his character or personality--he is absolute which by Hartshorne's own definition means "nonrelative."²

Hartshorne regards absolute and relative as polar concepts which require each other³ and sets forth both philosophic and religious reasons for the necessity of both poles. For example, in terms of metaphysics it is not possible to think of everything as relative, because "if all things are relative . . . then at least relativity itself . . . must be something invariant, non-relative, or 'absolute.'"⁴ Further, in terms of religion, God must be regarded as absolute since "absolute-ness is requisite for complete reliability."⁵ However, also within the context of religion, the complete or total absoluteness of God would not be admirable or appropriate since this would mean that God would be in no way related to the world and would be totally neutral or insensitive to our needs.⁶ Some dependence on God's

¹Ibid., p. 90.

²Ibid., pp. 19, 83.

³Man's Vision of God, p. 15.

⁴Divine Relativity, p. 6.

⁵Ibid., p. 22.

⁶Ibid., pp. 42, 43.

part, on the other hand, would be admirable since this would mean that he would be related to the world and could respond appropriately to each and every circumstance.¹

This dependent or relative aspect of God which is constituted by the contingent existents--that is, God's body--is according to Hartshorne, in a very real sense necessary as a correlate to the absolute or nonrelative aspect of God. On this very important point we quote at length from Hartshorne.

God's necessity of existing, while our existence is contingent, may simply mean that had we not existed, still some creatures or other would necessarily have existed, sufficient for God's needs. Any particular contingent thing might not have existed; but it does not follow that there might have been no contingent things. It would be a contradiction to say that a certain accidental thing happens by necessity; but there is no contradiction in saying that it is necessary that some accidents or other should happen, that there should be accidents.....

Thus God may depend, even for his essence, upon there being creatures, but he may have power to guarantee absolutely that there should be such; while beyond his essential characters he may necessarily have accidental ones²

On the same theme Hartshorne writes,

It may be necessary, not contingent, that there be some contingent things or other There is no possibility of "nothing contingent," but only of this contingent thing or that contingent thing or some other contingent thing (other

¹Ibid., p. 45.

²Man's Vision of God, p. 108.

than sheer nothing)

The import of the foregoing is that the absoluteness of God need not imply his non-relationship to the creation as such, but only to the contingent alternatives of creation.¹

And again,

. . . the abstract is neutral with regard to alternatives of concrete embodiment but is not neutral to the alternative, some embodiment or none.²

In this important matter we select one final quotation.

Since absolute is defined in terms of relativity, as such, it cannot be independent of relativity in every sense, but it can be independent of which relative things there are.³

It is abundantly clear that in Hartshorne's view God's abstract, absolute aspect requires some accidental embodiment or other. This accidental embodiment, whatever form it takes, is God's concrete relative aspect constituted, as we noted earlier, by the physical universe, God's body. Having clarified that both aspects of God require each other, we now turn to a further examination of the nature of each aspect, paying particular attention to the contrasts involved.

Hartshorne equates the abstract and concrete aspects of God with the primordial and consequent natures respectively of Whitehead's God, the abstract or essential aspect being purely eternal and the concrete accidental

¹Divine Relativity, pp. 73, 74.

²Ibid., p. 87.

³Ibid., p. 74.

aspect being temporal.¹ In his absolute character God is existence or "Being itself,"² that is pure being abstracted from any concrete accidental embodiments; he is, in this abstract essence, "no actual subject."³ However, in his concrete aspect God is not pure being, but is the total actual being of a given moment, "with all achieved determinations."⁴ The similarity to Whitehead's view of God's primordial nature being deficient in actuality, but this deficiency being countered by the fully actual consequent pole, is evident.

In his essence or absolute aspect God is necessary; in his concrete aspect he is contingent.⁵ That is to say, in his essence and for his existence God is absolutely independent of any particular finites, but he depends upon those finites for his concrete experience.⁶ Thus, for Hartshorne there is an element of divine emergence, namely the achieved concrete experience. "All such achievement is an emergent, a creation, even if it be divine achievement."⁷

¹Man's Vision of God, p. 234.

²Ibid., pp. 93, 284; Divine Relativity, pp. 87, 88.

³Reality as Social Process, p. 76.

⁴Divine Relativity, p. 88.

⁵Man's Vision of God, p. 29; Divine Relativity, p. 32.

⁶Man's Vision of God, pp. 107, 164; Reality as Social Process, pp. 138, 139.

⁷Reality as Social Process, p. 203.

Another contrast which can be drawn between the two aspects of God is that in his absolute aspect God is perfect whereas in his concrete aspect he is perfectible. That is, as abstract he is ethically perfect; as concrete he is aesthetically perfectible without limit.¹ Although God's ethical perfection is absolute, that is independent of any finite existents, he "needs" the creatures for the intrinsic beauty of their lives, which beauty adds to the life of God.² This aesthetic need of God exists because, in Hartshorne's view as we have already seen, the beautiful must contain contrast and "it is as necessary that there be variety, multiplicity, in God as that there be unity."³ Thus Hartshorne's "aesthetic" argument which we noted earlier has a two-fold thrust. First he argues that to be truly beautiful the universe must be constituted by individual units of reality each of which must possess feelings; secondly, he contends that the universe thus constituted supplies God's aesthetic needs by its inclusion in his being.

Now, if it is the case that God is in his concrete aspect aesthetically perfectible without limit, always having new "enjoyments" added to his own life, can he then meaningfully be described as a truly perfect God? Hart-

¹Man's Vision of God, pp. 29, 50, 159.

²Ibid., p. 163.

³Ibid., p. 217.

shorne answers in the affirmative but concedes the need to redefine "perfection".¹ He states,

. . . we define the perfect, or supremely excellent or good, as that individual being . . . than which no other individual being could conceivably be greater, but which itself, in another "state," could become greater (perhaps by the creation within itself of new constituents) Or again, let us say that the perfect is the "self-surpassing surpasser of all." The self-surpassing surpasser of all has the power of unfailingly enjoying as its own constituents whatever imperfect things come to exist. Then it will be bound to possess in its own unity all the values which the imperfect things severally and separately achieve, and therefore it is bound to surpass each and every one of them. Thus it is certain of superiority to any "other individual." It must, in any conceivable state of existence, be the "most excellent being."²

Thus Hartshorne redefines "perfection" in such a way that God, as the all-inclusive being (and therefore including the values of the individuals "contained" in him), is perfect in the sense that he cannot be equalled or exceeded in value by any other individual, but may exceed the total value himself as new experiences and enjoyments are added to his being. Hartshorne is eager to point out, however, that God's perfectibility in this respect does not detract from the absolute and therefore immutable perfection of his ethical character.³

A further distinction that can be drawn with

¹Ibid., p. 6; Divine Relativity, p. 20.

²Divine Relativity, p. 20.

³Man's Vision of God, p. 21.

reference to Hartshorne's dipolar concept of God is that between God as creator and God as created, or God as cause and God as effect.

That God is the cause, the "creator," of all things . . . does not imply that he is in no sense the effect of anything. For his essence may be the cause, the necessary condition, of all other essences, and the effect of none in particular nor of any totality of them; and yet his accidents may be both cause and effect in relation to other things. In terms of accidents man may be part-creator of God.¹

Hartshorne emphasises the same point when he says that "in a very real sense the First Cause is also effect (not in his essence), the creator is also (in some aspects) created, and the creatures are also creative."² In speaking of God as both creator (cause) and created (effect) Hartshorne once again applies the principle of eminence. We have already noted his application of this principle to God's relativity, that is, God as eminently or supremely related to every part of the world. Now Hartshorne applies it again stressing that God is eminently or supremely creative and also (in another aspect) eminent or supreme effect. With reference to God as creator, Hartshorne writes that

God, if social, is eminently or supremely so Man certainly is social. If then ordinary sociality is ordinarily creative, eminent sociality will be eminently creative, divinely creative. And ordinary sociality is, in a humble sense, creative. A man contributes

¹Ibid., p. 109.

²Ibid., pp. 123, 124.

creatively to the concrete actuality of his friends and enemies, and they to his The supreme member of a society would contribute most vitally and largely to the actuality of all.¹

Hartshorne of course recognizes that some will object that this is not truly creation since it presupposes material with which to work. He responds by rejecting creation ex nihilo, insisting that there was no first moment of creation and that God creates each stage of the world as successor to a preceding phase and so on through an infinity of earlier universes.² Further, Hartshorne argues that the only "making we ever encounter is transformation, enrichment of something already there."³ If it be objected that divine creation must be a unique case, Hartshorne argues that the uniqueness of God's creating lies in "maximality. He makes on a supreme, that is cosmic, scale; he makes the whole, not just certain parts, and he makes not for a limited time but during infinite time."⁴ In this respect, Hartshorne equates his own view with that of Whitehead who held that the world process had no beginning.⁵ Hartshorne's conclusion in this matter could have been anticipated; we have already noted that in his view both aspects of

¹Divine Relativity, p. 29.

²Ibid., p. 30; Man's Vision of God, p. 94.

³Man's Vision of God, p. 231.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Reality as Social Process, p. 203.

God, the absolute and the concrete, require each other, in which case the contingent aspect, the universe, could have no beginning in time. Thus God is eminently creative through infinite time by continually transforming the contingent existents.

But how does God effect this transformation? He does so by being the object of our awareness. Our being is dependent upon God and specifically so in the sense that our knowledge that God knows us is constitutive of our being. In this sense God can be said to create us.¹ God and men are objects for each others' knowledge and so can respond to each other. The divine response,

. . . becoming our object . . . influences us
 The radical difference between God and us implies that our influence upon him is slight, while his influence upon us is predominant. We are an absolutely inessential (but not inconsequential) object for him; he is the essential object for us Thus God can rule the world and order it, setting optimal limits for our free action, by presenting himself as essential object so characterized as to weight the possibilities of response in the desired respect. This divine method of world control is called "persuasion" by Whitehead He, perhaps the first of all, came to the clear realization that it is by molding himself that God molds us, by presenting at each moment a partly new ideal or order of preference which our unself-conscious awareness takes as object, and thus renders influential upon our entire activity Only he who changes himself can control the changes in us by inspiring us with novel ideals for novel occasions. We take our cues for this moment by seeing, that is, feeling

¹Divine Relativity, p. 123.

what God as of this moment desiderates.¹

For Hartshorne, as for Whitehead, God's creative or transforming power lies in "persuasion" as he presents himself to us as the object of our awareness.

To speak of God as the object of our awareness is to speak of him in his absolute aspect. We have already observed that God in his concrete aspect is eminently related to the world, is indeed the subject of all change. Hartshorne stresses the same point when he describes God as the subject-for-all-objects.² However, Hartshorne contends that just as God is unique in this sense, so is he also unique in the sense that he is the object-for-all-subjects.

. . . to be known by all subjects is fully as distinctive a status as to know all objects Only God can be so universally important that no subject can ever wholly fail or ever have failed to be aware of him (in however dim or unreflective a fashion). Thus the unique status of object-for-all-subjects is to be correlated with the more commonly recognized one of subject-for-all-objects. The difference between them is that the latter means, "having relations to all objects," and thus implies universal relativity; the former means that all subjects have relation to the one object, without the latter having relation . . . to them.³

So we find another contrast in God's respective aspects: as absolute he is the object of our awareness; as relative he is the subject, aware of us. Again, we wish

¹Ibid., pp. 141, 142.

²Ibid., p. 70.

³Ibid., pp. 70, 71.

to emphasise the importance of this matter with reference to God as creator. It is not only our awareness of God, but rather our awareness that he is aware of us that is constitutive of our being, and as we respond to this knowledge that God is aware of us, his creative or transforming power is realised. In this transformation of the finite existents God is eminently creative.

However, as noted earlier, God is not only creator or cause, he is also created or effect, and to God as effect Hartshorne also applies the principle of eminence. It will be recalled that we drew attention earlier to Hartshorne's view of the universe as an eminent effect, a self-maintaining, uniquely perfect body.¹ Hartshorne further affirms this conclusion, once again basing his argument upon his panpsychism, when he insists that the universe must be regarded as both animate and rational.

Suppose then that the universe is, in eminent fashion, animate and rational. It will, accordingly, be supreme among effects. All other creatures will be its members, inferior as such Thus the universe, patterned after the ideal of rational animality, will be as distinctive among effects as the creator of the universe is distinctive among causes.²

Hartshorne, having supposed that the universe is indeed eminent in the manner described, then presents us with a dilemma.

¹Man's Vision of God, pp. 180, 181.

²Divine Relativity, p. 79.

. . . if the universe is eminently animate and rational, then either it is God, or there are two eminent beings, God and Universe, and a third supereminent entity, which is the total reality of God-and-universe. The dilemma is satisfactorily dissolved only by the admission that the God who creates and the inclusive creation are one God. Then the two eminences under cause and effect are two aspects of God rather than two Gods, or than a God and an eminent being other than God.¹

It is clear that Hartshorne's panpsychism results in a concept of God in which God must be all-inclusive (and therefore effect as well as cause), or else he is confronted with an eminent being other than himself. Thus in his absolute and abstract being, God is cause; in his relative and concrete aspect he is effect.

Perhaps one of the clearer distinctions that Hartshorne draws between the two aspects of God is that of character and experience, the former being God's abstract aspect and the latter referring to his concrete aspect.² In his character God is immutable; in his concrete experience he is mutable, ever changing.³ We shall return shortly to the immutability of God's character and for the present look a little more closely at the mutability of God's concrete experience. We have already encountered this concept in Hartshorne's view that God is the subject of all change. Hartshorne con-

¹Ibid.

²Man's Vision of God, p. 110.

³Ibid., p. 112.

tinues the same theme when he speaks of God as the "endurer of all change, the adventurer through all novelty."¹ Hartshorne then contends that all changes, once they have occurred, are retained for ever more in the "expanse of his [God's] memory, the treasure house of all fact and attained value."² In God's perfect memory all of the past is retained without any loss of detail or quality. "From this memory, no joy once attained anywhere in the world can ever be lost."³ Furthermore, in God's memory there will always be a net increment of value. This is the case because there is always--Hartshorne assumes but does not argue--more joy than sorrow in the world.⁴

This view of the retention of value in God's concrete aspect is extremely similar to Whitehead's concept of the preservation of value in God's consequent nature. Hartshorne continues this Whiteheadian theme when he correlates the perfect memory of God with the objective immortality of the finite existents. Our lives become meaningful now when we realise their significance in a two-fold sense. First, our lives contribute to the life of God. Secondly the lives which we have lived and thus have contributed to the life of God are never lost; they

¹Ibid., p. 298.

²Ibid.

³Reality as Social Process, p. 161.

⁴Divine Relativity, p. 46.

are retained, in terms of the values achieved, in the perfect memory of God.¹ In this sense, and only in this sense, does Hartshorne believe in immortality. As in Whitehead, this objective immortality is not to be confused with personal immortality, that is, the survival of the human soul or spirit as subject. For Hartshorne, the real death is forgetting the past experiences of life.² This "death" is overcome in the perfect memory of God. Again, what is preserved, what "survives" is not the subject, but the values the subject achieved.

Although the views of Hartshorne and Whitehead on God's memory constituting the objective immortality of finites seem to be identical, we contend that there is at least one significant difference in the views of the two men. In the previous chapter we argued that according to Whitehead the values attained by the finite existents were added to the experience of one single actual entity who is God. In Hartshorne's view, however, God as recipient of the values achieved by the finites is himself a temporal series of entities or beings. There is a "temporal series of self-states in God. The divine personality is concretely and in part new each moment, and each new divine self sympathises with its

¹Reality as Social Process, pp. 41, 42.

²Ibid.

predecessors and its (in outline) anticipated successors."¹
 God, says Hartshorne, is in process and has "a distinct
 personality for each stage of his life."²

In this connection it must be pointed out that Hartshorne believes that even with respect to God as a temporal series, his view coincides with that of Whitehead.³ That Whitehead held such a view Hartshorne believes to be the case because Whitehead reportedly confirmed such in conversation with a third party.⁴ Hartshorne's view of Whitehead's position notwithstanding, we have argued in the previous chapter--based upon the writings of Whitehead--that the British philosopher viewed God not as a society of actual entities but as a single actual entity. We maintain that in this respect these two great philosophers differ.

Hartshorne's concept of God as a temporal series or society makes it possible--within the context of process definitions--to regard God as a person. It was observed in our study of Whitehead that he regarded persons as societies of actual entities. With this position Hartshorne agrees,⁵ and since he insists that God himself is

¹Man's Vision of God, p. 351.

²Reality as Social Process, p. 153.

³Man's Vision of God, p. 51, Divine Relativity, p. 31.

⁴Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 274.

⁵Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, p. 209.

also a temporal society, God too can be considered as a person. Hartshorne refers to God as "the supreme case of personality,"¹ and as "a supreme person."² Furthermore, Hartshorne stresses that to describe God as a "divine person" is not to speak metaphorically. "It is the human being that more or less exhibits personal continuity and integrity, God that literally, is always the same personal 'I'."³ This continuity and integrity of God, this absolute dependability has to do with God's immutable character (as opposed to his mutable accidents) and to this immutable character of God we now direct our attention.

In discussing the character of God--which Hartshorne equates with the abstract aspect of God--we are dealing with absolute, that is, nonrelative types of relations.⁴ These abstract relational types are God's immutable attributes and we shall deal in this study with some attributes of particular religious significance, namely God's omnipotence, omniscience, holiness and love.

With reference to these attributes of God, Hartshorne's definitions are very important and must be taken into consideration. Hartshorne insists that there is a great

¹Divine Relativity, p. 25.

²Ibid., p. 142.

³Ibid., p. 39.

⁴Ibid., pp. 121, 143, 156.

need for clearer definitions and he attempts to supply them. God's omnipotence, for example, must be defined in such a way that this omnipotence is not limited by free human choice. That is, we must avoid the dilemma of having to choose either that God is omnipotent or that there are such things as free human choices. Omnipotence must be defined so that free human choice is not limitative of God's omnipotence but rather implied by it.¹ That God cannot make us do certain things "does not 'limit' his power, for there is no such thing as power to make nonsense true" ² Hartshorne seems to be saying that some things are not subject to power, not even infinite power, and that not even infinite power can compel another to freely choose to act in a certain manner. Such a concept is "nonsense" says Hartshorne and therefore human freedom does not detract from a proper understanding of God's omnipotence.

Such a proper understanding of God's omnipotence must allow that some power belongs to individuals other than God,³ and that omnipotence be defined as "causal adequacy", that is, power adequate to cosmic need.

Religious faith imputes to God at least the kind and degree of power that the world needs as its supreme ordering influence. Or, more brief-

¹Man's Vision of God, p. 105.

²Ibid., p. 294.

³Divine Relativity, pp. 134, 138.

ly, it imputes power adequate to cosmic need His power is absolute, if that means absolute in adequacy, or such that greater power would be no more adequate, and therefore would not really be "greater"--since adequacy is the measure of greatness, on our theory.¹

Thus for Hartshorne, omnipotence is defined as "causal adequacy" or "adequate cosmic power." But what is "adequate cosmic power"?

Adequate cosmic power is power to set conditions which are maximally favorable to desirable decisions on the part of local agents. Maximally favorable conditions cannot imply that the most desirable local decisions will be inevitable. For decision is by its very nature not wholly inevitable.²

Therefore, omnipotence is not the ability to do anything, but is rather the setting of limits to the decision making process of local agents so that whatever decisions they make, the society will be preserved.³

It will be recalled from previous discussion that God's power lies not in compulsion but in "persuasion". He influences us by changing himself, as the object of our awareness.⁴

Thus God's power is absolute in the sense that it is always and unfailingly adequate to any situation which may occur. But this adequacy of God's power in concrete experience does not infringe upon the free responses of the finite existents whom he can influence but can never

¹Ibid., p. 134.

³Reality as Social Process, p. 41.

²Ibid., p. 135.

⁴Divine Relativity, pp, 139, 141, 142.

compel.

Since for Hartshorne "adequacy" is the measure of greatness, he defines "omniscience" as "cognitive adequacy."¹ Cognitive adequacy is knowledge adequate to its objects; it is knowledge which is infallible, that is, it truly and infallibly corresponds to whatever is, to the actual as actual and to the possible as possible.² It is precisely because God's knowledge infallibly or perfectly corresponds to what is, that his knowledge must be considered as truly and unrestrictedly relative. Hartshorne argues that the "knowledge" of men is not truly relative, that is, does not truly correspond to reality; we think we know when we do not; we make mistakes.³ But not so with God. Whatever is, God knows infallibly; his knowledge is truly relative, truly corresponds to reality. Thus for Hartshorne, infallibility implies relativity. Hartshorne further argues that since God's knowledge is truly relative to the actual as actual and the possible as possible, that his infallible knowledge can grow in content as future possible events are actualized.⁴ Thus the specific content of God's knowledge is contingent, that is, depends upon the free choices and actions of the finite existents.⁵

¹Ibid., pp. 121, 122.

²Ibid., pp. 8-15.

³Ibid., p. 10.

⁴Man's Vision of God, pp. 98, 104.

⁵Reality as Social Process, p. 206.

Thus far what has been emphasised is that God's concrete knowledge is truly relative. In what sense, then, can God's knowledge be absolute, which by Hartshorne's own definition, means unrelated? The answer, of course, lies in Hartshorne's distinction of abstract and concrete aspects of God. In his concrete aspect God's knowledge is truly relative; in his abstract aspect his omniscience is truly absolute, that is, nonrelative or unrelated. This is the case because omniscience is a type of relation, not a relation itself. (As noted earlier, God's abstract character is made up of relational types). As Hartshorne says,

The type of a relation is not itself subject to the relation, is not relativized by it. "Greater than" is not itself greater than, cognitive adequacy does not itself know, whether adequately or otherwise--any more than it is volition that wills If volition does not will, and cognitive adequacy does not know, then cognitive adequacy need not be relative, even though the adequate knower himself is relative, relative to what he knows. Thus there is in God something absolute or non-relative, his cognitive adequacy. Nevertheless, in knowing any actual thing, God himself is related and relativized with respect to that thing. There is here no paradox, unless it is paradoxical that seeing does not see, or that humor does not laugh.¹

God's knowledge, then, is both absolute in that it partakes of the abstract relational form of adequacy, and relative in that it truly corresponds to every concrete existent

¹Divine Relativity, pp. 121, 122.

and circumstance.

Also with reference to God's omniscience, Hartshorne argues two further points of importance. First, in keeping with realistic epistemology, he contends that knowledge is an internal relation as far as the subject is concerned, that is, knowledge makes a difference to the subject and is therefore constitutive of the knower.¹ This principle Hartshorne applies also to God, thereby making God's knowledge constitutive of his being.² Here, too, Hartshorne is emphasising the relativity of God's knowledge. Secondly however, Hartshorne goes beyond this principle that the object known is constitutive of the subject who knows; he argues that relations--such as the relation involved in knowledge--contain their terms. He states,

We find that persons contain relations of knowledge and love to other persons and things, and since relations contain their terms, persons must contain other persons and things. If it seems otherwise, this is because of the inadequacy of human personal relations, which is such that the terms are not conspicuously and clearly contained in their subjects In God, terms of his knowledge would be absolutely manifest and clear and not at all "outside" the knowledge or the knower.³

On the same theme Hartshorne writes,

To include relations is to include their terms.

¹Ibid., pp. 7, 119.

²Ibid., p. 17.

³Ibid., pp. 143, 144.

Hence to know all is to include all. Thus we must agree with modern absolutism and orthodox Hinduism that the supreme being must be all-inclusive.¹

Thus Hartshorne presents an epistemological argument for God as all-inclusive in addition to the general metaphysical argument and specific aesthetic argument discussed earlier.

Compared to the other attributes of God discussed by Hartshorne, God's holiness receives little attention. However, in compliance again with Hartshorne's view of adequacy as the measure of greatness, he defines God's holiness as "motivational adequacy".² This motivational adequacy is implicit in God's omniscience.

If then, God is adequately aware of all actuality as actual and all possibility as possible, he has adequate motivation for seeking to actualize maximal possibilities of further value. There can be no ethical appeal beyond the decision of the one who in his decision takes account of all actuality and possibility There could not be a wrong decision which thus took account of the situation; for a right decision can be defined as one adequately informed as to its context. Omniscience in action is by definition right action.³

So we see that God's cognitive adequacy (or omniscience) is the foundation for his motivational adequacy (or holiness). Because God knows everything, he is able to have an adequate or appropriate purpose or goal for

¹Ibid., p. 76.

²Ibid., p. 124.

³Ibid., p. 125.

actualization. Hartshorne continues,

The holiness of God consists . . . in the single aim at the one primary good, which is that the creatures should enjoy rich harmonies of living, and pour this richness into the one ultimate receptacle of all achievement, the life of God.¹

Thus while God's holiness is absolute in that it is an abstract relational type--motivational adequacy--it seems to be the case that the concrete response of the creatures is necessary for the "completion" of that holiness, that is, for the realisation into fact of the purposes or aims which God recognizes as maximally good.

It could probably be argued with much justification that the attribute most associated with God is love. In Hartshorne's estimation, "the new doctrine . . . is nothing at all but the analysis of the simple idea that God is 'the perfectly loving individual,'"² and since God is love, then the attribute of love must determine "the legitimate scope of the concept of absoluteness."³ It will be recalled that Hartshorne's definition of absoluteness is "nonrelative", that is, non-related. But if God is love, he must be related to the world. "For to love a being yet be absolutely independent of and unaffected by its welfare or suffering seems nonsense."⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 127, 128.

²Man's Vision of God, p. 48.

³Ibid., p. 42.

⁴Reality as Social Process, p. 40.

Further, that God is truly related to the creatures is emphasised in Hartshorne's definition of love as "social awareness." God is the only one who is truly socially aware of others, whose compassion for them is without limit.¹

Having argued that the very concept of love implies God's "relatedness" to the world and compassion for it, Hartshorne continues to emphasise the point by way of illustration, namely the example of Jesus.

I can only say that if it is Jesus as literally divine who loves men, really loves them, then my point, so far as I can see, is granted. . . . Should we not take him [Jesus] as proof that God really is love--just that, without equivocation?²

But divine love must be understood as more than benevolence.

I suggest that much more than divine benevolence or human kinship was symbolized in the doctrine that the man on the cross was deity. The devotion of Jesus to his fellows was not mere benevolence It was a feeling of sympathetic identity with them in their troubles and sufferings, as well as in their joys, so that their cause and their tragedy became his To say that Jesus was God then, ought to mean that God himself is one with us in our suffering, that divine love is not essentially benevolence--external well-wishing--but sympathy, taking into itself our every grief.³

The basic meaning of the cross, says Hartshorne, is that

¹Divine Relativity, p. 36.

²Man's Vision of God, p. 165.

³Reality as Social Process, p. 147.

God shares with us all of our griefs as well as our joys, that God suffers for us and with us.¹

The above quotations could leave the impression that Hartshorne does attribute deity to Jesus in some unique sense. Such, however, is not the case. Hartshorne openly concedes this point when he writes, "I have no Christology to offer, beyond the simple suggestion that Jesus appears to be the supreme symbol furnished to us by history of the notion of a God genuinely and literally 'sympathetic'"² While Jesus is indeed the supreme example of divine love, Hartshorne feels that such phrases as "Jesus was God" or the "divinity of Jesus" are too ambiguous to have any real meaning.³ However, Hartshorne goes on to say, if we insist that in some sense Jesus was God, then "we must remember that in some sense or degree every man is God."⁴ Thus Hartshorne, with the refreshing candour typical of his writings, explicitly states that in his particular philosophical perspective no true uniqueness can be attributed to the being of Jesus.

With Hartshorne's emphasis upon reality as social and God's being supremely related to the world, one important qualification must be kept in mind, and this

¹Ibid., pp. 123, 147; Man's Vision of God. p. 198.

²Reality as Social Process, p. 24.

³Ibid., p. 152.

⁴Ibid., p. 153.

is the process principle--already found in Whitehead --of the independence of contemporary entities. For Whitehead, it will be recalled that this meant that two actual entities contemporary with each other could notprehend each other. Hartshorne likewise states that "two subjects cannot be objects to each other" ¹ This is not to deny that two individual persons could know each other, "for a man is not one particular but a stream or system of actual and potential particular experiences. But two experiences, two momentary or irreducible 'subjects,' could not, according to our principles . . . each know the other [C]ontemporary events are mutually independent." ² In Hartshorne's own words, "The topic of contemporary relations bristles with difficulties" and is "the most vulnerable point in the surrelativist doctrine." ³ Hartshorne concedes that the answer to this problem escapes him and we shall have cause to return to this matter later in the chapter.

The brief exposition of Hartshorne's surrelative panentheism given in this chapter will, we believe, suffice to demonstrate how he has applied the process principles of Whitehead in order to produce a theistic philosophy of his own. While the similarity to Whitehead is obvious,

¹Divine Relativity, p. 98.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 99.

we wish to take this opportunity to once again stress the importance of recognizing the environment in which Whitehead's philosophy can best be understood, namely the broader context of British neo-realism. Thus in and through Whitehead, British neo-realism had its influence on the American philosophical scene and, perhaps to a greater extent than many have realised, particularly on the philosophical theology of Charles Hartshorne.

This concludes the positive explication of the major points of Hartshorne's surrelative panentheism. As we now turn to a brief examination of his philosophy, we shall be concerned primarily with the internal coherence of Hartshorne's dipolar theism, and particularly his view that such dipolar theism has its natural conclusion in panentheism.

Dipolar theism--including panentheism--requires to be examined in light of its attributing to one being, God, both infinite and finite qualities. It is surely justifiable to say, in this respect, that dipolar theism at least gives the appearance of being self-contradictory since as Owen emphasises, "the idea of the infinite by definition excludes the idea of the finite" ¹ Hartshorne's response is that such a criticism is based upon a failure to grasp the real significance of God's

¹H. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1971), p. 83.

dipolarity. True, if God were regarded as both infinite and finite in the same aspect of his being, then such would indeed be contradictory. But Hartshorne, as noted earlier, believes that the problem can be overcome by attributing both infinite and finite qualities to God, but to different "aspects" of his being. The infinite aspect of God is eternal, abstract, impersonal and unrelated, that is, absolute; the finite aspect is temporal, concrete, personal and related, that is, relative.

The question must then be raised concerning the relationship between the two aspects of God, one of which--the infinite--cannot be related to any particular existing thing, and the other--the finite--which must be related. Hartshorne, it will be recalled, contends that while it is true that God in his absolute nature cannot be related to any particular existing finites, that is, to the "contingent alternatives of creation," he is related, and must be so related to some creation. That is, some accidents are necessary; God's absolute character requires, that is, must be related to some accidental embodiments, but he is not dependent upon nor related to the specific form which the accidental embodiments may take at any given moment.

Hartshorne's response, however, gives rise to several further criticisms. First, in stating that while the abstract aspect of God can be related to, and

indeed must be related to something, it cannot be related to any particular thing. Hartshorne leaves himself open to the charge of saying what is meaningless. For example, Hartshorne believes that God has always been creative, and has been so through an infinity of universes. Very well, let us ask if God in his abstract character is related to the present universe? Hartshorne's answer is in the negative. This present universe, after all, is only one of the contingent alternatives of creation. What about the universe immediately ~~pre~~^{pre}ceding this present one; was God dependent upon and thereby related to that universe? Apparently not, and for the same reason. Then let us ask the same question concerning any one or all of the preceding universes ad infinitum. Hartshorne's answer must always be the same; God in his abstract, absolute aspect cannot be related to any particular contingent creation, though Hartshorne insists that this does not prohibit God's being related to creation as such. But what can this possibly mean? Hartshorne insists that God needs some creation, but seems to be saying that God has not needed any one of them produced thus far and, furthermore, will not need any one of any universes which may be produced in the future.

This same problem can also be stated from Hartshorne's viewpoint of something contingent being necessary, but no

particular contingent being necessary. But again, it could be asked of any contingent existent (whether in this universe or previous ones) "Does this exist necessarily?" In each case, Hartshorne's response would be in the negative, since necessary existence does not belong to any particular contingent being. But surely, as Craighead says, "if it is contradictory, then, to assert of any particular concretum that it necessarily exists, it would seem to be likewise contradictory . . . to assert of all concreta that at least some of them must exist."¹ It would, thus far at least, seem to be the case that Hartshorne's concept of God's relationship to the finite existents is indeed self-contradictory, and since in panentheism these finites constitute God's contingent or finite aspect, it does seem that the relationship between God's infinite and finite aspects is indeed problematic.

Secondly, Hartshorne argues that although God's abstract and eternal aspect needs to be related to something, the need is satisfied by God himself, that is, God's eternal aspect has the power to continually create the contingent aspect. It will be recalled that as abstract God is cause, and as concrete he is effect. But here two further inconsistencies may be noted. To create

¹Houston Craighead, "Non-Being and Hartshorne's Concept of God," Process Studies, I (1971), 19.

is surely to be related to what is created, even--and especially--to the particular things created. Hartshorne himself agrees that to create, or to be the cause of something, is to be related, but he fails to acknowledge that the eternal aspect of God can be related to any particular contingent existent. A further inconsistency is recognized when it is remembered that in Hartshorne's view, God's essential attributes are types of relationship and a relational type cannot itself be related. For example, as Hartshorne states the case, cognitive adequacy cannot know. How, then, can causal adequacy--which is only a type of relationship--create the contingent existents which God needs? As another writer has well stated, "Hartshorne's abstract, immutable absolute, as qualityless . . . is a concept which gives us no satisfactory idea of how God can create anything."¹ Thus again, we see difficulty concerning the relationship existing between the infinite and finite aspects of God. In this respect, Hartshorne's panentheism suffers from a common weakness in process thought, namely the ontological problem. There is no adequate explanation for finite existents.

Thirdly, we present Hartshorne with a dilemma as follows: either God's abstract aspect is related to the

¹D. Luther Evans, "Two Intellectually Respectable Conceptions of God," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, X (1950), 576.

present universe or it is not so related; if God's abstract aspect is related to the present universe, then God has no absolute aspect at all, since according to Hartshorne's own definition, to be absolute means to be non-related. (Indeed, it has been argued that since in Hartshorne's view even the abstract aspect of God needs to be related to something, there is in actual fact no way in which a dipolar God can be absolute).¹ If on the other hand, God's absolute aspect is not related to the present universe, then this is the same thing as saying that God's infinite aspect is not related in any way to his finite aspect since the present universe of contingent existents actually constitutes God's finite aspect. Thus, if the former horn of the dilemma is accepted, then Hartshorne's dipolar God is absolute in no respect whatever; if the latter horn is accepted, then Hartshorne has created within the very being of God a bifurcation which radically undermines the unity of the concept.

Leaving aside this particular problem, let us now turn to the question as to whether God as he is related to the world can really function in the way that Hartshorne demands. According to Hartshorne, God conserves without loss the values achieved in the world. Now, it will be recalled that Hartshorne views God not as an

¹Edward Farley, The Transcendence of God (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), pp. 147-149.

actual entity but as a series of actual entities, this being consistent with Hartshorne's insistence that God is truly personal. The question is, can God as a society of successive entities function in the way Hartshorne suggests? Can God truly conserve all values achieved? If so, then God--at best--differs in this respect from every other temporal series or--at worst--he must be regarded as a being who violates the fundamental process principles which Hartshorne endorses. The real tragedy of life, according to both Whitehead and Hartshorne, is loss, specifically the loss of the present, the problem of forgetting to which we humans are so much subject. This particular problem arises because the occasions in our past are no longer "immediate" for us and, since time is "perpetual perishing", we find ourselves losing much of what has gone before. But if God too is a series of actual entities, as Hartshorne believes, then how is the problem of loss solved? If time as perpetual perishing is the problem, and God is a temporal series, then God too must suffer loss; values achieved could not be conserved, at least not in their totality, not in their immediacy.

But the problem is not only that God is a temporal series; it is aggravated by the process principle of the independence of contemporary entities. No actual entity, including God, canprehend or experience another as sub-

ject. What is experienced or known must be an object, having already lost its subjective immediacy. In accordance with this principle, God has never known the subjective immediacy of any actual occasion, but surely that subjective immediacy was a vital part of the value achieved by the temporal occasion, a value which God could not ever have known, far less conserved without loss. As others have stated, "Hartshorne's insistence on this power in God is inconsistent with his own (and Whitehead's) metaphysical principles according to which no actual entity can experience the immediacy of past (i.e., 'objectively immortal') actual entities."¹

Thus we have seen that the process principle of the preservation without loss of all values achieved, in the consequent or relative aspect of God, is nullified not only by another process principle--the mutual independence of contemporary actual entities--but also by Hartshorne's view of God as a temporal series of entities.

With continuing reference to God as a temporal series, John Baker has raised what appears to be another problem for process thought. According to the principles of process philosophy, God must be able toprehend the satisfaction of every temporal actual entity, and every

¹Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare, "Evil and Unlimited Power," Review of Metaphysics, XX (1966/67), 284; See also Robert C. Neville, "Neo-Classical Theology and Christianity: A Critical Study of Ogden's 'Reality of God,'" International Philosophical Quarterly, IX (1969), 617, 618.

temporal actual entity must also prehend the satisfaction of a divine occasion. Baker then demonstrates that if every occasion in the universe enjoys one or another of twenty four temporal extensions based upon fractions of a second, then God must have 2,042,042 occasions of experience per second.¹ However, if one is tempted to believe along with Professor Edwards that in a universe such as ours the temporal occasions would share many more than the twenty four temporal extensions which Baker used for his calculations, then God's actual occasions would not be limited to approximately two million per second, but would be infinitely dense and as Edwards states, "an entity with infinitely dense actual occasions is a continuum! Such a God would simply be a continuously concrescing actual entity!"²

It would seem, then, that for God to be omniscient--which Hartshorne argues he is--he would for all practical purposes have to be regarded as a single actual entity, always in concrescence. However, it will be recalled from our discussion of Whitehead's view of God as a single entity, that such a view involves further problems, particularly a violation of process principles in that

¹John Robert Baker, "Omniscience and Divine Synchronization," Process Studies, II (1972), 203.

²Rem B. Edwards, "The Human Self: An Actual Entity or Society?", Process Studies, V (1975), 203.

God as a single entity is always in concrescence (possessing subjective immediacy) and always satisfied (possessing objective immortality) at one and the same time.

Thus Hartshorne can be presented with another dilemma: either God is a single actual entity always in concrescence and always satisfied, or he is a temporal society of actual entities. If he is a single actual entity as described then he is a blatant violation of process metaphysical principles; if he is a temporal society, then there is no guarantee either of his omniscience or his ability to preserve without loss all the values achieved in the world.

Hartshorne, of course, does view God as a temporal society, always growing in perfection, this because of the continual addition of the values achieved by the "imperfect" beings.¹ But the question we wish to ask is, "Will God, then become more perfect by the addition of further imperfections?" We have not forgotten Hartshorne's redefinition of perfection as the all-inclusive self-surpassing surpasser of all. However, we do not believe that even this redefinition can remove all difficulty for Hartshorne on this point. Dealing with this apparent contradiction, he states that some argue

. . . that God is good and wise and therefore excludes the predicates bad and foolish, leaving them outside

¹Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, pp. 19, 20.

himself. By the same reasoning a house which is large and heavy excludes small and light, which must be outside the house. On the contrary the smallness and lightness of the parts of the house are in the house, and yet the house is not small or light. It is not according to logic to suppose that predicates not applicable directly to a thing as a whole must be outside it. They may be inside it as the properties of its constituents.¹

On this particular occasion, Hartshorne is somewhat less than convincing. We agree that many light things taken together do indeed become heavy. But surely it cannot be justifiably argued that many bad and foolish things together thereby become good and wise!

Hartshorne's argument, of course, has to do not only with God's perfection, but also with the concept of God's being all inclusive, that is, the doctrine of panentheism which we will now examine.

We observed earlier that Hartshorne sets forth three basic arguments for his concept of God as all-inclusive. We termed these the arguments from aesthetics, epistemology and the general metaphysical position of panpsychism. We shall deal with these in the above order. First, to speak of Hartshorne's aesthetic approach as an "argument" is probably not entirely justified. Hartshorne assumes certain matters to be true concerning his theory of aesthetics without really arguing the case. Two basic assumptions are made: (1) The contrast between the living

¹Ibid., p. 145.

and dead matter is not beautiful and therefore all matter must, in some sense be alive; and (2) God must possess as much variety in his being as the universe does. Hartshorne's conclusion, of course, is that God's "need" for aesthetic variety in his own being is supplied by the world's inclusion in God. Certainly, these assumptions can be questioned. For example, is not the first assumption merely a subjective assessment on Hartshorne's part? Would the distinction between living and dead not be an even greater aesthetic contrast, emphasising the beauty and value of life? With reference to the second assumption, it may be appropriate to ask, "Why must God require aesthetic variety in his being?" Could God not simply be aware of, that is, 'know' the aesthetic variety in the universe without actually including it in his being? Hartshorne's answer to the latter question is an emphatic negative. For Hartshorne, to know is to contain or include.

This brings us to the epistemological arguments for the all-inclusiveness of God. Hartshorne goes beyond epistemic realism which recognizes the existence of two entities in the knowing process, namely subject and object. Hartshorne, as stated above, contends that the object becomes included in the subject which knows it. As discussed in the previous chapter, Hartshorne holds that this is even true of persons who thereby contain one

another, and that if this does not seem to be the case, it is only because of the inadequacy of human personal relations. But for God, all the objects of his knowledge are clearly known and therefore are literally contained in God. Since God is omniscient, this would mean that he is all-inclusive.

Now, all of this is based upon Hartshorne's theory that relations contain their terms. But is such really the case? Is there anything in our experience which would justify such a theory, or pass sentence upon it as false? Hartshorne seems to say that an appeal to human experience in this matter would not be appropriate because, although persons do not seem to contain other persons, this is because of the inadequacy of human relations. But we must ask, might it not seem to be the case because it is not the case? Might it not be the case that we human beings can have genuine knowledge--not infallible to be sure--of other persons, while they remain just that, other persons "over against us" with their own identity unviolated by the knowledge process? Such is the testimony of experience, and if God is the "eminent" personality, why not eminently "over against" other persons, rather than all-inclusive?

John Wild has drawn attention to the fallacy of Hartshorne's epistemological argument when he argues that Hartshorne has failed to distinguish between noetic and

entitative inclusion. As Wild well argues, no matter how exact a man's knowledge of Africa may be, it is not conceivable that Africa thereby is "within" him. Knowledge does not result in spatial inclusion. Wild writes, "As a realist, I believe that the noetic faculty immaterially grasps or assimilates its object, and in this sense 'includes' it. But apart from this sense, certainly not that of entitative 'inclusion.'"¹

It would seem that the epistemological argument used by Hartshorne is no more conclusive than the aesthetic argument in arguing the case for panentheism. Indeed, there is an epistemological argument, ironically drawn from Hartshorne's own process principles, which can be used in devastating fashion against the concept of panentheism. It is, once again, the theory of the mutual independence of contemporary actual entities. The argument is simple and takes the form of a question concerning the present universe, with the emphasis upon the word "present." That is, the question does not concern the universe of a moment ago, but the universe of this very moment. Is the present universe prehended by God; is it the object of his knowledge? According to the process theory of the mutual independence of contemporary entities, Hartshorne ought to answer in the negative. Very well, if the present universe cannot be the object of God's

¹John Wild, "The Divine Existence: An Answer to Mr. Hartshorne," Review of Metaphysics, IV (1950/51), 69.

knowledge, how can it be included in him? How can panentheism be true? On one hand Hartshorne tells us that to know is to include and therefore God includes the universe in his being; God is "surrelative to the present universe."¹ On the other hand he tells us that not even God can know the present universe composed of actual entities still possessing their subjective immediacy; "contemporary events are mutually independent."² This is a fundamental contradiction in Hartshorne's panentheism.

Hartshorne may thus be presented with a further dilemma: either God includes actual entities still possessing their subjective immediacy or he does not so include them; if he does include the actual entities as described, he may indeed be "the subject of all change" but is so in violation of the principle that contemporary actual entities cannotprehend one another; if he does not so include the actual entities, then panentheism is false, at least with reference to the universe of this present moment.

We turn now to the final argument for panentheism to be discussed, and this will involve some brief remarks concerning panpsychism, the philosophy upon which panentheism depends. It will be recalled that Hartshorne regarded the universe as an eminent effect, being animate

¹Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, p. 88.

²Ibid., p. 98.

and rational. He then presented us with a dilemma of his own: "if the universe is eminently animate and rational, then either it is God, or there are two eminent beings, God and Universe" ¹ Hartshorne, of course, solves the dilemma by resorting to panentheism, claiming that the two eminences are two aspects of God rather than two Gods, or God and an eminent being other than God. Now, this dilemma is built upon the supposition of a panpsychistic universe. But suppose the universe is not eminently animate and rational; suppose panpsychism is false. Then Hartshorne's dilemma would be no dilemma at all. There would be one eminent being, God, and the universe he created.

But is panpsychism false? Hartshorne states that the denial of panpsychism--specifically the concept of the universe as a self-maintaining society--is unverifiable. ² If so, does this make panpsychism necessarily true? One is tempted to respond in kind by stressing that the affirmation of panpsychism is unverifiable. However, some additional response is possible. For example, the question has been raised concerning how Hartshorne's theory of the universe as a self-maintaining society can be upheld in

¹Ibid., p. 79.

²Reality as Social Process, pp. 32, 33, 39.

the light of entropy and the Second Law of Thermodynamics,¹ which states that entropy, that is, the measure of randomness or disorder, increases in all real processes. Further, in chapter three dealing with Whitehead, we emphasised that Whitehead's philosophy did not seem to live up to his own criteria, including the standard of "adequacy". So also with Hartshorne. While a philosophy of organism may apply from the human through the animal to plant life, there seems to be no real indication (and certainly no confirmation) that physical objects such as stones consist of actual entities with feelings. Panpsychism seems to claim too much for such things. On the other end of the scale, George Thomas² has pointed out that panpsychism is not adequate for a full understanding of persons. With its emphasis upon a succession of actual entities, panpsychism does not provide a doctrine of genuine personal identity. If panpsychism claims too much for "sticks and stones" it does not claim enough for persons. We must conclude that, at best, panpsychism must be regarded as very speculative and, as indicated above, speculation which does not adequately explain life as it is experienced.

We therefore conclude that Hartshorne's arguments

¹Eric C. Rust, Evolutionary Philosophies and Contemporary Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969), p. 186.

²Thomas, Religious Philosophies of the West, p. 380.

for his concept of panentheism, based upon aesthetics, epistemology and a metaphysical pansychism, have failed to establish his case. Further, we have shown in this chapter, particularly through a series of dilemmas presented to Hartshorne, that his surrelative panentheism seemingly lacks internal coherence and must therefore be regarded as inadequate in its formulation of its concept of God.

However, before concluding this chapter, we now wish to look briefly at the panentheistic view of the personality of God. Hartshorne's view of the personality of God is somewhat ambiguous and, indeed, this ambiguity gives rise to the impression that the concept may also be self-contradictory. The problem arises because Hartshorne seemingly attributes God's personality to his abstract aspect on one occasion and to his concrete aspect on another. On the one hand, Hartshorne constantly refers to God's abstract aspect as his "character", and does so in this passage where the character of God is equated with his personality.

. . . since the essence of God is compatible with any possible universe, we can be allowed some power of decision, as between possibilities, without infringing the absolute independence of God in his essential character or personality.¹

On the other hand, Hartshorne also identifies the

¹Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, p. 89.

personality of God with his concrete aspect when he writes that "If God is in process, then he has, in a sense, a distinct personality for each stage of his life."¹

Hartshorne's ambiguity is understandable. It is perhaps inevitable given panentheism's emphasis upon God's dipolarity. God's personality must be somewhere, that is in one aspect or the other, but neither option does justice even to what Hartshorne seeks to express. Hartshorne wishes to preserve God's immutability of personality (and thereby attributes such personality to God's absolute aspect) while still holding that God as a person is truly related to other persons (and Hartshorne therefore attributes God's personality to his relative aspect). But Hartshorne simply cannot do both. We recognize his dilemma. If he attributes God's personality to the abstract aspect then he will have preserved God's immutability at a terrible cost; God's personality, belonging to his essence--"what makes God God"--would be unrelated. That is, God in his essence--which would include his personality--would be totally unaffected by and unconcerned with the world and its affairs. If it is argued that this is not a deficiency but is precisely what Hartshorne is con-

¹Reality as Social Process, p. 153.

tending for, then we must respond by saying that this is so much the worse for Hartshorne's position. How can God's essence be unrelated and yet consist, as Hartshorne insists it does, of God's goodness, love and other "religious" attributes? What is unrelated goodness; unrelated love? If these are meaningless concepts, then panentheism is meaningless. If they are meaningful concepts, then such meaningfulness has not yet been given adequate explanation by panentheists.

If on the other hand, Hartshorne attributes the personality of God to the relative, concrete aspect, then other problems arise. God would then even in his personality be "related" to the world, but that personality would no longer in Hartshorne's estimation be immutable, dependable. Further, what would it mean to attribute God's personality to his relative aspect and his character to his abstract aspect?

If it is argued that we have failed to distinguish between the personality of God and God as a person (which would amount to the charge that we have failed to recognize the true significance of God's dipolarity), we respond that not only have we not failed to recognize the significance of the dipolar concept, but rather it is the dipolar concept itself which creates the problem.

One question of importance needs to be directed towards the matter of the panentheistic view of God as

a person. Is God as a person finite or infinite? Hartshorne, of course, does not like such dyadic formulations, insisting that they beg the question that one of the two alternatives must be true, whereas some third alternative may be possible.¹ Hartshorne, of course, may be somewhat less than objective in this assessment, since he wishes to hold to a concept of God as both infinite and finite, infinity belonging to one aspect of God and finitude to the other. However, we insist that it is meaningful to address the above question concerning God as a whole. Hartshorne himself states that "deity . . . as an actual whole, includes all relative items."² Now, is such a God infinite or finite? If the response is that he is infinite-finite, we suggest that the hyphen does not solve the problem, and we further insist that this particular dyadic formulation as to whether God is infinite or finite is not question begging but is true by definition.

We contend that Hartshorne's panentheism results in the concept of a God who is finite. It is not possible for a God who is constituted in part by finite constituents to be truly infinite. From Hartshorne's own writings we recall that God, in his abstract essence, is "no

¹Man's Vision of God, pp. 27, 28, 34.

²Divine Relativity, p. 89.

actual subject."¹ But in his concrete aspect God is a temporal series of actual entities--required for God's "personhood"--and is contingent.² The concrete aspect of God which is required for his "personhood" is the aspect which makes him finite.

While such criticisms are significant within the context of our study insofar as they allow us a better understanding of process and panentheistic concepts, the major point of this chapter has been to confirm Whitehead's influence on Hartshorne, a point generally conceded. But in this particular study in the history of ideas, Whitehead's influence on Hartshorne has been expounded in the wider context of twentieth century Anglo-American process philosophy. We have traced an affinity of thought in Alexander's theory of correspondence, Morgan's concepts of correlation, involution and dependence, Whitehead's dipolar theism, and Hartshorne's surrelative panentheism. It was the purpose of this research to set forth systematically the affinity of thought in early twentieth century British neo-realism and the later American panentheism. Through expounding primary sources, we believe that this purpose has been accomplished, this relationship of ideas demonstrated in

¹Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, p. 76.

²Man's Vision of God, p. 29; Divine Relativity, p. 32.

systematic fashion.

However, before concluding this research, we wish to take note of an American influence on Hartshorne and his concept of God, namely the idealist William Ernest Hocking. The next chapter will be given over to this task.

CHAPTER FIVE

WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING: AN AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON HARTSHORNE

This research thus far has demonstrated an affinity of thought in early twentieth century British neo-realism (as set forth in the works of Alexander, Morgan and Whitehead) and American panentheism (as expounded in the writings of Charles Hartshorne). This affinity can be seen in common elements in these philosophers, such as a doctrine of emergence or novelty, the theory of panpsychism and the concept of a God who is involved with or in the temporal process. We have also argued that this affinity of thought is not totally coincidental, but is due in large part to the influence of Whitehead upon Hartshorne. However, no claim is being made that Whitehead--and through Whitehead the wider context of British neo-realism--was the only major influence upon Hartshorne. On the contrary, we have already noted from Hartshorne's own writings that his first convictions that God was temporal as well as eternal he derived from William Ernest Hocking. We wish therefore to take this opportunity to briefly review Hocking's idealism, laying emphasis upon his concept of God and the similarities of that concept to the view of Hartshorne.¹

¹Much of Hocking's emphasis lies in religious epistemology. While we recognize his contribution in this area, our primary concern in this brief review is Hocking's concept of God and not his concept of how men come to know God.

The disaffection with absolute idealism which was occurring in Great Britain during the early twentieth century was also taking place in the United States of America. In Britain one result of this disaffection was neo-realism; in America Hocking attempted a modification of absolute idealism, which would nonetheless allow his philosophy to retain its idealistic identity. According to Hocking, the deficiency of absolute idealism could be recognized within the framework of religion. He states that people "do not find the Absolute of idealism identical with the God of religion; they cannot worship the Absolute."¹ In a similar vein he continues, "Idealism is unfinished, then, not having found its way to worship; it has not found its way to the particular and the historical in religion; to the . . . wholly super-personal . . . it has not yet been able in this matter of religion to accomplish union with the concrete."²

To this concept of the Absolute, Hocking applies the criterion of negative pragmatism. This standard can be stated as, "That which does not work is not true."³ When this principle of negative pragmatism--which Hocking insists must be an effective instrument of religious

¹William Ernest Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912), p. vi.

²Ibid., pp. xi, xii.

³Ibid., p. xiii.

knowledge¹--is applied to absolute idealism, the concept of the Absolute as here discussed does not "work" in terms of religion and therefore cannot be true. Hocking argues that the problem is not so much that idealism is essentially false as that it is "unfinished" and requires to be completed. He writes,

Idealism fails to work, I believe, chiefly because it is unfinished. Unfinishedness is not in itself a blemish A thing is properly unfinished when it is finishable; when it has an identity that finishing will not change Idealism can entertain much of what pragmatism, realism, and the rest have brought forward, and still remain idealism²

Hocking therefore argues that idealism can be finished or completed by incorporating into it certain realistic elements. He speaks of the need of this synthesis: "It is the finished idealist who best knows the need of the realistic elements of experience I know not what name to give to this point of convergence, nor does name much matter: it is realism, . . . it is idealism also, its identity, I believe, not broken."³

The need for idealism to complete itself reaches into the realm of religion and specifically the doctrine of God. Hocking describes the God of orthodoxy:

. . . this God does things in the world which, if we like, we may call miracles or, if we like better, deeds of Providence. Upon this differential work of God, as contrasted with his total work,

¹Ibid., p. xiv.

²Ibid., pp. x, xi.

³Ibid., pp. xix, xx.

was based much of the urgency of former religious observance, prayer, and piety. Pragmatism rightly enquires what becomes of this differential work when God becomes the All-One of idealism In such wise, the pragmatic principle tends to confront idealism . . . with the substantial values of orthodoxy; compelling idealism to complete itself by the standard of these values (I do not say, of these propositions), even if at the cost of its philosophic identity.¹

Thus Hocking seeks a modified, that is completed idealism which rejects the concept of God as merely the "All-One" and which regains the doctrine of a God who can be distinguished, through his work, from the All. God, then, is not to be identified with the "All-One" of idealism, that is the Absolute. Nonetheless, although God and the Absolute are not equivalents, "God, whatever else he may be, must needs also be the Absolute."² For Hocking, then, the Absolute does not "work" in terms of religion when it is identified with God, that is when God and the Absolute are regarded as equivalents. But the concept of the Absolute, no longer equated with God but now regarded as a necessary attribute of God, remains a fundamental feature in Hocking's philosophy.

Hocking retains the Absolute because, he argues, it is not possible to dispense with a "Changeless Ultimate in our world."³ For example, men constantly seek im-

¹Ibid., pp. xiv, xv.

²Ibid., p. 206.

³Ibid., p. 186.

provement in many aspects of life. But what does "improvement" mean; what goal is sought? The possibility of improvement implies the concept of the Absolute, Hocking argues, because "the degree of alteration which we can endure, even for the better or best, is not indefinitely great" and "there will be something at the last day which was also there at the first."¹ Secondly, the Absolute is necessary if men are to judge or measure achievement. "We pass judgment upon the intellects, and estimate the world-guesses, of Newton, and Paracelsus, and Thales, and Lao Tze, and Moses: we are able to do this only in so far as they, and we all, have been aiming at the same mark"² Thirdly, the Absolute is necessary because of its qualities of unlimited hospitality and indifference. These attributes have the advantage of being compatible "with every relative improvement. Offering all the advantages of changelessness, with none of the disadvantages of conserving the undesirable."³ Hocking continues this important theme later, emphasising that the Absolute must indeed be compatible with everything.

If the absolute good were not compatible with every relative evil, it would not be the Absolute. If the Absolute were not compatible with every relative danger, it would not be the Absolute. That which holds good, no matter what occurs,--that is precisely the object of our search.

¹Ibid., p. 187.

²Ibid., pp. 187, 188.

³Ibid., p. 187.

Such an object is no modern discovery. From the beginning of religious thought, in the very conception of a creator, there has been present to the mind of man a Being who is present alike in good and evil. . . . The founder of a popular religion held up to the minds of a spell-bound multitude, as his own original revelation, a God who "maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust." Upon this basis he defined the "perfection" of God, and summoned men to the same perfection, the same absolute bearing. Thereby he defined an attitude of mind which was indeed new in that world, an attitude of equal treatment toward friend and enemy, toward good and bad,--an attitude much garbled and misunderstood, but an attitude wholly intelligible in the light of that unmistakable description of the Absolute God.¹

Thus we cannot dispense with the Absolute, and God must be regarded as absolute but, as noted earlier, he is not equivalent to the Absolute; whatever else he may be, he must also be the Absolute.² Hocking is seemingly arguing that God cannot be less than the Absolute, but must be regarded as possessing attributes which allow him to be described as something more than the Absolute. This interpretation of Hocking is confirmed when he states that God may be regarded as both absolute and personal, that is, God is the Absolute raised to the level of personality.³ "Substance is known as Subject: reality from the beginning is known as God."⁴ God, then, is both Substance and Subject, both absolute and personal. In what respect, then, does Hocking regard God as absolute and in

¹Ibid., pp. 204, 205.

²Ibid., p. 206.

³Ibid., p. 207.

⁴Ibid., p. 296.

what respect personal?

Hocking describes God as absolute in that he is "the God who merely is" ¹ As absolute God stands "outside the arena of human effort with its contrasts of good and evil" ² This absoluteness of God is regarded by Hocking as advantageous in that God, "standing outside the arena . . . is able to transmute evil into good; . . . this standing outside the arena itself is a necessary condition of his being all-powerful in this transmuting work." ³ In this respect, God as absolute is promotive of human morality, and is therefore both good and righteous in his activity. ⁴

But can the Absolute, even as an attribute of God, be justly described in this way? Does the concept of the Absolute not imply neutrality? Has Hocking himself not already spoken of the "indifference" of the Absolute? Hocking's response is to concede that the Absolute makes no difference; what makes a difference is consciousness of the Absolute. ⁵ For example, "Evil becomes a problem, only because the consciousness of the Absolute is there: apart from this fact, the 'colour of evil' would be mere contents of experience." ⁶ But how is this knowledge of

¹Ibid., p. 331.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., pp. 331, 332.

⁵Ibid., p. 203.

⁶Ibid.

the Absolute attained? Hocking appeals to what one might justifiably call a qualified mysticism. While rejecting much of what may be described as historical mysticism, Hocking insists that there is a necessary mysticism, a mysticism which is compatible with idealism and which constitutes the essential standpoint in religion.¹ The mystic, writes Hocking, "finds the absolute in immediate experience."² Thus in Hocking's philosophy there seems to be an intuitive element not unlike that of C. Lloyd Morgan discussed earlier. In this intuitive process, the absolute is recognized, and this recognition makes all the "practical difference" in the world.³ For Hocking, then, God as absolute has reference to God as he merely is, who transcends the temporal realm of human affairs, is compatible with every relative danger and who can be "found" of men, and in being found makes a difference to the world.

But now what of God as personal? Hocking draws the contrast: God as absolute is God as he merely is; God as personal is God in his relationship to others. "For God is not apart from what he has created Self includes, and is with, its objects, in so far as it comprehends them, or is creating them. God, then, does actually include me,

¹Ibid., pp. xviii, xix.

²Ibid., p. xix.

³Ibid., p. 203.

in so far as I am dependent upon him" ¹ This relationship of inclusion is one which is associated with God's comprehension of, or reflection upon, the finite existents. Hocking, once again arguing that God must stand outside the arena of human affairs in order to be the supreme power, also adds that while God must be another than any finite self, he must also reflect upon and in his reflection include all finite selves and their circumstances. ² Thus God as personal is God as inclusive. And yet in adopting this position Hocking recognizes that some may regard it as unusual.

It is God in external relation to me, as my Other, that seems the personal God; it is God as the Whole, including me within himself, that seems impersonal: and the true God is the Whole, as in Christian doctrine God is the One of the three persons. But we may discern in the world generally a principle to the effect that inner relations assimilate themselves to outer relations, and conversely. Thus, of organisms, the whole cares for the parts in the same sense that the parts may be said to care for each other. ³

So Hocking argues that his concept of inclusion detracts neither from the possibility of regarding God as personal, nor from the finite existents having a genuine relationship to God and to one another.

Has Hocking here reached the position of regarding the world as God's body? In connection with this question,

¹Ibid., p. 298.

²Ibid., p. 223.

³Ibid., p. 334.

and as a further development of the concept of God as personal, we now turn to Hocking's introduction of some realistic tenets into his idealism. Hocking not only recognizes but insists upon the realistic doctrine of the independence of Nature. "This world, in its constitution," he says, "is not my doing; nor is it the doing of any one else situated as I am, nor of any assemblage of such."¹ Thus far this position coincides with natural realism, but Hocking goes beyond this formulation claiming that in its independence, in its "obstinacy", Nature begins to assume "the unmistakable aspect of Other Mind."² This is the case, Hocking affirms, because Nature is that which sustains us from moment to moment and is in actual fact creative of us. In its obstinacy and independence we find Nature unyielding, and in responding to it we are created by it. Speaking of Nature Hocking states,

Is not that outer activity then essentially . . . creative of me? My dependence upon Nature, my momentary submission to its independent, obstinate, objective decision of what Fact and Truth shall be, both in principle and in detail: --is not this a finding of my own mind? It is here, in this momentary (as well as permanent) creation of my Self that I begin, I say to find Nature taking on the aspect of an Other Mind.³

Hocking carries this argument a step further when he adopts the position that this creative influence of Nature upon

¹Ibid., p. 283.

²Ibid., p. 284.

³Ibid., pp. 286, 287.

men is intentional. He writes of the "Other Mind . . . which is there actively and intentionally creating me."¹ Nature "is found as an intentional communication of a Self wholly active."² In this latter quotation, Hocking leaves the impression that he is drawing a distinction between Nature and the Self who communicates through it. Nature does not seem to be the "Self" but rather the communication of or from the "Self" who is Other Mind. This position is verified when Hocking states that "God . . . is immediately known, and permanently known, as the Other Mind which in creating Nature is also creating me."³ In creating us God is that Self or Other Mind who is wholly active in and through Nature. In this respect God is Subject⁴ and as such may be regarded as personal.

In additional reference to God and his relationship to the world, Hocking relates that God must be understood as supplying the unity of the world, but this unity must be recognized for what it really is, namely a personal world unity.

There is neither merit nor truth in rarefying the thought of God; nor in presenting him to our conceptions in terms of some thinner and weaker sort of world-unity easier to image and believe in than a personal world-unity.⁵

¹Ibid., p. 294.

⁴Ibid., p. 296.

²Ibid., p. 295.

⁵Ibid., p. 334.

³Ibid., p. 297.

Thus Hocking presents God as personal not only in terms of his relationship to men, but also in terms of his relationship to the world as a whole.

We are now able, after this discussion, to return to our question: does Hocking regard the world as God's body? The answer, we believe, must be in the negative. Hocking speaks of God as the Other Mind who communicates through Nature, rather than being Nature, as the Other Mind which, in creating Nature (rather than being Nature) is also creating men. That God is undoubtedly related in some intimate manner with the world we do not deny; we have already recognized that he is the personal world-unity, and also in some manner "includes" the finite existents. That he is related to the world is obvious; that the world is God's body does not necessarily follow. But does our admission that God in some sense includes the finite existents not amount also to a concession that the world is God's body? No, because the "inclusion" of which Hocking speaks is a noetic rather than spatial relationship; God "includes" the finite existents as he reflects upon them. Lest this be insufficient to establish our point, we refer to Hocking's own explicit statement that, in discussing the nature of God, "We are baffled and not foolishly by the absence of a body that we can attribute to God"¹ We must therefore conclude

¹Ibid., p. 332.

that the world is not God's body; we do not thereby deny God's intimate relationship with the temporal process. Indeed, Hocking insists upon it.

At this point two further questions may be raised: (1) Since God is the personal world-unity in intimate relation with Nature, does God himself undergo change as the world does so? And (2) in conjunction with this, may God be regarded as finite? With reference to both questions Hocking is very explicit in his response and answers in the negative in each instance. He writes that while it is true that men have unlimited co-operation with God in world-making, this does not hold true "in ultimate God-making. The religious object offers that identity without which creative freedom itself would lack, for us, all meaning."¹ Men do not help create or change God; God is the abiding identity behind the ever-changing world. This language, of course, coincides with that which describes God as the personal world-unity. Elsewhere Hocking raises the question as to whether a developing God would be sufficient for the world's needs and answers emphatically in the negative.² From what has already been stated, one could justly conclude that the answer to the second question has also been given. God cannot be regarded as finite. However, such an inference,

¹Ibid., p. xvii.

²Ibid., pp. 184 ff.

while true, is not required since Hocking explicitly deals with the matter when he accepts the entire justice of the contention "that the finite God is of no worth."¹ The personality of God must be understood as personality "whose bonds are broken 'in passing through infinity.'"² If we deny this infinity, the rest must be rejected as useless.³ Thus for Hocking God is neither developing nor finite. He is the infinite God who is the permanent identity behind the changing world, the personal world-unity which can be perceived in and through Nature.

We trust that this brief exposition of Hocking's concept of God is such that the similarity to and influence upon Hartshorne can already be seen. However, we wish to conclude this chapter by drawing attention to certain specific points.

First, both Hocking and Hartshorne insist that God must be absolute in some respect. Hocking argues that God, whatever else he is, must also be the Absolute; that is he must be not less than the Absolute and, as shown in this exposition, Hocking adopts the position that God is more than the Absolute. Hartshorne specifically emphasises that God must be more than the Absolute, that is, the Absolute must represent only one aspect of God.

Second, both philosophers agree that God as absolute

¹Ibid., p. 225.

²Ibid., p. 226.

³Ibid.

is God not in relation to the finite existents. Hocking describes God as absolute as "the God who merely is" Hartshorne speaks of God in his absolute aspect as abstract, Being itself, separate and apart from the creatures. In this respect, Hocking speaks of the Absolute's "indifference" and Hartshorne writes of the Absolute's being neutral or non-related.

Third, both men concur in their assessment that the Absolute in God is compatible with everything or any particular thing. For Hocking, the Absolute is compatible with every "relative improvement" and every "relative danger." For Hartshorne, God's absolute, abstract aspect "can be correlated with any possible character you please in its correlate, the world."

Fourth, Hocking and Hartshorne adopt similar positions with reference to our knowledge of the Absolute. Hocking stresses that men can intuitively reach a knowledge of the Absolute and that this consciousness of the Absolute is what makes the difference in the world. Hartshorne agrees. Men do have a knowledge of God as absolute; as absolute, God is the object of our awareness. By being the object of our awareness, God effects transformation in the contingent existents. Hartshorne, however, carries this a step beyond Hocking. Hartshorne argues that it is not merely our knowledge of God which is constitutive of our being, but rather our knowledge that God is aware of us.

Fifth, both philosophers agree that while God must be absolute, he must also be personal. Hocking views God as personal insofar as "he is not apart from what he has created." God is personal as he is with his creatures and, indeed, as he "includes" them through his reflection upon them. God is also personal in that he must be regarded as Subject who, through Nature, communicates with and creates us. The similarity to Hartshorne's position is obvious. Hartshorne argues that relations, including the relation involved in the knowing process, contain their terms. Thus he concludes that as God knows all things so he must include all things; God must be all-inclusive. (We are not arguing that these positions are identical. We have already indicated that Hocking's concept of "inclusion" is not spatial, but noetic). For Hartshorne also, it is God as inclusive of the finite existents who is personal, himself a temporal succession of actual entities. Again, with reference to God as personal subject, Hartshorne writes that God in his abstract essence is "no actual subject" but in his concrete aspect is so.

In all of these points the similarity existing in the philosophies of Hocking and Hartshorne is evident. Of course, not all of these similarities may be the result of Hocking's direct influence upon Hartshorne, but in light of Hartshorne's statements to the effect that Hocking

first introduced him to the concept of God as temporal as well as eternal, we deemed it appropriate in this research to include Hocking's perspective as a viewpoint to which Hartshorne expressed his indebtedness. Thus in Hartshorne we find an original thinker in his own right influenced--for no man is an island unto himself--by both American idealism and British neo-realism, and it may with much justification be argued that Hartshorne's panentheism is in some respects a synthesis of both philosophical perspectives.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In laying the foundation for our study in the concept of God, it was necessary for us to briefly examine the metaphysics of the writers discussed. In this research, certain common elements were identified in the respective metaphysical theories and, on the basis of these common elements, a significant conclusion can be drawn: the history of twentieth century Anglo-American process philosophy is the history of a movement involved in philosophical synthesis, a synthesis of realism and idealism.

As noted earlier, the British neo-realists in rejecting absolute idealism never fully escaped it. They retained some basic tenets of idealism, among which perhaps the most obvious was the retention of "mind" as central to their cosmology. This concept, in which "mind" was attributed to all of reality resulted in panpsychism, a common trait in Alexander, Morgan and Whitehead. Thus the British neo-realists combined their realism with idealism. Of course, we are not suggesting that a complete escape from idealism was even desired by the neo-realists. On the contrary, at least one of them--Whitehead--indicates that his philosophy may be considered as "a transformation

of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis."¹ Thus at least in Whitehead's case this fusion of realism and idealism which resulted in the panpsychistic philosophy of organism was a deliberate philosophical synthesis, and this synthesis was true of the philosophies of all three British neo-realists discussed in this research.

However, we have claimed that this combination of realism and idealism was true not only of the British neo-realists but also of American process philosophy. This conclusion is justified not only by the proven influence of Whitehead upon Hartshorne, but also by the explicit statements of Hartshorne himself. He too stresses the centrality of "mind" in his cosmology when he writes, "Mind in general becomes the theme of which the entire universe is a system of variations."² This statement is made within the context of Hartshorne's argument for panpsychism, a position he held in common with the British neo-realists. But Hartshorne, more explicitly than they, affirms that panpsychism--normally regarded as a concept associated with idealism--can be a wholly "realistic" doctrine.³ This is possible, Hartshorne claims, if panpsychism is the necessary conclusion of realistic epistemological premises.⁴ Hartshorne believes that such is the case and regards his own philosophy as one which com-

¹Process and Reality, p. viii.

²Man's Vision of God, p. 214.

³Reality as Social Process, p. 73.

⁴Ibid.

bines epistemological realism with ontological idealism. To this synthesis Hartshorne attributes the description of "realistic idealism".¹ Thus in Hartshorne also (as representative of American process thought) this philosophical synthesis of realism and idealism can be found. This synthesis, as we stated, is a common point in the philosophers discussed in this research, an identifying trait in Anglo-American process philosophy. We also included in this research a brief review of Hocking's philosophy and his influence upon Hartshorne, and noted there that Hocking also deliberately formulated a viewpoint which was a synthesis of idealism and realism. We therefore suggested that Hartshorne's panentheism may best be understood as a synthesis of American idealism and British neo-realism.

While the process philosophy of panentheism is not by any means a majority viewpoint in the religious world, thanks to the influential writings of Hartshorne it is a perspective which is gaining ground in the United States. The philosopher whose impact was undoubtedly greater than any other on Hartshorne was Alfred North Whitehead. We have argued that while Whitehead was the immediate influence on Hartshorne, Whitehead's philosophy was not radically novel, but was representative of a particular philosophical perspective. This perspective was British

¹Ibid.

neo-realism. Whitehead's influence on Hartshorne, therefore, was the influence of not just one man, but rather of a philosophical viewpoint shared by others, such as Alexander and Morgan. Whitehead's direct influence on Hartshorne consequently resulted in an affinity of thought in two entire philosophical perspectives, namely British neo-realism and American panentheism. It was our purpose in this study in the history of ideas to systematize this relationship of thought in these two philosophical perspectives more fully than had previously been done, and particularly so with reference to the concept of God. Our effort therefore has been to concentrate on the concept of God as expounded in British neo-realism and American panentheism, explicating the general metaphysical background where such was beneficial to the understanding of the theory of God. In accomplishing our purpose, we set forth the metaphysical theories of contemporaries of Whitehead on the British philosophical scene. We traced an affinity of thought in Alexander's theory of correspondence, Morgan's concept of correlation, and Whitehead's dipolar theism. Whitehead's dipolar theism, of course, laid the foundation for Hartshorne's panentheism. Thus we have contended that American panentheism shares a relationship of thought not generally recognized to the British neo-realism of the early twentieth century. In this thesis we have systematically set forth this affinity of thought, thus fulfilling our

purpose.

This similarity of thought is clearly seen in the respective concepts of ultimate reality and of God. It is extremely significant that in the Anglo-American process philosophers discussed in this research, these two concepts--ultimate reality and God--are not to be equated. God is to be understood and defined within the context of either something more "ultimate" than himself--such as Alexander's Space-Time or Whitehead's creativity--or as requiring a necessary co-existent--such as Morgan's basal limiting concept of the physical world or Hartshorne's temporal actual entities necessary for God's actuality. We must therefore conclude that in twentieth century Anglo-American process thought, God must be regarded as finite.¹

In conjunction with this, the concept of God in the process perspective is deficient in that it does not fulfil the principle of sufficient reason. If God is the explanation for the world process, he is not the explanation for the world's existence. Cobb has endeavoured to interpret Whitehead in such a way that Whitehead was at

¹ This conclusion is not nullified by Hocking's view of God as infinite. Hocking is included in this research, not because he was a process philosopher--for no such claim is being made--but because he influenced Hartshorne in the development of the latter's process perspective of panentheism.

least moving in the direction of regarding God as the cause of the being of the actual occasions,¹ and Cobb himself wishes to regard God as playing such a role. However, even here Cobb concedes that he does not claim for God "either eminent reality or necessary existence in contrast to contingent existence."² Cobb, adopting a position seemingly identical to that of Hartshorne, is therefore compelled to regard each divine occasion as receiving its being from its predecessors through an infinite regress.³ In this he sees no problem, but we feel it necessary to question whether an infinite regress of contingent existents is capable of fulfilling the principle of sufficient reason. We believe not. Cobb is to be commended for recognizing this particular lacuna in process philosophy, but given the basic tenets of dipolar theism, it was perhaps inevitable that his own answer would leave the problem unsolved.

While we have been compelled to draw the conclusion that process philosophy has certain deficiencies, particularly with reference to its internal coherence, we nevertheless acknowledge that the process viewpoint contains some very valuable insights. For example, Hart-

¹Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, pp. 212, 213.

²Ibid., p. 212.

³Ibid.

shorne's emphasis upon God's love rather than power is significant. It would seem that the "logic of love" demands that God really cares for man, "feels" for him (though perhaps not in the literal sense Hartshorne intended) and is genuinely related to him. The fact that God loves us and suffers with us is surely confirmed in the crucifixion of Christ. The cross cries out to us that we are loved, cared for, and can be redeemed (although Hartshorne seems to have little concept of redemption).

Further, the process emphasis upon God's being truly related to the world is certainly welcome. In the introduction to this research we argued for the validity of metaphysical studies, but in much of metaphysics the concept of God as related to the world is blurred or perhaps even lost. Such is not the case in process thought. The relationship of God to the world is constantly affirmed. We concur with Hartshorne's rejection of the Greek philosophical view--and its modern counterparts--of a totally unrelated and unmoved mover. God must be portrayed as a living God.

Again, process thinkers have rendered a service in stressing that God's omnipotence must be defined in such a way that man's freedom is preserved. We must recognize that some things are not subject to power, not even infinite power, and that God therefore cannot compel another to freely choose a specific course of action. To define

God's omnipotence in terms which leave men truly free is significant, not least in current discussion concerning the problem of evil. Of course such a meaningful definition of God's omnipotence is not entirely original to process theology. Many who do not adopt the process perspective have for some time argued that not even God can do the "undoable", such as that which is self-contradictory, including God's compelling men to freely choose a specific course of action. Nevertheless, we are grateful to process writers for a needed reminder of a valuable insight.

Also, Hartshorne's panentheism, with all men as constituents of God, causes the American philosopher to stress the importance of social justice, human dignity and worth. Certainly such concepts are vital to a cultured civilization, and yet tragically are still lacking in many parts of the world. Hartshorne rightly reminds us of our responsibilities to our fellow-men, that we are our brother's keeper.

But perhaps as much as anything, the process philosophers and theologians prompt us to be constantly aware that we live our lives in the very presence of God.

However, these insights are not exclusive to process thought, nor are they dependent upon a panentheistic interpretation of the relationship between God and the world. In traditional theism, for example, God's love is directed towards others who are truly other than God,

whom God loves in and for themselves and not merely because they contribute to God as constituents of his being. Further, that God is truly related to man is not denied by traditional theism. On the contrary, it lies at the very heart of the Christian faith that God is the one who has revealed himself to men and is thereby truly related to them.

In addition, scripture speaks clearly on the need for social justice and respect for human dignity. In Malachi 2:10 the writer asks, "Have we not all one father? Hath not one God created us? Why do we deal treacherously every man against his brother . . .?" In Biblical theism, social justice and a sense of human worth are called for, not because we are all constituent elements within the being of God as in panentheism, but because we are all creatures of the same God, children of the same father.

As to living our lives in the presence of God, since Biblical times many men have succeeded in doing so, have walked with God as it were, separate and apart from any acquaintance with process philosophy.

A more traditional theism, then, contains the same valuable insights. We are grateful, however, to Hartshorne and other process thinkers for reminding us of them.

In conclusion, the history of ideas is the history of influence, of action and reaction, suggestion and response. It is the history of questions and answers, of seeking and finding. It is also the history of what men

regard as important, as significant. It is therefore appropriate that this study in the history of ideas has centred upon the concept of God. No more significant topic could be discussed, no more important answer sought. If therefore we have had occasion to take exception to some of the conclusions of the process philosophers, we nonetheless thank them for their recognition of the momentous nature of the discussion whose Subject is the Living God.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alexander, Samuel. Space, Time and Deity. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1920.
- Baker, John Robert. "Omniscience and Divine Synchronization." Process Studies, II (1972), 201-207.
- Christian, William A. An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1977.
- Cobb, John B. Jr. A Christian Natural Theology. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965.
- Craighead, Houston. "Non-Being and Hartshorne's Concept of God." Process Studies, I (1971), 9-23.
- Edwards, Rem B. "The Human Self: An Actual Entity or Society?" Process Studies, V (1975), 195-203.
- Evans, D. Luther. "Two Intellectually Respectable Conceptions of God." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, X, (1950), 576.
- Farley, Edward. The Transcendence of God. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960.
- Hartshorne, Charles. Man's Vision of God. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1964.
- _____. Reality as Social Process. New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1971.
- _____. The Divine Relativity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.
- Hartshorne, Charles & Reese, William L. Philosophers Speak of God. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953.
- Hocking, William Ernest. The Meaning of God in Human Experience. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912.
- Madden, Edward H. and Hare, Peter H. "Evil and Unlimited Power," Review of Metaphysics. XX (1966/67), 278-289.
- Mascall, E. L. He Who Is. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1970.

- Morgan, C. Lloyd. Emergent Evolution. London: Williams and Norgate Ltd., 1927.
- Neville, Robert C. "Neo-Classical Theology and Christianity: A Critical Study of Ogden's 'Reality of God,'" International Philosophical Quarterly, IX (1969), 605-624.
- . "Whitehead on the One and the Many." Southern Journal of Philosophy, VII (Winter, 1969), 387-393.
- Owen, H. P. Concepts of Deity. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1971.
- Pittenger, Norman. God in Process. London: SCM Press Ltd., 1967.
- Runes, Dagobart D. ed. Dictionary of Philosophy. Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1979.
- Rust, Eric C. Evolutionary Philosophies and Contemporary Theology. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969.
- Sahakian, William S. History of Philosophy. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968.
- Temple, William. Nature, Man and God. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1934.
- Thomas, George F. Religious Philosophies of the West. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965.
- Tillich, Paul. Systematic Theology, Vol. I. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.
- Whitehead, Alfred North. Adventures of Ideas. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933.
- . Process and Reality. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929.
- . Religion in the Making. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926.
- . Science and the Modern World. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925.
- Whittemore, Robert C. "The Americanization of Panentheism." Southern Journal of Philosophy, VII (Spring, 1969), 29-35.

Wild, John. "The Divine Existence: An Answer to Mr. Hartshorne." Review of Metaphysics, IV (1950/51), 61-84.

Zweig, Arnulf. "Krause, Karl Christian Friedrich." The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Paul Edwards. Vol. IV. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1967.